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BLOMGREN, REBECCA ANN FRAZIER, Ed.D. Special Education and 
Human Dignity: A Hermeneutic of Hope. (1988) Directed by 
Dr. David E. Purpel. 222 pp. 
In directing attention toward concerns regarding human 
dignity, this paper addresses the revealing and concealing 
nature of paradigms that we unconsciously and consciously 
embrace as we interpret, classify, and make meaningful our 
experiences and relationships. In reflective examination 
and hermeneutic interpretation of my professional and per­
sonal experience within the field of special education, three 
educational visions emerged which have served to organize 
the analysis of human dignity. 
The three-fold typological structure provides a framework 
within which to discuss educational theory and practice and 
to facilitate a conversation of what ought to constitute an 
educational vision that fosters hope for inclusion and 
enhancement of dignity. The technical rationale is the 
positivistically framed model, which stands as the current 
and taken-for-granted paradigm of educational theory and 
practice. This vision prizes objectivity and neutrality and 
is aimed at standardization, prediction, and control. The 
demystifying and empowering thrust of critical theory is 
reflected in the transformative-emancipatory paradigm and 
posits a vision which embraces the quest for justice in face 
of the uncertain. The message of the transcendent-liberatory 
paradigm is elusively illustrated by the prophetic tradition 
which seeks to recognize, in love, the awe and wonder of 
being human while marveling at the mystery of existence 
itself. With criticism and hope this vision addresses 
oppressive and alienating conditions that prevent us from 
being free in a real and spiritual sense. 
As issues of special education, primarily concerns for 
inclusion, and regard for dignity, specifically reciprocity 
and subjectivity in relationship, are filtered through these 
educational models, the liberating and oppressing nature of 
such vision unfolds. The technical rationale, although 
inviting of handicapped participation by means of the pre­
scriptive behavioral objective, ultimately abolishes hope for 
genuine relationship thus denying dignity. Transformative-
emancipation and transcendent-liberation, while offering 
incomplete and at times elusive visions of liberation, present 
a dialectic between love and justice that provides the sub­
stantial platform from which to begin to address and affirm 
dignity. Through this dialectic one courageously embraces 
the hope that the authentic questions of humanity can be 
illuminated. This paper embodies that hope. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I wish to express my gratitude to all of those who have 
extended their personal and professional support to me during 
the course of my doctoral program studies. I am especially 
grateful for the numerous friends, family members, and fellow 
graduate students who have held me in their hearts while at 
the same time have provided me with the intellectual encour­
agement which has sustained me during this journey. 
I am particularly indebted to my doctoral committee 
members whose guidance, criticism, and vision have enabled 
me to embrace the discipline and responsibility necessary 
to seriously engage in this form of inquiry. I wish to 
thank Sarah Robinson, who while honestly sharing her intense 
quest to unveil the mystification of the handicapped popula­
tion has also unfolded the deeper meaning of the student and 
teacher relationship. To Svi Shapiro I extend the most 
sincere appreciation for his enabling me to touch upon the 
significance of the social context. His courses and ques­
tions have allowed me to focus and take a direction which 
has made this paper possible. In addition, his serious 
and heartfelt reflection upon my work has provided me with 
energizing inspiration. I am especially indebted to Fritz 
Mengert, whose philosophical questioning has given me the 
framework and grounding for this study. He has openly shared 
his own intellectual path and in so doing has invited honest 
iii 
conversation and valued participation. Further, his genuine 
concern and friendship have nourished me emotionally and 
intellectually during the course of this program. 
During the entirety of this process, I cannot begin to 
adequately express the depth of my appreciation and gratitude 
for the compassionate care and guidance extended to me by 
David Purpel. His ability to see and hold the whole vision, 
while I faltered and lost perspective, has been a tremendous 
source of comfort. At the same time, his confidence and 
support has required a serious commitment and acceptance 
of responsibility on my part. He has lived and shared with 
me the humanizing and empowering process of teacher as 
prophet and through this unfolding has been the "chance 
giver" whose spiritual and intellectual vision has touched 
me and has inspired my own vision which has, in turn, made 
this dissertation possible. 
Finally, my journey through this process would not 
have been possible without the assistance and encouragement 
of my family. I wish to express sincere appreciation for 
my mother, Una Frazier, who has spent hours typing and copy­
ing course papers, and who has been willingly available to 
care for her three grandchildren while I studied or attended 
class. I am very grateful to my husband, Peter, who had 
encouraged me, for years, to begin this process. Without 
his initial faith and support, this journey may well have 
never been started. I want to recognize with gratitude 
the place that my three young children, Breck, Leigh, and 
Erica, have held in this process. Their energy and the joy 
of their presence have grounded and made authentic this 
quest; for them and for those reasons I am eternally grate­
ful. 
Lastly, a special note of thanks is extended to 
Mrs. Ibby Hunt, who has graciously accepted to type this 
paper. She has provided me with the clerical reassurance 
that has enabled me to meet the detail and time requirements 
that have given closure to this process. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
APPROVAL PAGE ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii 
PREFACE viii 
CHAPTER 
I. THE TECHNICAL RATIONALE AND CRITIQUE. . . 1 
Section I: Ralph Tyler and the Technical 
Rationale 2 
Section II: The Critique: Henry Giroux 
and Paulo Freire 11 
Section III: Alternative Discourses: 
Phenomenology and Hermeneutics 24 
II. SPECIAL EDUCATION 42 
Section I: Special Education and the 
Technical Rationale . . . 42 
Section II: Critique of Special Education 53 
Section III: Hermeneutic Illumination of 
Special Education Teaching Experience . 56 
Section IV: Interviews of Two Former 
Special Education Students 65 
III. THE TRANSFORMATIVE-EMANCIPATORY VISION. . . 88 
Section I: John Dewey and the Reflective 
Thought Process 90 
Section II: Paulo Freire: The Conscien-
tization Process 97 
Section III: Reflective Thought and 
Conscientization Compared 104 
Section IV: Political Literacy and 
Educational Emancipation 109 
Section V: My Transformative-Emancipatory 
Hermeneutic Journey 121 
IV. THE TRANSCENDENT-LIBERATORY VISION 127 
Section I: Martin Buber: "Distance and 
Return, 129 
Section II: Buber: The I Self-
Consciousness of Ego 138 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 
Page 
CHAPTER IV (continued) 
Section III: Buber: The I Consciousness 
of Person 142 
Section IV: Buber: Good and Evil 152 
Section V: The Transcendent-Liberatory 
Educational Vision 166 
V, CONCLUSION 190 
Section I: The Technical Rationale .... 193 
Section II: The Transformative-Emancipatory 
Vision 201 
Section III: The Transcendent-Liberatory 
Vision 206 
Section IV: Beyond the Typology 211 
vii 
PREFACE 
In my quest to illuminate the connections which shape 
and enrich an understanding of human being, I have turned 
toward a discussion of educational paradigms. These models 
form the typological structure which serves as the organiza­
tional mechanism for this paper and which more significantly 
facilitates the exploration of issues regarding human dig­
nity. The concerns for human dignity have emerged as I have 
reflected upon my personal and professional experience sit­
uated within the context of special education. These 
reflections have been further focused and clarified as they 
have been filtered through the lenses of these differing 
educational visions. 
This three-fold typological structure includes the tech­
nical rationale embodying the positivistic notions of control, 
prediction, and standardization which are captured by the 
work of Ralph Tyler and which represents the existing and 
taken-for-granted model of educational theory and practice. 
The demystifying and empowering momentum of critical theory 
is encompassed within the transformative-emancipatory model 
which is nourished by the work of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, 
and Henry Giroux. The transcendent-liberatory vision 
reflects the religious-prophetic impulses of criticism and 
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energizing as well as openness and surrender in fostering 
relationships of inclusion and visions of liberation. Martin 
Buber and Abraham Heschel have provided the metaphors and 
insights that have supported this paradigm. 
This typology provides the structure from which to 
address the current state of educational theory and practice 
as well as to pull into the area of debate alternative dis­
courses. As concerns for human dignity are filtered through 
this three-fold typology, the concealing and revealing nature 
of each perspective is illuminated. In examining that which 
is attended to, avoided, silenced, and dismissed by each 
paradigm, one is aided in considering what ought to be 
included in a vision of just and loving educational practice. 
The purpose of the typological structure, in keeping 
with the intention of this paper, is to offer a framework 
within which to more concretely understand the existing edu­
cational practice—what it is and is not—in order to more 
securely embrace alternative discourses which may more fully 
reflect and encompass the authentic and genuine concerns of 
humanity that ought to shape our educational visions. The 
discussion of human dignity placed within the context of 
special education when filtered through these paradigms 
serves to touch upon the tensions that constitute the para­
doxes which direct one to such discourses and questions. 
The typology is intended to function as a heuristic tool 
that stimulates the dialogue that attends to the complexi 
of human dignity and education. 
x 
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CHAPTER I 
THE TECHNICAL RATIONALE AND CRITIQUE 
Within the typological structure that I have constructed 
in order to further enhance the understanding of my experi­
ences and those of others, I have considered the technical 
rationale as being the model that is reflective of a posi-
tivistic orientation that has aimed educational practice 
toward goals of control, prediction, and conformity. My 
professional special educational experience confirms that the 
values implicit in most current educational practices are 
those that reflect the aims of the technical rationale. I 
consider the work of Ralph Tyler, in the areas of curriculum 
planning and development, as being influential in transmitting 
the message of the technical rationale and in constructing 
the curricular framework within which to implement the goals 
of positivism. Thus, the values of the technical rationale 
will be discussed as they are reflected in the constructs of 
Ralph Tyler's work. 
The values and constructs of the technical rationale 
and positivism will further be analyzed and critiqued by the 
insights offered by Paulo Freire and Henry Giroux. Freire 
and Giroux provide an understanding of educational practice 
that is informed by critical theory and thus provides an 
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alternative discourse for contemplating the theory, practice, 
and purpose of education. 
This chapter will conclude with a discussion of the 
significance of alternative discourses and the ramifications 
these discourses hold for educational theory and practice. 
The phenomenological orientation of the transformative-
emancipatory model will be approached from a discussion of 
Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic of suspicion. The discourse 
offered by the transcendent-liberatory vision will be regarded 
as an o'pen hermeneutic, one that more closely resembles the 
nature of Gadamer's hermeneutic circle. These alternative 
discourses will be presented in an effort not only to cri­
tique positivism but in an attempt to enhance the construc­
tion of alternative educational visions. 
Section I; 
Ralph Tyler and the Technical Rationale 
Ralph W. Tyler's model for instructional planning and 
curriculum development captures the spirit of the technical 
rationale which embodies the principles of industrial and 
learning psychology. The technical rationale is translated 
into educational practice through the production and imple­
mentation of Tyler's key construct, the educational objec­
tive. Essential to the construction of the educational 
objective is the requirement that a thorough analysis of 
needs be conducted. 
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For Tyler, a needs assessment is the foundation for all 
curriculum and instruction planning. He makes this clear in 
his article, "Specific Approaches to Curriculum Development," 
when he writes, "The main point I wish to make is that cur­
riculum development projects must begin with an analysis of 
the needs or problems that have stimulated the decision to 
develop a new or revised curriculum" (Gress & Purpel, 1978, 
p. 243). 
Further, he proposes that a needs analysis be more far-
reaching than an assessment of a failed program outline. He 
writes, 
Related to the analysis of the relevant problems, the 
approach should examine the contemporary educational 
environments, including the home, the peer group, the 
larger community, and the school, in order to identify 
dynamic factors that influence the problem and the con­
straints that must be considered in designing an effec­
tive curriculum. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 243) 
This type of examination enables the curriculum planner and 
creator of objectives to analyze the conditions that can be 
potentially arranged in order to more reliably predict and 
control a desired outcome. 
With regard to what is considered to be a problem or 
how a need is discerned, Tyler turns to his 1949 syllabus 
outline, "Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction": 
The syllabus ... comments on the use of the school's 
educational philosophy as a screen or set of criteria 
for selecting objectives, particularly for distinguish­
ing the more important from the less important ones. 
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The syllabus also points out the way in which knowledge 
of the psychology of learning can be used to estimate 
the probability of attaining a given objective under 
the conditions found in a particular school. It is 
obvious that the effort to develop learning experiences 
for an objective that has small likelihood of being 
attained will be wasted. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 248) 
Thus, the school's educational philosophy prioritizes the 
objectives and defines the needy conditions that warrant the 
formulation of the objectives in the first place. Further, 
if the research or analysis has been thorough enough, all 
of the antecedent and consequent conditions will have been 
identified so as to maximize the chance that a particular 
objective will be attained under the direction and guidance 
of the principles of operant conditioning as discussed in 
applied learning psychology. Tyler neatly and appealingly 
reduces the dilemmas of curriculum planning to the efficient 
identification of needs out of which objectives are identified 
and sequenced in order to effectively eliminate curricular 
and instructional problems. 
Reliable, valid, and measurable evaluation forms the 
mechanism for legitimization of the Tyler Rationale. Logical 
positivism, behavioral psychology, and the field of testing 
and measurement provide the sources for the Tylerian evalua­
tion principles and structures. That which constitutes the 
nature of learning is fundamental for understanding the pur­
pose and design of evaluation. 
Tyler borrows from behavioral psychology his understand­
ing of learning. Therefore he considers learning to be 
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observable changes in behavior which occur over a period of 
time. These behavioral changes are encapsulated within the 
construction of behavioral objectives. Consequently, the 
focus of evaluation is directed at measuring these changes 
and determining the extent to which the educational objec­
tives have been attained. 
In order for evaluation to proceed, not only must the 
educational objectives be stated, but the required individual 
behaviors and the sequenced subject content of the objective 
must be identified. Tyler writes, "Every kind of human behav­
ior that is appraised for its part as an educational objec­
tive must be summarized or measured in some terms" (Giroux, 
Penna, & Pinar, 1981, p. 246). 
Learning becomes a reference to observable and desired 
changes in behavior. Educational intervention takes the form 
of the construction of objectives designed to maneuver an 
individual through a series of required and predetermined 
behavioral changes. All of this activity takes place at an 
observable level. All that we know, learn, understand, think 
and reflect, can and, according to Tyler, should be seen. 
He writes: 
The only way that we can tell whether students have 
acquired given types of behavior is to give them an 
opportunity to show this behavior. This means that we 
must find situations that not only permit the expres­
sion of the behavior but actually encourage or evoke 
this behavior. We are then in a position to observe 
the degree to which the objectives are actually being 
realized. (Giroux et al., 1981, p. 243) 
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The preceding discussion of the key structures of the 
Tylerian model, primarily needs analysis, educational objec­
tives, and evaluation, form the boundaries within which 
instructional intervention can develop. The inclusion and 
consideration of the teacher and student are minimal within 
the Tylerian mod-el but seem to be most present in his con­
sideration of the selection and creation of the appropriate 
learning experiences and the organization of the learning 
experiences to achieve a maximum cumulative effect. 
Tyler considers the selection and creation of learning 
experiences to be a most "artistic enterprise," one that is 
directed by the stated objectives and which also provides the 
condition within which the educational objective is attained. 
In order for an experience to be successful in facilitating 
the acquisition of the objective, it must, according to Tyler, 
provide an opportunity for practice, be designed in such a way 
that the student is capable of enacting the specific behavior, 
and provide reinforcement. 
In order for an experience to fulfill these require­
ments, Tyler feels that it is necessary, at this point, to 
consult the participant. He writes, "In creating learning 
experiences, it is important to use the perspective of the 
different kinds of students for whom they are designed" (Gress 
& Purpel, 1978, p. 249). He continues: 
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It is necessary to keep firmly in mind that human learn­
ers rarely, if ever, want to be "shaped" by others. 
Each one has purposes and interests of his own and uti­
lizes much energy and effort to further his purposes 
and satisfy his interests. If a school activity is 
perceived as interesting and/or useful for his purposes, 
he enters into it energetically whereas if it seems 
irrelevant or boring or painful, he avoids it, or lim­
its his involvement as much as he can. I have found that 
observing and interviewing students when they are 
actively engaged in learning things they think important 
help me to develop initial outlines for experiences that 
will help these students learn things the school seeks 
to teach. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, pp. 249-250) 
Ultimately, Tyler's purpose, in gaining insight into the 
interests and perspectives of the student, is to know better 
how to implement the school's (the authorities') predetermined 
plan and to more reliably control the students' responses to 
the learning experience. It is a process designed as an 
extension of evaluation and needs analysis. Inquiry into a 
student's perspective provides a mechanism through which one 
more variable is reduced, thus insuring greater predictability 
and control. 
When considering the organization of learning experi­
ences, issues of control, predictability and reliability are 
central. Tyler again turns to the importance of addressing 
teachers and students in this connective process when he 
writes, "The principles can generally be selected on the 
ground that they furnish a sequence or an integration that is 
meaningful and effective with the students and teachers who 
are expected to use them" (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 251). 
However, he focuses his appeal upon the curriculum planners 
for development of the organizing elements. He writes: 
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The curriculum makers identify major concepts that are 
useful in explaining and controlling phenomena and that 
are sufficiently complex and pervasive to enable the 
student to gain increasing depth of understanding and 
increasing breadth of application of them as he pro­
gresses from week to week and year to year in the curric­
ulum. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 251) 
Tyler recognizes that perception of meaningful connec­
tives is an individual process and that this process can be 
more predictably controlled if blueprints or guides are set 
forth and legitimated by an external authority, in this case 
the curriculum planner. By centrally positioning curriculum 
makers as the organizers of fundamental conceptual elements 
which structure the principles upon which meaningful connec­
tives are made, Tyler places the power for determining what 
is meaningful and how meaning is constructed in the hands of 
planners rather than in possession of the actual teachers and 
students. 
In order for the educational objective to be attained, 
conformity to the path designed during the organization of 
the learning experience by the planners is crucial. Conse­
quently, for Tyler, the curriculum makers' organizational 
patterns become the standards by which connectives are judged. 
In this way, the sequence of how something is learned and 
the value of the connectives can be controlled. Individuals 
can be directed toward more efficient and conforming learning 
choices. The determination of an over-arching sequence pro­
vides the teachers and students with a frame of reference and 
guarantees greater reliability, accountability, and predict­
ability. 
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When educational intervention and participation are 
viewed through Tyler's guidelines provided for the selection, 
creation, and organization of learning experiences, the 
teaching-learning activities are clearly delineated. The 
function of the teacher in selecting and organizing learning 
experiences becomes one of analyzing the student's interests, 
understanding the curriculum maker's sequential connectives, 
and implementing efficiently the learning experiences. The 
teacher assumes the role of a highly skilled technician who 
organizes and implements vast quantities of predetermined 
information. The student's role is one of compliance in which 
he or she moves, more or less passively, through predeter­
mined experiences in a designated manner. Mastery of the 
educational objective inherent in a particular learning 
experience is determined by the extent to which the student 
copies the outlined sequence and fulfills the imaged blue­
print . 
Tyler offers us a compact and simple guide for action 
in educational curriculum and instruction that matches and 
complements the technical rationale which supports this edu­
cational orientation. It is a model that has had and con­
tinues to have far-reaching impact upon current educational 
thought and practice. As Kleibard astutely comments: 
In one sense, the Tyler rationale is imperishable. In 
some form it will always stand as a model of curriculum 
development for those who conceive of curriculum as a 
complex machine for transforming the exude raw material 
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that children bring with them to school into a finished 
and useful product. By definition, the production model 
of curriculum and instruction begins with a blueprint 
for how the student will turn out once we get through 
with him. (Gress & Purpel, 1978, p. 266) 
Further, in the insights provided by Macdonald and Purpel, 
"The Tyler rationale is essential to understanding today's 
curriculum planning process since it remains the fundamental 
and functional paradigm for the profession" (Macdonald & 
Purpel, 1987, p. 179). 
The production model of curriculum and instruction, as 
envisioned by the technical rationale and articulated by 
Tyler, is one in which prediction and control are essential 
for the standardization of desired outlines. The analysis 
of needs and the continuous assessment.in the form of evalua­
tion form the boundaries within which educational objectives 
emerge and within which the teaching-learning activities 
originate. These Tylerian structures support and perpetuate 
a view of educational practice that values control in the 
form of prediction in order to more accountably and effi­
ciently transform the diversity of children's experiences 
into finished and standardized products. 
The appeal of such a concrete, practical model for cur­
riculum development and instructional planning is difficult 
to deny. In a society which values accountability and effi­
ciency, it is not surprising to find such willing and unexam­
ined acceptance of the Tylerian structures. The simplicity 
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of and the seeming effectiveness of needs analysis, educa­
tional objectives, and evaluation make us oblivious to the 
possibility of the existence of other models, paradigms, or 
visions of what the educational endeavor might be. 
However, it is in the expression of and exploration of 
alternative conceptions of education that the inequities and 
limitations of production model begin to surface. In con­
structing visions of the educative process that do not conceive 
of children as being in possession of crude raw material which 
is in need of being transformed into a useful finished 
product, serious flaws in the positivistically informed Tyler-
ian rationale emerge. In the formulation of other visions 
of educational practice and theory, the taken-for-granted 
assumptions of the Tyler Technical Rationale begin to appear. 
Questions regarding the purpose of the control and the interest 
being served by the predictions of the Tyler rationale begin 
to be asked. 
Section II: 
The Critique: Henry Giroux and Paulo Freire 
Those who adhere to different visions of the purposes of 
education offer insights which enable one to penetrate the 
surface efficiency of the production ethic of the technical 
rationale. Henry Giroux and Paulo Freire discuss visions of 
educational theory and practice that concern themselves with 
humanization, conscientization, and empowerment rather than 
production. Consequently, they hold a radically different 
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understanding of the purposes of education and the functions 
of the school. I have found their writing to be especially 
informative to my grounding of and formulation of insights 
that have been vital to my construction of the questions 
which deal with value, power, and interest. 
As the technical rationale and the Tylerian model are 
filtered through the perspectives of Giroux and Freire, the 
taken-for-granted assumptions can be criticized and examined. 
Tyler's use of the philosophical screen and his correspond­
ing reliance upon objectivity, neutrality, predictability, 
and control serve as focal points for the beginning of such 
investigation and analysis. I will refer to Giroux's use 
of the constructs of ideology, resistance, and the hidden 
curriculum as they function to expose the political interest 
of the Tylerian model's philosophical screen. I will then 
turn to Freire's discussion of the "Banking Notion" of educa­
tion as it provides a metaphor for further revealing the one-
dimensional, manipulative, and alienating nature of educational 
intervention within the framework of the Tylerian and techni­
cal rationales. 
As discussed earlier, Tyler depends upon the school's 
philosophical screen to guide the selection and identifica­
tion of needs or problems out of which the educational objec­
tives are formed. This screen organizes and prioritizes 
school needs and establishes the pattern for school action 
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which usually takes the form of educational objective devel­
opment and evaluation. That which Tyler has taken for granted, 
failed to address, and has left to chance is the philosoph­
ical screen. That which Tyler avoids, overlooks, or approves 
is the power that this philosophical screen wields in contrib­
uting to and maintaining the status quo. Thus Tyler circum­
vents the issue of whose interest is being served as the 
philosophical screen is left to chance and remains unexam­
ined . 
Consequently, this oversight, regarding the non-neutral 
interest of the philosophical screen, enables Tyler to make 
the following bold statement regarding the nature of curric­
ulum development: 
Curriculum development is a practical enterprise^ not 
a theoretical study. It endeavors to design a system 
to achieve an educational end and is not primarily 
attempting to explain an existential phenomenon. The 
system must be designed to operate effectively in a 
society where a number of constraints are present, and 
with human beings who have purposes, preferences, and 
dynamic mechanisms in operation. Hence, an essential 
early step in curriculum development is to examine and 
analyze significant conditions that influence the con­
struction and operation of the curriculum. (Gress & 
Purpel, 1978, p. 240) 
Failing to address the complexity of the philosophical 
screen, world view, or lens through which our realities are 
constructed and experience is made meaningful, Tyler is able 
to conveniently reduce the serious questions of interest and 
power in curriculum development and instructional planning 
to neutral, simplistic, pragmatic issues of economic and 
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efficient doing. It is a practice which denigrates theory 
and a doing which has no clearly grounded direction beyond 
the immediate mastery of task steps as outlined by sequenced 
educational objectives. 
What we have is a planning process that denies by 
omission and intention the essentially spiritual qual­
ity of human existence and the essential "sovereignty 
of the good" where development of environments for 
living and learning are concerned. (Macdonald & Purpel, 
1987, p. 184) 
Further, Giroux discusses the superficiality and blindness 
of such an inadequately informed theory when he writes, 
Dancing on the surface of reality, traditional educa­
tional theory ignores not only the latent principles that 
shape the deep grammar of the existing social order, 
but also those principles underlying the genesis and 
nature of its own logic. (Giroux, 1983, p. 75) 
It is with the intent of exposing and addressing that 
which Tyler and traditional education have taken for granted 
that Giroux puts forth his analytical constructs of ideology, 
hidden curriculum, and resistance. In so doing, the groundwork 
of neutrality, objectivity, efficiency, and conformity, which 
forms the core of the Tylerian model, begins to crumble and 
reveals itself as being composed of the value-laden concepts 
and subtle muting mechanisms. 
Giroux views traditional educational theory and practice 
and the positivism which informs it as being mechanisms which 
perpetuate and maintain the status quo. He regards positivism 
as being the enemy of true reasoning because it fosters a 
separation of fact from value allowing essence and appearance 
to blend into one dimension and it undermines criticism by 
appealing to objectivity. In the guise of neutrality, posi­
tivism supports a rationality that values efficiency, economy, 
correctness, and conformity. Thus, when the analytic con­
structs of hidden curriculum, ideology, and resistance are 
placed over the Tylerian model, Giroux offers us a deeper 
examination of traditional theory and practice. 
With regard to issues of the hidden curriculum, tradi­
tional education 
accepts uncritically the existing relationship between 
schools and the larger society . . . transmission and 
reproduction of dominant values and beliefs via the hidden 
curriculum is both acknowledged and accepted as a posi­
tive function of the schooling process. (Giroux, 1983, 
p. 58) 
The traditional rationality legitimizes the taken-for-granted 
aspects of schooling and views the entire process as a prepa­
ration for life. Using the hidden curriculum as a critical 
mode of inquiry, what emerge from this critique are questions 
that cannot be formulated concerning issues of interest. 
That the hidden curriculum functions, in terms of its ideolog­
ical and political significance, to sustain a class society 
is not mentioned. In placing hidden curriculum critique over 
traditional educational theory and practice, knowledge and 
culture stand waiting to be recognized as the political enti­
ties they are. The need to reclaim the normative and histor­
ical dimenions of culture and knowledge is revealed through 
hidden curriculum critique of traditional education. 
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The construct of ideological critique, when applied to 
traditional educational theory and practice, points to the 
same historical and normative needs as indicated by the hidden 
curriculum critique. Giroux writes of ideological critique: 
Ideology is a crucial construct for understanding how 
meaning is produced, transformed, and consumed by indi­
viduals and social groups. As a tool of critical analy­
sis, it digs beneath the phenomenal form of classroom 
knowledge and social practices and helps to locate the 
structuring principles and ideas that mediate between 
dominant society and the everyday experiences of teach­
ers and students. As a political construct, it makes 
meanings problematic and questions why human beings have 
unequal access to the intellectual and material resources 
that constitute the conditions for the production, con­
sumption and distribution of meaning. . . . Hence ideol­
ogy "speaks" to the notion of power by accentuating the 
complex ways in which relations of meanings are produced 
and fought over. (Giroux, 1983, p. 161) 
Ideological critique examines the transmission of the 
taken-for-granted values, social relationships, knowledge, 
and messages that are present in our classrooms. Giroux 
refers to the process of unmasking relationships historically 
and personally when he discusses ideological critique grounded 
in the unconscious. Revealing the messages located in our 
taken-for-granted categories is referred to when he writes 
of ideological critique grounded in common sense. Ideolog­
ical critique grounded in critical consciousness concerns 
itself with illuminating the normative basis of knowledge. 
When ideological critique is placed over traditional 
education, the value-neutrality of knowledge and the ethical 
ramifications of that neutrality begin to surface. Issues 
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of subordination and dominance begin to emerge where once 
superficial values of integration and harmony stood. The 
coopting power of pluralism is revealed as a mechanism of 
social control and maintenance of the status quo. Ideolog­
ical critique powerfully exposes the inequity of traditional 
education's removal of power from knowledge and separation 
of the political from the cultural. Ideological critique 
of traditional education points to the real bias and non­
existent neutrality of claims of neutrality and objectivity 
as they serve to maintain the status quo. 
In considering resistance as an analytical construct 
to be used in an examination of traditional.education, sev­
eral factors need to be highlighted. First, Giroux wishes 
to make clear "not all oppositional behavior has 'radical 
significance,' nor is all oppositional behavior rooted in 
a reaction to authority and domination" (Giroux, 1983, 
p. 103). Secondly, he points out that all behaviors do not 
automatically "speak for themselves; to call them resistance 
is to turn the concept into a term that has no analytical 
preciseness" (Giroux, 1983, p. 109). However, resistance, 
as an analytical tool, is re-framed and placed into political 
context. Consequently, oppositional behaviors and school 
failure are removed from functional explanations and educa­
tional psychology understandings to the political arena. 
Rather than being viewed as being the result of deviance, 
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individual pathology, and learned helplessness, oppositional 
behavior is viewed as having to do with moral and political 
indignation. Resistance, when viewed from this perspective, 
contains "an expressed hope, an element of transcendence, 
for radical transformation" (Giroux, 1983, p. 108). When 
resistance critique is used to examine traditional education, 
the actual voices of those who have not fit into the produc­
tion, transmission models of traditional education begin to 
be heard. Once again the objective, neutral position of tra­
ditional education begins to be revealed for what it truly 
is, a mechanism of homeostasis that is not at all neutral 
but serves to maintain the status quo. Resistance critique 
of traditional education serves to expose the political dimen­
sion of culture and the power component of knowledge. Resis­
tance critique seems to be the most personal and powerful 
component of critical theory for it calls into focus the 
actual lived experiences of those who have been denied access 
or who have felt anguished by the production, transmission 
pulse of traditional education. It is through these voices 
that we may begin to glimpse an insight into the truly 
alienating conditions of our human existence as manifest through 
the structures of Tylerian intent and traditional education. 
When traditional education is viewed through the lens 
of critical theory by Giroux, the mystifications of objec­
tivity and neutrality are exposed as mechanisms of social 
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control. Needs analysis, educational objectives, and evalua­
tion are revealed as structures that are filtered through 
an "interested" philosophical screen. The invisibility of 
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this screen further addresses the function that these myths 
of objectivity and neutrality have performed in silencing 
criticism and in maintaining the status quo. Thus, in criti­
cally examining Tyler's philosophical screen, the blemishes 
of the technical rationale begin to appear. This objective, 
production model for action begins to reveal itself as being 
a model that perpetuates injustice, through its appeal to 
neutrality in maintianing class, gender, racial, religious, 
and intellectual discrimination and exclusion. Through hid­
den curriculum, ideological and resistance critique, Giroux 
enables one to re-connect knowledge and culture with power 
and the political. Giroux offers us the language of critical 
theory with which to begin to articulate the questions of 
interest that Tyler silences. 
Giroux's examination of the positivism that supports 
the technical rationale and the Tylerian model for curric­
ulum and instruction, addresses the political connection 
between educational theory and practice. Paulo Freire, while 
also concerned with the implications of positivism for educa­
tional theory and practice, focuses attention upon the per­
sonally alienating and manipulative aspects of relationships 
that are defined by Tyler's technical rationale. Freire's 
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examination of traditional education focuses upon the produc­
tion model of curriculum and instruction which he metaphor­
ically addresses as the "Banking Concept" of education. His 
criticism of traditional education unfolds as he positions 
the alienating structure of a "depository" view of education 
beside an empowering vision of educational liberation. 
The banking notion of education is one in which the -
students and teachers are alienated from authentic participa­
tion in the construction of meaningful knowledge. It is what 
Freire describes as a narrative process: 
[The teacher as narrator] leads the students to memorize 
mechanically the narrated content. Worse, yet, it turns 
them into 'containers,' into 'receptacles' to be 'filled' 
by the teacher. The more completely he fills the recep­
tacles, the better a teacher he is. The more meekly 
the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the bet­
ter students they are. (Freire, 1983, p. 58) 
This view of education is that of a narrative monologue in 
which any two-way dialogue is muted, turning teachers and 
students into passive objects. It is an inhibiting, anes­
thetizing, alienating structure that leaves one incapable 
of engaging in Freire's "humanization" process, the process 
of praxis which fosters on emancipatory vision. 
The one-dimensional, narrative nature of traditional, 
Tylerian educational practice is supported by its manipulative 
and alienating form of educational intervention. In Tyler's 
selection and organization of learning experiences, which 
constitutes the primary area in which one can participate 
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and engage in relatoinship, teachers and students are reduced 
to being cogs in a wheel, performing their predetermined 
roles as they support the larger educational mechanism. 
Under the requirements designed by Tyler for selecting 
and organizing learning experiences, students and teachers 
are studied and observed in order to gain insights into their 
interests and the ways in which they organize meaningful con­
nections. The purpose of such research is to more finely 
develop learning experiences that will insure conformity to 
and attainment of the educational objectives as they are 
established by the distanced planners. Consequently, the 
ways in which meaningful connectives can be put together are 
established by the curriculum planners who seem to have 
special access to the "ultimate" organizational principles 
of making meaning and who then develop a bluepirnt for teach­
ers and students to imitate. This model represents for Freire 
a structure of ultimate violence. "Any situation in which some 
men prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is 
one of violence ... to alienate men from their own decision 
making is to change them into objects" (Freire, 1983, p. 73). 
Tylerian educational intervention takes the form of dis­
tancing and manipulation in which teachers and students act 
out their small roles as they mimic the behaviors that are 
designed by others for them to transmit. Both students and 
teachers are removed from any authentic participation in this 
educational or learning endeavor. Learning is neither a con­
struction of meaning nor an ownership of personal connections; 
it is a demonstration and evaluation of properly sequenced 
behaviors. 
Through the lens of Paulo Freire, the Tylerian educa­
tional intervention in the form of implementing and designing 
educational objectives begins to appear as being a process of 
violent oppression in which the individual is alienated, 
muted, and unable to genuinely state or direct his or her 
own participation in and or inquiry into the construction of 
meaning. Freire's powerful criticism of Tyler and traditional 
educational practice illuminates the structures that distort 
relationship and prevent the personal connection to knowledge 
and meaning. 
Giroux provides us with a criticism of the invisible 
theoretical constructs that inform positivism and the Tyler 
rationale. He articulately examines the interest served by 
the Tylerian rationale, namely the maintenance of an unjust 
cultural hierarchy. Freire, too, addresses the political 
aspect of pedagogy but focuses his attention upon the per­
sonally alienating nature of Tylerian educational practice. 
In delving into the student-teacher relationship in the "bank­
ing notion" of education, Freire locates the source of ulti­
mate oppression in the function served by the dominant ideol­
ogy in preventing the individual from making his or her own 
decisions. Freire speaks to the subtle personal violence 
perpetuated by the structure of traditional, Tylerian educa­
tional practices. 
Although Tyler has attempted to collapse the field of 
curriculum and instruction into a practical enterprise aimed 
at economic efficiency, Freire and Giroux have exposed the 
flaws and mystifications of this economy and efficiency. They 
have revealed an absence of questions that examine the what or 
the why of Tyler's pragmatic, progressive "how to do." 
Their criticisms have highlighted Tyler's failure to address 
the value of the boundaries established by the philosophical 
screen and the educational objectives. Through the perspec­
tives offered by the criticisms of Giroux and Freire, the 
one-dimensional, alienating and manipulative nature of the 
technical rationale can be examined. As a result of such an 
examination, one begins to realize the limitations of under­
standings formulated while holding to the vision offered by 
the technical rationale. 
The positivistic nature of the technical rationale and 
the Tylerian structures allow us to know that which is on 
the surface. Research conducted from this perspective is 
limited to that which can be observed, measured, and statis­
tically recorded. Meaning can only be discussed within the 
boundaries of that which is considered to be significant from 
a statistical and quantitative orientation. 
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Section III; 
Alternative Discourses; Phenomenology and Hermeneutics 
In recognizing that the lens through which one views the 
world serves to direct awareness, focus attention, and form 
the boundaries for what can be known, I realize the serious 
necessity for examining the nature of the lens. I also under­
stand the responsibility we hold for reconstructing this lens 
when it prevents us from viewing or dealing with the concerns 
that we consider to be vital. 
My concerns are directed toward a deeper understanding 
of who we are and what we are about. These understandings 
may be more fully reached in recognizing the meaning of human 
interaction propelled by a regard for love and justice. It 
is action grounded in love and justice that I feel affirms 
and illuminates human dignity. My research is focused upon 
the quest to more deeply understand human dignity and to com­
prehend the actions of love and justice which I feel reveal 
this dignity. I am concerned with ways of interpreting mean­
ing and formulating understanding that reach beyond a surface 
observation of human behavior. 
The framework of the technical rationale and the boun­
daries established by a positivistic notion of research do 
not allow for an authentic exploration of human relationships 
in which love and justice are expressed. Statistical equa­
tions and numerical significances are nonsensical in light of 
investigation into the realm of human dignity. Educational 
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practices aimed at efficient, economic production within a 
framework of prediction and control are offensive when con­
sidered from a perspective of love and justice. 
The monologic nature of the technical rationale prevents 
the recognition of the validity and/or the inclusion of non-
statistical understandings that are grasped through the dia­
logic relationships inherent in the phenomenological and the 
hermeneutic quests of the transformative-emancipatory and 
the transcendent-liberatory visions. Since my concerns are 
directed toward the illumination of the acts that may reveal 
our human dignity, I realize the necessity to explore these 
other modes of discourse in an effort to more fully penetrate 
and develop my understanding of the practices and implica­
tions of various orientations and perspectives. 
In so doing, I have constructed a typological structure 
which is representative of three visions of educational prac­
tice as well as of three distinct positions toward explora­
tion and research. The first, the technical rationale, has 
been discussed as being reflective of much current educa­
tional practice. In an examination of the constructs of this 
view, as presented by Ralph Tyler, one recognizes the posi-
tivistic, production orientation of such educational practice. 
Research conducted from this perspective is focused upon that 
which is observable, measurable, and quantifiable. Conse­
quently, concerns that fall beyond such surface behaviors 
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go unrecognized, are dismissed as being irrelevant, or are 
avoided because they cannot be statistically reduced. 
The writings of John Dewey, Henry Giroux, and Paulo 
Freire have enabled me to construct a second model, the 
transformative-emancipatory view. Embodied within this vision 
is an educational practice which embraces the concept of 
emancipation through an empowering action aimed at the reduc­
tion of injustice. Critical consciousness and demystifica-
tion are central to this empowerment process. Contained within 
this educational vision is an orientation toward investigation 
and exploration that adheres to the confirmation of phenom-
enologically revealed insights. 
Abraham Heschel and Martin Buber have been fundamental 
to the development of a third model, the transcendent-
liberatory vision. Their metaphors have contributed to the 
construction of an educational vision that is concerned with 
enhancing genuine relationship within a context of love. 
Surrender and openness are central to the actions of this 
vision. The insights obtained regarding the connections that 
we make to one another and the world are known through an 
examination of the links we make between our understandings 
and our interpretations. Thus, the hermeneutic search for 
deeper connections is implicit within this vision. 
The transformative-emancipatory view and the transcendent-
liberatory vision grapple with the dynamics of relationship 
and with questions of subjectivity and subjects. Consequently, 
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a major thread that links these two visions and thus dif­
ferentiates them from the Tyler perspective is the centrality 
of hermeneutic and phenomenological investigation. In order 
to elaborate upon this orientation, I will rely upon the work 
of Edward Dickenson. 
Edward Dickenson's work, Hermeneutic Experience and 
Intersubjectivity in the Schools; On the Way Toward Meaning, 
has provided me with a framework for classifying my under­
standings of the basic structures of and distinctions between 
phenomenology and hermeneutics. Not only does his work pro­
vide a convenient and logical organization, but his insights 
resonate with my intuitive sense of the importance of address­
ing the phenomenological and hermeneutical perspectives. 
In interpreting and summarizing the viewpoints of Gad-
amer and Habermas, Dickenson suggests that Habermas, Ricoeur, 
and the critical theorists represent a more epistemological 
position, one which Dickenson regards as being reflective 
of a phenomenological orientation. Conversely, Dickenson 
considers Gadamer's hermeneutic position as being one in which 
ontological concerns are reflected. Consequently, the phe­
nomenological and hermeneutical perspectives, while sharing 
some grounds of common agreement, reveal differing approaches 
to and reasons for interpreting experience and arriving at 
understanding. 
For the purpose of structuring a brief discussion of 
the different movements and insights reflected by the 
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phenomenological and hermeneutical perspectives contained 
within a dialogical relationship, I find the phenomenological 
concepts of "distancing" and "bracketing" and the more her-
meneutic orientation of "openness" and "subjectivity" to be 
most meaningful. The phenomenological constructs which offer 
the greatest insight into relationship and dialogue are con­
tained within the framework of Ricoeur's hermeneutic of sus­
picion. The hermeneutic concepts which provide the deepest 
illumination of subjectivity and relationship are found within 
Gadamer's hermeneutic circle. Consequently, I will refer 
to Ricoeur's hermeneutic of suspicion to enhance points of 
phenomenological distinction and to Gadamer1s hermeneutic 
circle to enrich concepts of hermeneutic understanding. 
Central to the concept of hermeneutics is the recogni­
tion of the dialectic movement between the researcher and 
the researched, between the interpreter and the interpreted, 
and between the text and the reader. It is a conceptualiza­
tion of understanding which recognizes and addresses the com­
plexity of and elusive nature of meaning. This complexity 
is discussed by Terry Eagleton as being a "sliding [of] the 
signified beneath the signifier—a constant fading and evapo­
ration of meaning which never yields up its secrets to inter­
pretation" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 168). 
The hermeneutic task is one aimed at interpreting mean­
ing. According to Harvey Cox: 
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Hermeneutics comes from the name of the Greek God Hermes 
(Mercury, in the West), whose main job was to carry mes­
sages among the gods and from the gods to men. Herme­
neutics is the study of messaqes, or more exactly, the 
study of how one interprets the meaning of texts. (Cox, 
1973, p. 46) 
This interpretive process assumes a dialectical relationship 
between and among the various texts being interpreted, includ­
ing the text of the self initiating or participating in the 
interpretation. Thus, it is only within the context of the 
meeting of texts that interpretation, the understanding of 
meaning, can occur. 
Further, according to Gadamer, "The effort of under­
standing is found wherever there is no-immediate understand­
ing, i.e., whenever the possibility of misunderstanding has 
to be reckoned with" (Dickenson, 1981, p. 38). Consequently, 
the recognition that one does not understand, and the ensuing 
quest to understand, are set into motion when imbalance, 
uncertainty, or discomfort is felt. The quest to seek under­
standing begins when one senses that something is incomplete 
and unfulfilled. However, as Eagleton points out, "there 
is no transcendental meaning or object which will ground this 
endless yearning" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 168). Thus, the herme-
neutic search for meaning is an endless, dynamic journey which 
is never put to rest by positivistic proof or certainty. 
The potential for understanding exists in the dynamic 
and dialogical meeting of texts. The hermeneutic task is 
one which is directed at interpreting and understanding the 
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significance and meaning of this encounter. This understand­
ing emerges during and is shaped by the language which marks 
the meeting of texts. Dialogue, conversation delineates the 
points at which understanding may emerge. 
Beyond the central position of dialogue to the concept 
of hermeneutic understanding is, for me, the recognition that 
we enter into this conversation in different ways and for 
varying reasons. When we engage in dialogic relationship 
with suspicion and distance, we will emerge from that encoun­
ter differently from one in which we entered with an open 
surrender. Consequently, in addition to understanding and 
interpreting the message of the meeting of texts, it is 
essential to reflect upon and interpret the meaning of why 
we are engaging in the conversation to, begin with. 
This reflection, for me, is the self-reflective turn 
to which Dickenson refers and which is considered by him as 
being the connecting link between the phenomenological, epis-
temological orientation of Ricoeur, Habermas, and the crit­
ical theorists and the ontological concerns of Gadamer's 
hermeneutic. 
The self-reflective mode for formulating questions 
regarding tradition has been the method of inquiry assumed 
by both critical social theory and philosophical herme-
neutics. This methodological similarity reflects only 
the basic epistemological agreement that has been shared 
by adherents to these different theoretical traditions. 
In general, the disagreements concerning the value and 
purpose of self-reflection mark the boundaries between 
the epistemological critique of ideology (of critical 
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social theory) and the ontological interest in a better 
understanding of the conditions for understanding itself 
(of philosophical hermeneutics). (Dickenson, 1981, 
pp. 50-51) 
Thus, the purpose and value of the self-reflective turn 
form the distinctions between what Ricoeur calls a "hermeneu-
tic of suspicion" and the hermeneutic circle of Gadamer. 
The primary focus of the epistemological task set forth 
by Habermas, Ricoeur, and the critical theorists is one which 
is based upon a theory of distorted communications aimed at 
encouraging a hermeneutic of suspicion. Fundamental to the 
quest of a hermeneutic of suspicion is a phenomenological 
method which is utilized to disclose a false consciousness 
inherent in symbolic structures of expression. 
Ricoeur's approach to a hermeneutic phenomenology 
appears to assume that it is possible and necessary 
to achieve a degree of objectivity from which the phe­
nomenal world held in one's consciousness can be 
analyzed and judged for its symbolic nature. (Dick­
enson, 1981, p. 47) 
Ricoeur's hermeneutic journey is one in which the 
dialectic movement is a dynamic interchange between belief 
and understanding. The dialectical fulfillment of such 
belief is found in a greater conscious knowing. Further, the 
language which mediates the dialectic is viewed with sus­
picion and is regarded as representing distorted communi­
cations. Consequently, it is through a bracketed examination 
of such beliefs, which are expressed by distorted communi­
cations, that one begins to unravel the authentic threads of 
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ideological critique that reveal domination and the possi­
bility of reconstruction and eventual emancipation. 
The self-reflective questions which are brought to 
the conversation, as texts meet, in Ricoeur's hermeneutic 
of suspicion are those designed to further enhance our 
conscious knowing about the relationships of domination 
that comprise our experiences. They are the questions aimed 
at formulating an ideological critique. These questions 
emerge during the self-reflective turn of the hermeneutic 
of suspicion as one extricates one's self from the context 
in an effort to analyze the symbolic nature of our commu­
nications. This is the distancing and bracketing movement 
of the self-reflective turn which attempts to make the 
familiar strange and the strange familiar in an effort to 
revel a false consciousness which permeates the symbolic 
structures of our expression. 
These questions are designed to move one through experi­
ences by enabling one to appropriate and take from that 
experience those understandings that have refined our con­
scious knowing about the relationships of control and domi-
naton. This conscious knowing can then be utilized to recon­
struct the experience and enable one to re-insert him/her 
self into a less oppressive and oppressing context. 
For Ricoeur, the purpose of the self-reflective turn 
in formulating the questions which generate the dialogue 
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within a hermeneutic of suspicion, is one aimed at disclosing 
a false consciousness. The value of such questions rests 
in the degree to which distorted communications are exposed 
as hiding the controlling and dominating nature of many of 
our relationships. The dialectic relationship of a hermeneu­
tic of suspicion is shaped by the conceptually grasping and 
appropriating nature of these questions. The emergent under­
standings are bound by the interests of domination and control 
reflected in the questions. The purpose of the dialectic 
relationship is directed at discussing oppressive authority, 
exposing a false consciousness and encouraging infinite sus­
picion in the hope that reconstruction and emancipation will 
be envisioned. The purpose determines the limits of the 
relationship as well as the boundaries for the emergent under­
standings . 
The hermeneutic journey of Gadamer is one in which the 
dialectic movement is between experience and understanding 
and one in which the dialectic fulfillment of experience is 
a further openness to experience rather than a conscious 
knowing. Language is viewed as being non-suspect and is 
regarded as reflecting experience which then provides a deeper 
understanding of human beingness. "The hermeneutic tradition 
of Gadamer suggests that understanding is the particular out­
come of relatedness" (Dickenson, 1981, p. 24). Further, for 
Gadamer, "understanding is the emergence of truth which is 
34 
conditioned by and conditions the relationship of intersub-
jectivity" (Dickenson, 1981, pp. 21-22). Thus, understanding 
is the outcome of the experience of intersubjectivity and 
these understandings are then conditioned by and condition 
those experiences of relationship. 
With the dialectic fulfillment of experience being a 
further anticipation for and openness to experience, the her-
meneutic task becomes one of finding ways to sustain that 
experience. As Palmer (1969) reflects, 
The encounter is not a conceptual grasping of something 
but an event in which the world opens itself up . . . 
as each interpreter stands in a new horizon, the event 
that comes to language in the hermeneutical experience 
is something new that emerges, something that did not 
exist before. (Dickenson, 1981, pp. 11-12) 
Thus, the hermeneutic task becomes one not of analyzing the 
relationships of authority within an experience, but one of 
finding ways in which the experience of relationship can be 
sustained in order to understand how intersubjectivity 
reveals meaning (understanding which may or may not disclose 
oppressive relationships in need of reconstruction). 
Dickenson suggests that 
The method of questioning in the dialectical experi­
ence, of finding the right questions through an openness 
to emerging dialogue, and the existential "preunderstand-
ing" of our intersubjective condition are components 
of Gadamer's (hermeneutic) theory which are especially 
significant. (Dickenson, 1981, p. 47) 
Thus, the self-reflective turn, in which one formulates the 
questions which propel the dialogue aimed at a continuation 
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of the relationship in which understandings emerge, is a turn 
in which one seeks to place him/her self into the context 
of his/her prejudices and preunderstandings rather than to 
bracket and shut out these conditions. In so doing, one can 
discover the preunderstandings that form and are then reformed 
by the experience of relationship. The questions which surface 
during the self-reflective turn of Gadamer's hermeneutic 
circle are those which originate from an affirmation of the 
context of our preunderstandings and ones which are further 
designed to invite an openness to new understandings. 
According to Dickenson: 
The method of Gadamer's (1975, 1976) hermeneutics can 
best be referred to as the "hermeneutical circle" which 
is an acknowledgement of the researcher's or interpre­
ter's need to recognize the inevitability of approaching 
material with certain prejudices (preconceptions), or 
anticipations, originating in his/her own historicity, 
and yet retain a certain openness to the object of study 
(i.e., a recpetiveness to the "otherness" of the material, 
allowing it to speak for itself, creating a balance between 
prejudice and openness). (Dickenson, 1981, p. 56) 
Such a delicate balance between prejudice and openness 
has led Palmer (1969) to regard Gadamer's dialectical her­
meneutic as being a means to understanding that is "not manip­
ulation and control but participation and openness, not know­
ledge but experience" (Dickenson, 1981, p. 74). The self-
reflective turn of Gadamer's hermeneutic circle is designed 
to enable one to engage in dialogue articulating questions 
which reflect the sensitive balance between our preunderstand-
ing and an openness to new understandings. These questions 
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are aimed at perpetuating experience, in which understandings 
emerge, as we participate in the dialogic relationship. 
The purpose and value of the self-reflective turn mark 
the points of distinction between the phenomenological, epis-
temological orientation of Ricoeur, Habermas, and the criti­
cal theorists and the ontological interests of Gadamer. The 
self-reflective turn of Ricoeur and Habermas is one in which 
questions are formulated as one distances and removes him/her 
self from the context. This is done in an effort to analyze 
the symbolic nature of expression which further serves to 
construct a theory of distorted communications in which false 
consciousness can be examined. Understandings, which emerge 
from the relationship of the meeting of texts set within the 
framework of phenomenologically generated questions, are those 
which can contribute to the construction of an ideological 
critique within which relationships of domination and control 
are exposed. The purpose of such questioning is to enable 
us to solve the oppressing conditions which are hidden by 
a false consciousness. 
Gadamer1s self-reflective turn of constructing the ques­
tions with which to engage in the hermeneutic dialogue are 
formulated as one attempts to situate him/her self within the 
context of his/her prejudices and preunderstandings. This 
results in a confirmation of one's preunderstandings rather 
than a ridding of one's preconceptions and prejudgments. 
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The questioning process enables one to recognize rather than 
to solve. The purpose of such a self-reflective turn is to 
expose preunderstandings in an effort to generate questions 
which sustain the experience of relationship. The reciprocal 
nature of the giving and receiving quality of the dialogue 
within the experience of relationship guided by such ques­
tions is a non-manipulative, non-predictable exchange which 
may culminate in new and unintended understandings (Dicken­
son, 1981, p. 74). The emergent understandings are bound 
by one's ability to remain open to and inviting of the dia­
logue. The purpose of the relationship is to generate the 
conversation, within which the experience of relationship 
is cradled, in order to come to a deeper understanding of 
the conditions for understanding itself. 
Thus, the process of the self-reflective turn of the 
hermeneutic of suspicion is an act of distancing in order 
to bracket and demystify oppressive and alienating conditions. 
The purpose of this process is to encourage and empower one 
to formulate the questions which contribute to an ongoing 
ideological critique. The value of this process is deter­
mined by the degree to which the phenomenological distancing 
of the self-reflective turn enables meeting texts to partici­
pate in a dialogue about experience and in so doing enrich 
each other's understanding of the injustices existing in that 
experience. 
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On the other hand, the process of the self-reflective 
turn of Gadamer1s hermeneutic circle is an act of relating 
and coming into union with the context of one's preunderstand-
ings. The purpose of this self-reflection is to allow one 
to illuminate and articulate the questions which connect our 
preunderstandings with our present understanding in a hope 
of embracing new and unanticipated understandings. The value 
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of this connective, hermeneutic process is the degree to which 
the questions expressed during the self-reflective turn 
invite an openness to continued and sustained experience of 
the relationship. The degree to which this openness can be 
sustained contributes to the possibility of and potentiality 
for the emergence of understanding about understanding itself. 
The phenomenologically distanced self-reflective turn 
of the hermeneutic of suspicion and the connective turn of 
the hermeneutic circle formulate a platform upon which to 
stand in order to interpret the meaning of and the purpose 
for the meeting of life's texts. In order to interpret the 
meaning of texts, one must come into relationship with those 
texts and how one enters into that relationship shapes the 
nature of the experience which in turn structures the pos­
sible understanding. One can enter into relationship, appro­
priating and utilizing the experience in order to grasp mean­
ing and refine consciousness. Or, one can enter into rela­
tionship openly and receptively in order to further understand 
and to experience intersubjectivity. 
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In either case, the more pressing concern which forms 
the underpinning for questions formulated from a "distanced" 
or "related" self-reflective turn is that of why seek the 
relationship to begin with. 
Another way in which one discourse is distinguished 
from another which is neither ontological or methodolog­
ical but strategic . . . not what the object is or how 
we should approach it, but why we should want to engage 
with it in the first place. (Eagleton, 1983, p. 210) 
In contemplating why we would want to engage in the rela­
tionship with various texts in the first place, I return to 
my initial concerns for illuminating a fuller understanding 
of who we are and what we are about. These concerns, I feel, 
can only be reflected upon within the relationship of the 
meeting of texts. Consequently, it is only within the frame­
work of relationship that we can begin to understnad the mean­
ing of human dignity, a meaning that slips and flickers as 
texts meet, a meaning which is never fully revealed, but never­
theless a meaning toward which we are or ought to be contin­
ually striving in order to better understand this human 
experiment in which we are all linked. 
However, I feel that this meeting of texts within which 
understanding emerges, reflecting the meaning of who we are 
and what we are about, is severely impaired by the monologic, 
one-dimensional structure of the technical rationale, tradi­
tional education and positivism. Consequently, it is from 
this perspective that I have attempted to discuss the limiting 
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nature of the technical rationale while at the same time 
suggesting a shift and restructuring of the lens. As Dicken­
son points out, a reexamination of the ways we interpret our 
experiences takes place in the face of a limitation to our 
understanding. He writes, "One calls forth reflection upon 
the theory of interpretation-and the problem of understanding 
when some impediment to understanding draws attention to the 
understanding process" (Dickenson, 1981, p. 87). 
In light of the discussion regarding the technical 
rationale, as reflected in the Tylerian model, and the crit­
icisms offered by Giroux and Freire, the possibilities for 
authentic encounter and genuine dialogue are severely limited 
within that model. Therefore, that model and its vision pose 
serious barriers to the emergence of understanding that is 
aimed at illuminating human dignity. As has been discussed, 
the purpose for engaging in relationship within this model is 
to control the object of research or investigation in order 
to more predictably guarantee a conforming and satisfactory 
product. The entire purpose and structure of the technical 
rationale calls attention to an impediment to understanding 
that interferes with our capacity to engage in relationships 
in which meaning concerning who we are and what we are about 
is understood. 
The necessity for the dialogic meeting of texts is 
addressed in both the phenomenological orientation of the 
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transformative-emancipatory vision and the contextual, herme-
neutic position of the transcendent-liberatory vision. The 
differing ways in which each prepares to meet this encounter 
have been discussed as being either grasping and appropriat­
ing or surrendering and open, but each holds to a vision of 
the purpose for this encounter that attempts to further reveal 
who we are and what we are about. The movement of each vision 
to engage in relationship serves the purpose of further 
illuminating human dignity through acts of justice directed 
at the reduction of oppression or through acts of love aimed 
at sustaining relationship. Each offers a view of educational 
practice which attempts to address and remove impediments to 
the understanding of the meaning of human dignity that the 
technical rationale posits. 
CHAPTER II 
SPECIAL EDUCATION 
In an effort to make more personal and meaningful the 
impact of these impediments to understanding that the tech­
nical rationale burdens us with, I will discuss my experience 
as a special education resource teacher within the context of 
interpreting interviews of two former special education stu­
dents. I will situate these interviews within the context of 
a more general discussion of the field of special educational 
legislation, theory, and practice. In so doing I hope to 
reveal the power and appeal that the Tylerian model holds for 
the educators, students, and parents affiliated with special 
education, while at the same time exposing the limitations 
that this view poses when it is used as our greater vision 
of what learning and education ought to be about. 
Section I; 
Special Education and the Technical Rationale 
In attempting to capture the essence of the hopes, 
dreams, and practices of special education, one can turn to 
the Education of All Handicapped Children Act: P.L. 94-142, 
which was enacted by Congress in November 1975. Briefly, 
P.L. 94-142 addresses the conditions and problems of a fre­
quently excluded minority in our society, the handicapped 
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individual. Special education becomes the official meeting 
point for the educational institution and the handicapped 
individual in society. P.L. 94-142 has attempted to establish 
just and equitable practices for including the handicapped in 
our educational endeavors. 
It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all handi­
capped children have available to them ... a free 
appropriate public education which emphasizes special 
education, and related services designed to meet their 
unique needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped 
children and their parents or guardians are protected, 
to assist States and localities to provide for the edu­
cation of all handicapped children, and to assess and 
assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handi­
capped children. [Sec. 601(c)] (Turnbull, Strickland, 
& Brantley, 1978, p. 3) 
This is indeed a noble piece of legislation and speaks 
to the highest aspirations of those involved in the field of 
special education. At the heart of the implementation of this 
legislation's provision of a free and appropriate public edu­
cation for all handicapped students is the IEP (Individualized 
Education Program). The IEP is the document which contains 
the guidelines for establishing the criteria for an "appro­
priate" program. Within the IEP framework, evaluation and 
educational objectives form the cornerstones upon which 
"appropriateness" is determined. Each IEP must include the 
following: 
1. A documentation of the student current level of 
educational performance 
2. Annual goals or the attainments expected by the 
end of the school year 
3. Short-term objectives, stated in instructional terms, 
which are the intermediate steps leading to mastery 
of annual goals 
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4. Documentation of the particular special education 
and related services which will be provided to the 
child 
5. An indication of the extent of time a child will 
participate in the regular education program 
6. Projected dates for initiating service and the 
anticipated duration of services 
7. Evaluaton procedures and schedules for determining 
mastery of short-term objectives at least on an 
annual basis. (Turnbull et al., 1978, p. 5) 
Further insight into the value and function of the IEP 
is provided by Turnbull et al. when they write: 
The purpose of the IEP is to insure that handicapped 
students are provided with an appropriate education. 
Although the IEP is a legal mandate, mere compliance 
with the law should not be viewed as the primary reason 
for developing and implementing IEPs. The IEP has 
strong educational value, since it could serve as a 
catalyst to improve educational practice in a variety 
of ways. Some of the potential positive outcomes of 
IEP development and implementation include these: 
sequential curriculum development; coordination of pro­
gramming; increased attention to the individual needs of 
students; specification of needed services; systematic 
evaluation; increased professional accountability. 
(Turnbull et al., 1978, p. 12) 
In reading the above statements regarding the structure 
and purpose of the IEP, it becomes apparent that the practical 
application and implementation of P.L. 94-142 is informed by 
Tyler's production model of curriculum and instruction which 
reflects the positivistic vision of the technical rationale. 
Indeed, if Tyler represents the mainstream in curricular and 
instructional thought, it appears that Special Education, 
as framed by P.L. 94-142, is more mainstream than regular 
mainstream education. 
With the IEP documentation of educational appropriate­
ness, Special Education leads the way in concretizing the 
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essence of what education and learning are all about. 
The language of P.L. 94-142 as represented in the IEP 
closely parallels that of Tyler: needs analysis, select­
ing and defining objectives, selecting and creating appro­
priate learning experiences; organizing learning experiences 
to achieve a maximum cumulative effect; and evaluating the 
curriculum to furnish a continuous basis for necessary revi­
sions. The language of special education has encompassed 
the Tylerian intent and the practice of special educational 
instruction has made the technical rationale manifest. 
The framework provided by P.L. 94-142 not only shapes 
our conceptualization of the field of special education 
theory and practice in general but also guides our orienta­
tion toward teacher instruction in particular. Further, 
in understanding that the technical rationale and the Tyler­
ian production model of curriculum and instruction form 
the grounding for1P.L. 94-142, one begins to realize that 
the same vision also informs the practice of teacher 
instruction in special education. Consequently, the orien­
tation of most special education teacher instructional pro­
grams revolves around the Tylerian structures of assessment, 
educational objectives, and continuous evaluation. 
The educational programs for teachers of exceptional 
children are overly represented by courses in diagnostic 
testing and prescriptive teaching in which needs analysis 
46 
and educational objectives form a major concentration. 
Future techers are given lengthy lessons in "how to." How 
to write long- and short-term objectives, how to develop 
a task analysis, and how to set up reinforcement and contin­
gency progras. The Turnbull text on Developing and Imple­
menting IEP's catches, our professional attention with a 
gold seal on the cover, within which is written: "A com­
plete 'how to1 guide to IEP's—plus sample referral forms, 
notices to parents, checklists of curriculum objectives 
and much more." 
A central focus of learning disability courses has 
been a concentration on the Clinical Teaching Cycle in which 
a model of Assessment (diagnosis), Planning of the Teach­
ing Task, Implementation of the Teaching Plan, Evaluation 
of Student performance, and Modification of the Assessment 
has been presented as the guide and blueprint for future 
teachers to follow in organizing their own instruction 
(Lerner, 1985, p. 102) . Diagnostic Teaching Flowcharts 
and Scope and Sequence Charts are set forth to guide the 
special educator on the path of planning and evaluation. 
In Educational Assessment of Learning Problems: Testing 
for Teaching, Wallace and Larsen clearly identify the assess­
ment process: 
A complete educational assessment plan should be com­
prised ideally of four steps: (1) identification 
procedures, (2) evaluation techniques, (3) development 
of an educational plan, and (4) implementation of teach­
ing strategies. (Wallace & Larsen, 1978, p. 15) 
47 
The clinical teaching cycle and the educational assessment 
plan provide the special educator with the maps needed in 
order to proceed. 
The technical rationale as made manifest by the Tyler-
ian model of curriculum and instruction has informed the 
principles upon which P.L. 94-142 is based, and has also 
contributed to the formulation of a framework from which to 
define the specific characteristics of those who are to 
be considered for inclusion within the handicapped popula­
tion. P.L. 94-142 provides specific descriptions of who 
might be considered as being learning disabled, mentally 
handicapped, emotionally disturbed, etc. Further, specific 
equations, adaptive behavior checklists, and observation 
guides are provided by P.L. 94-142 in order to facilitate 
the accurate classification and placement of a specific indi­
vidual. Needs analysis, educational objectives, and contin­
uous evaluation are intrinsic to the process of determining 
who this handicapped population is. 
Tyler provides insight as to why this particular model 
has become so dear to special education when he writes: 
Similarly, an analysis of this problem of individuali­
zation of learning reveals certain categories of chil­
dren who devise their own individual sequence of learn­
ing and proceed at their own rate while others require 
a curriculum specifically designed to enable them to 
learn and progress sequentially. It.is an inefficient 
use of resource design of an individualized curriculum 
for those who develop one for themselves. (Gress & 
Purpel, 1978, p. 242) 
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Special education is composed of those "others" who are 
perceived by teachers and planners as being incapable of 
learning efficiently or effectively. The definition of a 
learning disabled individual as formulated by the National 
Advisory Committee on the Handicapped by the U.S. Office of 
Education and set forth in P.L. 94-142 is: 
Children with specific learning disabilities means 
those children who have a disorder in one or more of 
the basic psychological processes involved in under­
standing or in using language spoken or written, which 
may manifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen, 
think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical 
equations. The term includes such conditions as per­
ceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dys­
function, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. The 
term does not include children who have learning prob­
lems which are primarily the result of visual, hearing 
or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, of emotional 
disturbance or environmental, cultural or economic 
disadvantage. (Lerner, 1985, p. 7) 
The operational aspect of this definition continues as 
follows: 
A student has a specific learning disability if (1) the 
student does not achieve at the proper age and ability 
levels in one or more of several specific areas when 
provided with appropriate learning experiences, and 
(2) the student has a severe discrepancy between achieve­
ment and intellectual ability. (Lerner, 1985, p. 7) 
These varying perspectives on the nature of learning dis­
abilities lend themselves to constructing a picture of indi­
viduals who seem to be most ineffectual in initiating their 
own learning strategies and sequences. It becomes increas­
ingly apparent that these individuals fulfill the requirement 
of the "other" as formulated by Tyler. The educationally 
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handicapped population seems to be composed of just those 
students for whom a sequentially designed curriculum is 
intended. They are the ones who do not appear to perform 
in a logical way and whose unpredictable behavior and erratic 
performance has interrupted the efficiency of the educational 
plan. 
Consequently, at least initially they seem to be the 
ones for whom the Tylerian model makes the most sense. As 
Clarizio and McCoy remind us, "It must be remembered that 
behavioral approaches are used with people whose behavior 
is problematic or ineffective in some way" (Clarizio & 
McCoy, 1983, p. 450). Tyler offers us a needs analysis to 
reveal the problem, and the solution in the form of educa­
tional objectives and evaluation. The handicapped popula­
tion poses a very real problem to educational practice in 
terms of efficient and effective production, and the Tylerian 
model offers us a logical resolution. 
This is an exceedingly powerful and appealing model 
for curriculum and instruction which seems to have informed 
much educational practice in general and special education 
in particular. Tyler's constructs are logical, concrete, 
and clear. In adhering to this production model of curricu­
lum and instruction one is offered a great deal of security 
and certainty. The ways of taking action are stated and 
the educational objectives serve as guides for student 
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identification and placement as well as teacher instruction 
and planning. This is a practical model for action which 
leaves very little space for doubt. Most educational debate 
within this model revolves around the questions of which 
is the better starting point and whether or not the sequence 
of objectives is correct. 
The encounter or relationship within the technical 
rationale, as reflected in the Tylerian model, is mediated 
by the behavioral objective. The behavioral objective serves 
as the prescription which guides and controls the outcome 
of the interaction. The purpose of relationship within 
this model is to increase the probability of producing a 
useful product. The likelihood that such a product will 
be realized depends upon conformity to the prescription. 
The control and conformity provided by adherence to 
the educational, behavioral objective become the focus of 
understanding. The meanings that are revealed in relation­
ships mediated by behavioral objectives are uncritical 
understandings which reflect the authority of control and 
prediction but are oblivious to the boundaries set by such 
authority. 
The pervasive degree to which the necessity for control 
and prediction has become accepted by and acceptable to 
this vision is further reflected by central position of 
prescription in formulating a vision of liberation: 
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Instead of reducing an individual's ability to make 
choices and to freely select goals, behavioral tech­
niques (prescriptions) seek to enhance the person's 
control over the environment and his own behavior. 
It must be remembered that behavioral approaches are 
used with people whose behavior is problematic or inef­
fective in some way. In reality, their problems limit 
their freedom of choice . . . many behaviorists are 
now interested in fostering self-management, so that 
the person can be more in charge of his own life and 
increasingly free from external control. (Clarizio 
& McCoy, 1983, p. 450) 
There is no dialogue within this vision of liberation, 
only monologue and conformity to the prescription. The 
opportunity for authentic participation is truncated and 
reduced to re-action in which one's behaviors and actions 
are responses to an externally generated educational objec­
tive. Success is determined by the degree to which one 
is capable of complying to such prescription. 
Frequently it is the handicapped individual who is 
most malleable and compliant and is the least capable of 
articulating the questions which might place him or her 
into an authentic dialogue of genuine relationship. There­
fore he/she remains most vulnerable to a relationship medi­
ated by a prescription and for whom the educational pre­
scription, in the form of an objective, seems to make most 
sense. Further, in the absence of behavioral objectives, 
the handicapped individual has been the one most frequently 
excluded from participation in our schools and society in 
general. Ironically the prescription of the technical 
rationale has become the invitation to participate for the 
majority of handicapped individuals. 
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The paradox becomes one of recognizing that the control 
provided by the educational prescription has given many 
educators the courage to reach out to a previously excluded 
section of humanity. This tension is further increased 
in observing the joy of another human being as he feeds 
himself for the first time, or orders a hamburger at McDon­
ald's. It is the realization that without the prescription, 
this inclusion may have been denied. It is such a recogni­
tion that enhances our ability to understand the temptation 
to construct a vision of liberation based upon the self-
management offered by adherence to the prescription. 
However, the pain of this paradox is intensified as 
one further understands the manipulative and alienating 
nature of the prescription and realizes that the invita­
tion and the participation are somehow perverse. In recog­
nizing that the prescriptive vision of liberation is one 
in which there is no dialogue, but rather only monologue, 
one begins to understand that the relationship which is 
mediated by the prescription allows for neither genuine 
participation nor authentically constructed meanings. There 
is no meeting of texts, seeking understanding? consequently, 
there is no dialogic interchange as the individual is con­
fronted by the prescription. There is no dynamic give-and-
take between the interpreter and the interpreted. In the 
prescriptive vision of liberaton offered by the technical 
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rationale there is no reformation of or re-interpretation 
of the behavioral objective. The prescription is unchang­
ing, concrete, and unquestionable. The consequence of such 
authority is a control which prevents the opportunity to 
engage in or even contemplate dialogue and which further 
assures adherence to the prescription. 
The prescriptive vision of liberation is a closed 
system, one in which the educational objective forms the 
monologue and the control. There is only reaction to the 
prescription and no authentic interaction with it. The 
outcome of such a relationship is determined before the 
texts meet and there is no opportunity for dynamic reforma­
tion of the prescription as the individual re-acts to the 
objective. This vision offers a liberation in which to 
be well, whole, and healed means to be conforming, passive, 
and voiceless. 
Section II: 
Critique of Special Education 
Although critics such as Giroux and Freire provide 
very helpful insight into the alienating and violent nature 
of positivism as the technical rationale meets with general 
educational practice, there is little such criticism among 
those who write in the field of special education. A help­
ful exception is found in Edward Milner's dissertation, 
Myths, Morals and Models; Implications for Special 
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Education. He deals with special education but does so 
by insisting on the importance of analyzing the field from 
a broader perspective of a discussion of world views. 
Milner proposes a typology which resonates closely 
with the one which has enhanced my own interpretation and 
understanding of educational theory and practice. The tech­
nical rationale, the transformative-emancipatory, the 
transcendent-liberatory framework parallels the Modern, 
Greek, Judeo-Christian typology discussed by Milner. 
Briefly, Milner establishes a typology with which to 
reflect upon the meaning, and specifically the moral impli­
cations, of educational practice. He sets forth a framework 
borrowed from literary criticism and theology from which 
he constructs three models for interpreting special educa­
tional theory and practice. Milner's Modern Model most 
closely parallels the content of that which I have referred 
to as the technical rationale. Milner observes, and I con­
firm his insight, that it is the Modern Model that most accu­
rately represents the current state of special educational 
practice, but he discusses the other two models with ref­
erence to what they might offer as alternative visions for 
understanding the implications of educational practice. 
Specifically, the Greek view fosters the image of a prac­
tice that causes one to turn inwardly in self-examination 
and self-reflection for moral direction. It is a humanistic 
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but isolated quest for truth and meaning that evokes a fear 
and a pity that accompanies self-understanding in a tragic 
world. The Judeo-Christian vision offers a transcendent 
or liberating image for Milner, one in which there is a 
practice that embraces the dialectic between criticism and 
hope, compassion and judgment. Redemption and relatedness 
are key to Milner's Judeo-Christian model. However, for 
the purpose of this discussion, I will focus upon the Modern 
Model. 
Milner's modern vision closely parallels that of 
Tyler's technical rationale and is informed by the same 
positivism: 
The Modern curriculum . . . will use one-dimensional, 
positivistic, or behavioristic thought. This will 
reveal a character whose moral qualities are heteron-
omous (externally directed and generated). This in 
turn will yield a plot that is pathetic. Action will 
be a literal imitation of the teacher. . . . All hope 
for meaning beyond appearance is banished, and despair 
and pathos are firmly ensconced. (Milner, 1976, p. 44) 
Milner concludes his discussion of the Modern model in 
writing: 
The modern curriculum is clear and practical. It works. 
It avoids debates about reality and metaphysical ques­
tions. Since the morality of the status quo is legit­
imated, there are no problems of ethics either. Most 
importantly, the feelings of meaninglessness, pathos 
and despair that this curriculum engenders is glossed 
over by the rhetoric of success. (Miler, 1976, p. 51) 
Milner regards the Modern Model as one which being 
informed by behavioristic, positivistic thought, contributes 
to the development of individuals who are externally 
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directed and consequently whose action will ultimately be 
pathetic, thus in whom feelings of despair and pathos will 
emerge. This modern model confirms Freire's insights 
regarding the oppression and alienation of those who are 
prevented from making their own decisions as a result of 
positivistic frameworks. Further, Milner touches upon the 
political impact of positivistic thought, and the concerns 
which Giroux addresses as he discusses positivism's avoid­
ance of ontological and axiological debate. Milner provides 
one more lens through which to view traditional educational 
practice and with which to establish a platform for criti­
cism of our taken-for-granted activity. 
In Milner's clear discussion of the Modern Model's 
reliance upon positivism, it becomes increasingly clear 
that positivism itself is the source of meaningless action. 
Further, such meaningless activity perpetuates the despair 
and sadness of the modern man. Milner's insights into posi­
tivism's blithe dismissal of this despair through its 
"rhetoric of success" further coincides with my professional 
teaching experience. 
Section III: 
Hermeneutic Illumination of Special Education 
Teaching Experience 
I feel that most of us who enter the field of educa­
tion do so with varying degrees of awareness of an under­
lying impulse for care and of concern for humanity. Those 
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of us in Special Education seem to be at least initially 
very sensitive to and aware of our helping impulse. How­
ever, ironically, special educators frequently find them­
selves knowingly or obliviously performing the most inhu­
mane deeds, ranging from obvious acts of violence as mani­
fest in severe behavior modification programs to the more 
subtle abuses of person as witnessed in the detrimental 
effects of labeling. Consequently, the development of my 
consciousness from then to now is framed symbolically into 
my journey around the hermeneutic circle through the night 
of understanding, the dawn of symbols, the day of interpre­
tation, and the dusk or interpretation of interpretation 
and is propelled by the question, "In Whose Interest?" 
My first trip around the hermeneutic circle was gen­
erated by the understanding that what I was doing as a 
teacher in special education was ultimately in the best 
interest of the students with whom I was working. The ques­
tion of "in whose interest?" was not consciously formulated 
or addressed, and my activity in the world remained almost 
completely unexamined. My night of understanding included 
an impulse for care and a concern for doing good that mani­
fested itself in the activity of teaching which I perceived 
as an activity of helping. 
The commonly agreed upon symbols that I chose to 
express my night understandings in the dawn of this 
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hermeneutic trip were the symbols of language used by the 
helping professions and special education. This language 
seems to have come to special education primarily from the 
medical model and is a language of distance and objectifi-
cation. I expressed my desire to help in terms of diag­
nosis, remediation, prescription, and assessment. I acquired 
the language of special education and viewed my helping 
in terms of this language. I perceived my role as one of 
being primarily a fixer or repairer of inadequate or incom­
plete children. This language resulted in my viewing the 
children with whom I worked as having something wrong with 
them and that it was my responsibility to diagnose the 
problem, prescribe the correct educational label, and 
design a program that would remediate the individual. 
This language allowed me to see that what I was doing 
as a special educator was unquestionably in the best inter­
est of the children with whom I worked. Consequently, my 
unexamined assumptions in the day of my taken-for-granted 
world perpetuated my interpretation of my understanding 
that what I was doing was in the best interest of the stu­
dents. I was helping them to acquire techniques and skills 
that would fix them or help them to compensate for their 
problems. I was giving them skills that would guide them 
to conformity so they could be as normal as possible. I was 
repairing them by filling them with the help that I had 
to offer. 
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As I entered the dusk of my first trip around the 
hermeneutic circle, my conscious interpretation of my inter­
pretations remained at a reflective level in the sense that 
I continued to mirror my helping impulse in the terms of 
the established educational and institutional language. 
I also perceived the educational and institutional setting 
as being a fixed reality. I lacked insight into the under­
standing that our meaning, knowledge, and culture are 
humanly constructed realities. I was mystified by the educa­
tional reality that I saw as being permanent and conse­
quently unchanging and unchangeable. It maintained an aura 
of authority that I felt powerless and.inadequate to ques­
tion. Therefore, being unable to see the social context 
and political interest, my energies in the dusk of my 
reflection were directed at self-improvement of my teach­
ing skills and techniques. I searched for better methods, 
prescriptive books, and more effective reward systems. 
I felt that, if I could develop better task analysis out­
lines, my skills in imparting techniques to my students 
would improve. As long as my dusk remained on the reflec­
tive level, I continued to view my special education teach­
ing role as that of being a helper and fixer of children 
and my professional, intellectual role as that of being 
a technician. Thus, my reflective examination of my under­
standings, symbols, interpretations, and interpretations 
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of my interpretations alowed me to view my action and 
teaching as being in the best interest of the children whom 
I taught. 
Since the language I used to voice the understandings 
of my educational practice remained that of science and 
medicine which are also informed by positivism, my desire 
to help was expressed in terms of diagnosis, prescription, 
remediation, and assessment. In moments of doubt, this 
literal language resulted in a practice in which I turned 
to the mechanisms of behavioral objectives, task analysis, 
and scope and sequence charts in order to structure greater 
success. In spite of feelings of uncertainty, I continued 
to view, through this scientific, positivistic language, 
that my practice was in the best interest of the students 
whom I hoped to help. I felt that if I persisted at my 
task analysis, educational objective quest long enough, 
I would eventually be able to fix, repair, and guide my 
students in a direction that would allow them to be as normal 
and as conforming as possible. The modern model's and posi­
tivism's criteria for success enabled me to hope that, if 
I persevered on this course Long enough, I and my students 
would eventually all experience this success. The modern 
model places hope in technology and technique. "It assumes 
that if the scientific process is maintained long enough, 
a complete knowledge of reality will be revealed" (Milner, 
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1976, p. 48). Thus, my doubt propelled me toward a more 
energetic investigation of method and technique, leaving 
me further frustrated and anxious in the face of those times 
when failure occurred. 
As I searched for finer methods and reflected upon 
more efficient and productive teaching materials, my greater 
aim and goal, that of caring, was diverted. My energetic 
activity eventually led to frustration since it was directed 
at a more technical and mechanical search for successful 
behavioral and educational objectives. Thus the hope for 
a caring and loving relationship was lost in the overwhelm­
ing framework of positivism in which the prescription con­
trolled the relationship and this contr6l ultimately meant 
that there could be no authentic relationship. 
In reflecting upon my experiences as a special educa­
tion teacher in a public school resource center, I find 
that Milner's view of the modern model coincides with my 
understanding of the positivistic grounding of most special 
educational practice. Further, Milner's insights into the 
feelings of despair and meaninglessness that plague the 
Modern Man, resonate with the frustrations and doubts that 
I experienced as a special education teacher. However, 
at the time, I was unable to clearly articulate that the 
source of this doom end despair was an outgrowth of posi­
tivism that manifests itself as the absence of genuine rela­
tionship. 
62 
As Milner describes the plight of the individual caught 
within the framework of the Modern Model, I begin to connect 
more deeply with the source of this despair. This outwardly 
directed life of conformity, that Milner describes, in which 
one is never the fully participatory subject but the object 
of external authority, contributes to a pathetic view of 
existence in which life itself appears meaningless. The 
doing and success of the positivistic, technical rationale 
is on the surface. The doing is externally controlled and 
the successes are determined by an authority beyond one­
self . 
Eventually, if the emptiness of this activity emerges, 
one begins to feel the despair of such-meaningless activity. 
As a teacher, caught up in all the "busyness," I occasion­
ally asked myself what was the point to all these contracts, 
happy faces, and mastered objectives. I came to recognize 
that 12-year-old Barry who was still struggling with read­
ing, "Nat a fat cat sat on a mat," even though he had 
learned the alphabet, would never be reading at grade level, 
and Felton, who had gained two years in reading comprehen--
sion, would still return to his fifth grade classroom read­
ing two years behind his classmates. I was forced to contem­
plate the deeper questions of interest and purpose of my 
educational practice. 
As I began to connect with the messages of the emanci­
patory writers regarding the social construction of reality, 
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I began to refine the lens through which I viewed the world, 
a lens with which I began my second trip around the hermeneu-
tic circle. This lens has not only empowered me with the 
hope for re-construction, but it has brought into focus 
the questions which have allowed me to voice the injustice 
of positivism which obstructs relationship and which results 
in the loss of dignity. 
Freire, Giroux, and Milner have provided us with a 
more solidly grounded and clearly focused view of the 
alienating and oppressive nature of the Tylerian Rationale's 
positivistic root. Their insights and criticisms have con­
structed a platform upon which to stand in order to address 
and resist the superficial appeal of the concrete suc­
cesses offered by the technical rationale. Understanding 
that the despair, pathos, and meaninglessness do not reside 
in the failed method or the unsuccessful individual but 
rather in the basic tenets of positivism and modern think­
ing has offered an anchor that serves to further serious 
criticism and strengthen resistance to the appeal of suc­
cess offered by the positivistic version of reality. 
Thus, as my dusk became reflexive, in the sense that 
I began to examine my taken-for-granted assumptions of the 
world and the educational structure, my night, dawn, and 
day changed. In my reflexive dusk, I began my second trip 
around the hermeneutic circle. This second journey was 
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proplelled by the question of interest. However, it was 
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a question that was consciously and critically formulated. 
Consequently, this hermeneutic journey generated a differ­
ent response to the question of interest. Rather than being 
in the interest of the students with whom I worked, I now 
began to view that what I had been doing was actually in 
the best interest of the administrative bureaucracy and 
in the interest of establishing and maintaining a hierarchical 
structure that worked to preserve the status quo and which 
functioned beyond this to maintain the cultural standards 
of achievement, competition, success, and individualism. 
This newly acquired vision changed my night understand­
ings from ones dealing with care and help to deeper con­
cerns for dignity and justice. I began to see that what 
I was doing was actually offending the dignity of the stu­
dents with whom I worked and that my teaching and evalua­
tions were acts of injustice which perpetuated and sup­
ported an inhumane, personally and communally destructive 
educational structure. 
The symbols of this dawning reflect the language of 
the dialectic of the prophetic voice. Holding criticism 
and hope in a balance, it is a language of praxis and of 
critical reflection requiring repsonsible action. It is 
a deeper language, which when placed upon the surface lan­
guage of the helping professions, makes the diagnostic, 
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prescriptive terminology of help appear to be shallow, 
superficial, degrading, and manipulative. 
Interpreting my day in terms of emancipatory symbols 
has enabled me to see that what I was doing was not in the 
best interest of myself or my students. When viewed through 
Freire's banking notion of education and Milner's pathos 
of modern man, my helping impulse appeared to be patroniz­
ing. My fixing and repairing of others objectified me and 
those with whom I was interacting. Labeling was not in 
the interest of my dignity, as identifier, or the dignity 
of the chilren who were being identified. I viewed evalua­
tion as an act of injustice which resulted in the dehumaniza-
tion of students and teachers as it contributed to the main­
tenance of the school hierarchy and to the preservation 
of the general cultural status quo. 
Section IV: 
Interviews of Two Former Special Education Students 
It is with the lens that has been and is still being 
ground by this second journey around the hermeneutic circle 
that I began to interpret and understand the two interviews 
I conducted. I entered into these interviews with the view 
that special education, resource labeling, and placement 
were damaging and unjust experiences that were offensive 
to human dignity. I had hoped to gain greater insight into 
this experience and to possibly provide a voice for all 
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of us who have felt the frustration and anger of being 
removed as our own sources of authority as a result of having 
been externally defined as in the cases of Dee and Kay who 
were labeled through educational assessment as being learn­
ing disabled. 
My research of the experiences of two former special 
education students further confirms my connection to criti­
cisms of the technical rationale as it is made manifest 
in the practice of special education and illuminated by 
the work of Giroux, Freire, and Milner. The subtle, yet 
ever present despair, the anxiety of individual failure, 
the hope offered by persistent allegiance to the scientific 
method that Milner describes are verified in the experi­
ences of Dee and Kay. The anger and frustration that accom­
panies objectification as individuals are prevented from 
participating in their own construction of meaning and 
decision-making that Freire addresses are voiced by these 
students. The omission and absence of any conversation 
by Dee and Kay with regard to questioning the purpose of 
their educational activity, indeed their submission and 
conformity to the hierarchical structures that offer suc­
cess, powerfully affirms Giroux's political concerns regard­
ing the oppression and silence perpetuated by the technical 
rationale. 
The interviews with Dee and Kay were loosely struc­
tured, tape recorded, 2-hour conversations in which each 
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discussed how she has remembered her special education 
experiences and how each perceives that this experience 
has affected her life. There was no predetermined format 
for these interviews; however, three general categories 
emerged that served as a guide for the organization of this 
research: (a) the actual school experiences involving 
resource room, tutoring, summer school, testing, and removal 
from the program; (b) relationships with peers, teachers, 
and family members; and (c) sense of self, before, during, 
and after the resource experience. 
At the time of these interviews Dee was 21 years old 
and studying interior design at Randolph Tech in Asheboro, 
North Carolina, after having transferred from UNCG upon 
the successful completion of three semesters. Dee had been 
labeled as having a learning disability in 1974 and was placed 
in a resource room at that time. She remained in special 
educational programs through the eighth grade, leaving them 
in 1979. I was Dee's fifth and sixth grade resource teacher 
from 1975 to 1977. 
Primarily Dee's memories of school are dominated by 
pictures of continuous evaluation. Evaluations that she 
recalls were not explained and therefore she felt were unfair. 
She recalls feeling extremely frustrated with a third grade 
standardized test, "I remember barely being able to read 
everything that was on there, because most of it was too 
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hard. ... I felt stupid and very frustrated." She goes 
on to describe a hearing test she was administered in the 
third grade: 
At one point . . . they even tested me for hearing 
because they thought I couldn't hear. . . . You had 
to put those ear, head phones on. I was so nervous 
all I could do was hear my heart beat. So, they told 
my parents I couldn't hear. 
At the conclusion of this interview, I asked Dee if there 
was anything else she would like to mention and she stated 
further her feelings with regard to testing: 
I feel like an IQ's more the experiences you have 
instead of all of your book learning. I think people 
are intelligent in different areas and you can't be 
perfect in everything. I guess the tests are for 
society's perfect persons. I don't know. ... I just 
don't think the whole testing thirig is fair. I mean 
that's something that's sort of circumstantial. I 
mean, everything that's been going on in your life, 
whether you're stressed or not, has a great deal to 
do with how you do, how well you do, and how you feel 
that day. 
Although she has experienced the injustice of testing 
and has a sense of the discomfort it caused, she does not 
question the validity of the function of testing and has 
internalized the value for the necessity of tests designed 
to determine whether or not one has learned the important 
facts considered to be knowledge. Throughout the inter­
view, she blames herself for her lack of success and her 
academic problems. She says, "If I was older and had more 
experience, I'm sure I could apply it, but I didn't." She 
goes on to say, "I was just slower and didn't put forth 
the effort that I really should have, in study." 
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She is unclear as to whether or not the resource center 
was helpful in providing her with assistance in remediating 
her reading and spelling problems, but she did feel that 
it offered her a pleasant escape from the regular class­
room. "I felt relieved because the resource teacher was 
so much nicer and I really liked doing that, getting away 
from my [classroom] teacher." She goes on to say, however, 
with regard to the effectiveness of the resource center, 
"I don't know, I feel if I had had a private tutor early 
on, I would have been OK." Although she had had tutors 
from 4th through 9th grades, after school and during the 
summer, Dee felt that maybe she would not have had as many 
difficulties in school if tutoring had begun at an earlier 
point. The significance being the fact that Dee perceived 
herself as not being OK and that the cure required assis­
tance from an external authority. 
Dee goes on to describe herself, "I wasn't as smart 
as the average student. ... I think I was as smart as 
the other students, I was just slower and I didn't put forth 
the effort that I really should have, in study, I mean I 
did my homework." She is ambiguous about her own ability 
and once again partially sees her difficulties as being 
her own fault. She blames herself for her problems and 
for her inability to solve them. Dee was unsure about 
the actual label that she had been given in elementary 
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school but remembered it as having been associated with 
being slow: "I was labeled, I've forgotten, they had two 
different labels. One meant you were just a little bit 
slow and the other one meant you were a little bit retarded 
. . . and I was the one that was a little bit slow." 
In describing the actual resource center experience 
she commented, "I'd go down [the hall] and we'd have to 
have hall passes and all that stuff. I've had hall passes 
all my life!" The labeling process brought with it tickets 
of admission and identification. The "hall pass" indicated 
that permission was required for entrance and if denied 
permission, one might face the existential dilemma of remain­
ing in the hall, therefore not being allowed to participate 
and at the same time wondering why. Essentially she was 
being placed into a position, with the hall pass, which 
potentially denied her admission to the conditions that 
enable one to construct meaning within the competitive 
framework existing in our schools. Those who carry hall 
passes are designated as marginal; they may or may not be 
granted permission to compete. 
Feelings of being different permeate Dee's experiences 
and relationships. She felt most intensely alienated from 
the teachers for whom she perceived herself as being a 
structural problem in terms of causing an interruption. -
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I think they [teachers] were hostile because they 
wanted everyone to do this, this and this, [to] be 
very structured. I messed up the structure because 
I was slower and went to the resource room, more from 
being slower. 
She perceived herself as an interruption to the routine 
because she needed to have things explained and therefore 
she caused a problem for the efficient functioning of the 
classroom. 
Dee also felt that the expectations of the teachers 
were lowered as a result of her being placed in the 
resource center. 
I remember Mrs. B [a sixth-grade teacher] not letting 
me be on my level of math because I did go to the 
resource room. . . . She was telling me that I needed 
to do this and finally I convinced her into letting 
me be in the, it was a little bit.above average, and 
I did fine. . . . Her expectation was a lot lower, 
it was back to the math I did in 2nd grade—just 
addition and subtraction of single digits. 
Generally her memories of teachers were unpleasant, remem­
bering teachers as being impatient and herself as being 
an interruption. 
With regard to feelings about herself, she recalls 
that throughout elementary school and junior high school 
she felt that she was slower than other students and that 
she needed more time. She felt different and stressed. 
She says she is still insecure about spelling and reading 
aloud. She also expressed insecurity with regard to encoun­
tering new situations and leaving familiar settings. She 
recalls the time of high school graduation as being an espe­
cially frightening period: 
When I graduated from high school, I didn't know what 
I would do because I felt so stupid. I had a very 
good GPA, and I still have one, but I didn't think 
I could go to college because I wasn't smart enough 
to do the work. 
Self-doubt and feelings of inadequacy continue to be 
a part of her living experience. She comments that during 
her studies at Randolph Tech in interior design, she still 
experiences moments of uncertainty: 
I'm very cautious to look up words, sometimes every 
single word, especially when I'm stressed. [Sometimes 
I'll] have somebody proof-read my work before I hand 
it in. ... I think I could do it in the real world, 
[but] before I would hand anything to a client, I would 
not have it written in my scribbly writing. I think 
that would be uncalled for. 
Dee's view of school, as shaped by her experiences, 
seems to revolve around the idea that school is a place 
of much testing and that this testing transformed her into 
an object to be labeled and manipulated. She felt vic­
timized by the whims of teachers who decided how she was 
to be grouped, what she was to be taught, and where she 
was to go. She also victimized herself by feeling that 
the problems were her fault and that if she tried harder, 
put forth more effort, had had tutoring earlier, she would 
have been "OK." She viewed herself as being a bureaucratic 
problem. She was an interruption to the schedule and class 
routine, and she interfered with the efficiency of the edu­
cational process. She has had "hall passes all her life," 
she is different, alienated, and removed. She requires 
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a "pass" in order to gain entrance into the educational 
game. She lives her life with the fear that the admission 
may be denied at any point along the way; that she may be 
designated to remain in the hall and that if that happens 
it would somehow be her own fault. 
At the time of this interview, Kay was a 17-year-old 
high school junior who had been in special education resource 
programs from 1975 to 1980. She was identified as having 
a learning disability while she was in the first grade and 
was dismissed from learning disability programs after she 
completed fifth grade. I was Kay's third and fourth grade 
resource teacher. Kay's school activities included various 
school clubs, honor society, honor roll, track team, and 
theatre. She has had part-time jobs and has engaged in 
an assortment of physical activities ranging from bike 
riding to weight lifting. She was the Greensboro Optimist 
Club speech contest winner with a speech which focused upon 
the problems of the learning disabled entitled "My Responsi­
bility: Involvement." When I called to arrange this inter­
view with Kay, her sister commented that she was not sur­
prised that I would want to talk with Kay, since she [Kay] 
is such a "success story." 
Kay's school memories are also filled with recollec­
tions of extensive testing which remained usually unexplained 
and left her feeling like a specimen. 
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I can't remember anyone ever talking to me about the 
tests. They probably talked to my parents, but I don't 
know. ... I sort of felt like a specimen. I just 
felt like a guinea pig when it came to those books. 
You know, you look at the books or something and you 
say what it is. And then, not knowing whether it is 
right or wrong and nobody tells you. ... I feel like 
they are deciding. When it comes to the things that 
I have to do every day, I do feel like everyone is 
deciding if, you know, what kind of person I am or 
if . . . I'm smart. . . I've been tested so much. 
I remember those big books. You look at them all the 
time. The teacher won't tell you if you've done them 
right or wrong. You're just sitting there all the 
time. 
Tests are a tremendous source of anxiety for Kay and 
evoke waves of feelings of self doubt. She recalls the 
competency testing in high school as causing her a great 
deal of fear. She was afraid because she didn't know what 
to expect, and she wondered whether or not she should hire 
a tutor in order to do as well as the other students who 
would be taking the competency test. She also didn't know 
how to fill out the information section on the test: "I 
have those little decisions, should I say that I'm this 
special person or should I go on and act normal?" She was 
uncertain as to whether or not she should check the learning 
disabilities box. In retrospect she describes the test 
as having been as "easy as pie," and she is aggravated with 
herself for having been so nervous about it. But she says, 
So, it scares me when I don't know my results on tests 
and that goes back to learning disabilities. Because 
when I had LD, I didn't know the results. It's not 
like it is today, you know your results PSAT, SAT, 
and competency. Then I didn't know how I was doing 
at all. 
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With regard to resource class experiences, Kay doesn't 
remember exactly how she got into it, but does remember 
it as "not being that bad." Basically, she just feels that 
she has been through "a lot of schooling." 
They put me in a resource room and then I started 
improving. I don't know exactly how I got in there. 
I might have been tested ... I just remember being 
in there and that I had to go. No one told me why 
I had to go. I don't remember. I don't remember, 
when I think back to school, I've been through so much 
school. When I think back, I remember going to the 
classroom and having different special classes and 
I feel I've had a lot of schooling. 
She recalls that being in a resource program did make 
her feel different and insecure. 
I remember being in class and working and I remember 
one day sitting in there and it was time for me to 
go to the resource room and everyone asking, "Where 
are you going?" I felt weird because no one else had 
to go, except maybe a few other people. I didn't want 
to go, I wanted to stay in that class. I felt dumb 
that I had to go to a special class. I didn't want 
anyone to know, or to miss out on something in class 
and have to catch up. 
In retrospect Kay considers the resource experience 
as having been a positive event in her life. She says, 
"Then it was bad, but now it's good." This is because the 
resource program provided her with a condition that she 
wanted to get away from. When she got out of the resource 
program, she considered it as having been the accomplishment 
of a goal that has given her confidence that she might not 
otherwise have had. 
See, I was in there but that gave me,I mean, every­
one has a goal in their life, and you see, I've 
already accomplished one goal. You see, a lot of 
people haven't done that yet and they're 17, and that 
was a big goal. And so, like if anyone ever asked 
me, "What goal have you ever accomplished?" You know, 
just wondering. They [might] say, "Oh, well. . . I 
tried out for and made the theater." I'd say, "I made 
the theater, too, and made the track team, too, and 
I did everything you did, and I also did one more thing 
that you didn't do—I got out of the Resource Room!" 
Getting out of the resource room was an achievement 
and a source of confidence for Kay. She says, "It was an 
achievement. ... It was a big responsibility on a little 
mind, that's exactly what it was. But I'm glad I'm not 
in it now. Even though I've got my mind now, I'm glad I'm 
not in there." Part of Kay's "getting her mind" seems to 
be in being able to fully participate in the educational 
game. She seems to have fully accepted the necessity for 
and consequences of the hierarchical competitive structure 
of school. Although the evaluations inherent in competition 
are a source of fear and anxiety for her, she tenaciously 
hangs on to the unquestionable necessity for and legitimacy 
of competition. She has earned the right to play the game 
and to "act normal." 
Kay was very clear about her label as that of being 
learning disabled and recalls: 
It was a great excuse ... I could say, "Well, I have 
a learning disability, leave me alone! I'll pick it 
up in a minute. You might pick it up, but I'll pick 
it up, maybe longer." I was relieved. I was still 
scared that I wasn't going to do my best, but not as 
scared» 
She views the label as providing her with a sense of relief. 
Before she had been labeled learning disabled, she couldn't 
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understand what was happening to her or why she couldn't 
learn in the prescribed way. "I just remember that I couldn't 
do anything and that I just felt dumb, and so I was just 
going to be dumb." The learning disability label provided 
Kay with a reason for her difficulties and a sense that 
something could be done about them. However, even though 
it gave her hope, it also carried with it the fear that 
if she didn't try hard enough, she couldn't be successful. 
So, in some removed way, it was still somehow her fault 
but not completely; she was still scared but not as scared. 
Interestingly enough, although Kay considers getting 
out of the resource room as being one of her major life 
accomplishments, her actual removal from the resource room 
seems to have been a vague, mysterious process. She recalls, 
"I was getting tired of it, I didn't want to go anymore. 
I didn't want to be different. I was ready to get out and 
I got out." She remembers forgetting to attend her resource 
classes and the teacher deciding that she probably didn't 
need to come anymore. She doesn't remember any specific 
tests or conferences. She just remembers being told that 
she didn't need resource anymore. She honestly recalls 
that she just forgot about it and then she was told she 
didn't have to go. So, her achievement was accomplished 
through an act of passive resistance of which she is not 
actually conscious. 
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Basically, Kay regarded her peers as being smarter 
than she and was fearful that they would think she was dumb. 
She describes herself as having been friendly with other 
students, while at the same time feeling removed from them 
and different. She felt that they thought she was differ­
ent, but she was even more fearful that others would get 
the labels confused and think even worse of her. 
I was afraid people would get confused. I don't think 
slow learner is as bad as mentally retarded. If they 
thought I was mentally retarded, I'd probably freak. 
I wonder what thought they'd think . . . that I was 
weird, strange, or different? I think they thought 
I was different, not strange or weird. 
Kay felt alienated from her regular classroom teachers, 
describing them as "impatient, old bats." "I felt like 
some teachers were angry with me because it would take 
[them] longer to explain it to me." Consequently, Kay also 
felt that she caused a disruption of the daily school and 
class routine. She felt removed from the flow of the class 
because she was slower and needed explanations. 
Kay's learning disability was considered to be a 
"family thing" in the sense that the other family members 
helped Kay. Her mother and sister also participated in 
local community activities that were aimed at working with 
the handicapped. Kay recalls that when she went to summer 
school her mother and sister went with her. She described 
her mother as being "another tutor who drilled stuff into 
my head." Generally she felt good about her family 
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involvement and support. The only major conflict that Kay 
had with her family was concerned with Kay's attending a 
summer school tutorial program the summer following her 
dismissal from the resource program. Kay had always resented 
attending this program and was extremely upset with the 
idea of having to continue in that program after having 
been removed from the resource room. Kay sensitively rea­
lized that her mother was anxious about whether or not she 
could succeed without the additional assistance, but Kay 
recalls, "I was scared, scared enough for both of us." 
Feelings of being different and of being fearful per­
meate Kay's memories regarding herself at the time of place­
ment in a resource room. However, she now perceives herself 
as being confident, more determined and responsible as a 
result of her past experiences. She is not concerned with 
whether others know that she was in a resource program 
because she feels that most would not believe that she had 
actually been in the program. She says, "It's fine with 
me. It makes me feel good that they can't believe I was 
in there." Kay feels that she has her learning disability 
"under control" and is determined to keep it from resurfac­
ing. She regards herself as being an example to other learn­
ing disabled individuals. "I think I'm an example, not 
an exception. I don't know anyone like me, but I know there 
are other people about like me." In a sense, she objectifies 
herself and places herself on display for others to note. 
She has committed herself to the rigors of competition and 
at this moment she is winning. However, I feel that in 
some ways this activity is displayed for the purpose of prov­
ing that she is "normal" or OK. Without being conscious 
of it, I feel that Kay senses that she is in a period of 
remission and that there is always an underlying fear that 
she might experience a relapse which would cause her dis­
ability to surface. In a sense, I view her frantic achieve­
ment oriented actions as being an attempt to construct a 
"buffer" in order to ward off the potential reoccurrence 
of the disease. . 
In general Kay's view of school is that of being a 
place which is to be approached with suspicion--a place 
where there is a lot of testing and where people are deciding 
about you and keeping the results hidden. School is a place 
where one is examined impersonally and made to feel like 
a specimen. She felt objectified by the testing process 
and alienated from herself and others as a result of that 
process. Decisions were being made about her in which she 
had no participation or awareness. She was labeled and 
officially recognized as being different. She sensed that 
she was somehow to blame for her problems and felt that 
if she tried hard enough to "act normal" that she would 
be OK. School is a place where Kay has learned well the 
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lesson of winners and losers. She has absorbed that lesson 
into her very soul. She views her determined acts as being 
the safeguards that will hopefully enable her to remain 
on the winning side. She senses, but does not give voice 
to, the possibility that this game of "acting normal" could 
collapse and she would once again find herself disabled. 
The evolving world view of these two women, as having 
been shaped by their school experiences as a result of having 
been labeled and placed in special educational programs, 
seems to be one that is interpenetrated with themes of 
alienation and resistance. Their alienation from self and 
others is manifest in the fear and suspicion they experience 
in various concrete and abstract situations. Their fears 
are concretely recognized in testing situations and class­
room settings in which the circumstances for successes or 
failure are more or less clearly established. Voiced fears 
of general failure, time limitations, and testing seem to 
be consciously recognized. 
The more subtle forms of alienation seem to be more 
abstractly formulated in feelings of anxiety. There is 
a vague sense of discomfort that seems to haunt both of 
these young women as they move through their lives wonder­
ing where, when, or if their existing reality is going to 
collapse, leaving their disabilities exposed. They walk 
on the borderline, "acting normal" but always carrying 
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their "hall passes." They are extremely vulnerable to the 
possibility of being "found out" and consequently being 
denied access to commonly agreed upon conditions of compe­
tition in which meaning is constructed in our schools and 
our greater society. They live with an unvoiced anxiety 
that accompanies them in the form of doubt. 
They are alienated from themselves in the sense that 
they doubt their authenticity and are constantly seeking 
validation from external sources. The ever present nagging 
doubt has damaged their sense of self-worth; their dignity 
has been diminished by doubt. They are alienated from 
others as a result of not being able to name themselves; 
they are officially recognized as being different. In 
Tillich's sense of the "courage to be," they have been 
denied the dignity which would have allowed them to con­
struct the meaning that would have enabled them to "be as 
oneself." In so doing, they are denied the possibility 
of constructing meaning as "being as oneself" in community. 
They are robbed of dignity and ultimately alienated from 
self and others. They have been objectified and denied 
the opportunity of reciprocally engaging in relationships 
in which there is the possibility of dynamic interchange 
between subjects. 
The theme of resistance is manifest as an attempt to 
hold on to one's dignity and to affirm oneself as a human 
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being with the right to name oneself is apparent in the few 
but persistent acts of not accepting the prescribed labels 
and placements. Although not so apparent to themselves 
or others, both women resisted attempts by authorities to 
completely determine their fate. Passively forgetting to 
attend the resource program, not fully recognizing the label 
that had been prescribed, and actively confronting teachers 
about academic groupings are examples of acts of resistance. 
In spite of the few acts of resistance, it seems that a 
world view dominated by a sense of alienation prevails. 
Their world view is one in which the hegemony of the 
technocratic rationality is reflected. Dee and Kay have 
been perceived by others and themselves as being on the 
margin and, in wishing and hoping to be admitted, have not 
questioned seriously the existing flaws in'the dominant 
structure as reflected in the educational system. They 
have not examined the value of the conditions that enable 
one to construct meaning or that allow one to be received 
into the school hierarchy. They have internalized the ethic 
of competition and abide by the rules of evaluation which 
determine one's worth. The technocratic rationality world 
view has contributed to their further oppression as they 
perceive their own problems and difficulties within a psy­
chological framework. They are unable to place themselves 
within the social context by constructing a history that 
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is sociologically framed. They are the victims of the 
technocratic rationality, and they have internalized the 
consciousness of their oppressors. Dee and Kay are alien­
ated in their isolation. Their acts of resistance have 
been precarious efforts to become a part of the dignity-
denying, oppressive structure that further intensifies their 
anxiety and insecurity. 
As for the insights I have gained through conducting 
these interviews and contemplating this research, they are 
many and still evolving. Initially, the most profound 
understandings pivoted around the realization of just how 
fragile our reality or realities actually are. The first 
insight deals with the implications of having our realities 
completely altered if our labels become confused. Our 
reality, our sense of who we are and what we are capable 
of doing with regard to the meaning we construct, is somehow 
tied to our label or labels. It seems to me that the possi­
bility of having our labels confused is a very real threat 
to our reality. In this bureaucratically structured soci­
ety dependent upon computers for organization, the science 
fiction scenario of getting our labels, social security 
numbers, credit records, etc. confused is a very real pos­
sibility. However, at an even deeper, existential level, 
the sense of having our realities determined by the meanings 
we and others attach to the labels that we choose or that are 
chosen for us, leaves us vulnerable and attached to very 
frail realities. These realities can be changed instantan­
eously and whimsically, good and bad can become transposed 
and twisted. The very thin line between meaning and non-
meaning, being and non-being becomes more fully recognized 
for me in thoughtfully considering the profound implications 
of getting "the labels confused." 
The second insight regarding the fragility of our real­
ities came to me specifically in my conversation with Kay 
and concerns itself with the value and seriousness of being 
present with ourself and others. The idea that what we say 
and don't say to those around us truly does affect their 
reality. Therefore, we need to be extremely serious with 
regard to our understanding of the power of the "word." Kay 
recalled a situation in the resource room in which she was 
experiencing a great deal of frustration and remembers my 
telling her of another student I had taught who was no longer 
in the resource room. It was the first time she had ever 
realized that she might not always be in the resource pro­
gram. Kay said if I had not told her about that other girl, 
she would have given up hope. It seems that much of Kay's 
current reality is constructed upon a remark I made regarding 
a former student. The impact of the realization of what we 
say or don't say to others as having a profound implication 
upon the realities they construct is overwhelming to me. It 
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leaves me in a state of awe when considering the implica­
tions this has for the profession of teaching. 
The third major understanding that has become clarified 
for me while doing this research is the conclusion I reached 
regarding the relationship of children and adults. It occurs 
to me that we treat our children as aliens, we objectify 
them and regard them with minimal respect. We talk about 
them but not to them. We observe them, test them, and edu­
cate them. We teach them the lessons of alienation. As 
educators and as adults, we are the oppressors of our chil­
dren. We deny them dignity, perpetrating an injustice that 
handicaps us all! 
The experiences of Dee and Kay and my interpretation 
of these experiences confirm and verify the criticisms of 
Giroux, Freire, and Milner in their critiques of the Tyler-
ian, positivistic, technical rationale. Through the voices 
of Dee and Kay we may begin to hear the depth of their and 
our own despair and meaninglessness. It is with the insights 
that I have gained from the criticisms of Freire, Giroux, 
and Milner that I sense the need to more thoroughly under­
stand the vision offered by those that I shall refer to 
as holding a transformative emancipatory view. It is from 
the feelings of anguish and despair that I touch upon when 
hearing the voices of Dee and Kay that I move to explore 
the transformative, emancipatory vision of praxis and empow­
erment . 
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Further, the urgency of this turn is intensified for me 
in reflecting upon Camus' The Plague, in which I connect 
to the plague as being symbolic of the ultimate disconnector 
and therefore of being, representative of positivistic 
thinking. This disconnection blinds us, creating a condi­
tion of unawareness which for Camus is the source of immo­
rality and evil: 
The evil that is in the world always comes of ignorance, 
and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence, 
if they lack understanding. On the whole, men are 
more good than bad; that however isn't the real point.. 
But they are more or less ignorant, and it is this 
that we call vice or virtue; the most incorrigible 
vice being that of ignorance that fancies it knows 
everything and therefore claims for itself the right 
to kill. The soul of the murderer is blind; and there 
can be no true goodness nor true love without the utmost 
clear-sightedness. (Camus, 1972, p. 124) 
The soul of positivism which "fancies it knows everything" 
is blind and therefore potentially immoral; consequently, 
it (positivism) holds within it the capacity for murder. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE TRANSFORMATIVE-EMANCIPATORY VISION 
The intense conversation between Dr. Rieux and Tarrou 
in Albert Camus' The Plague, in which Tarrou recollects 
memories of his youth and the horror he felt when he first 
realized the human plight as being that of various manifes­
tations of the stages of plague, is a powerfully moving 
piece. The anger he felt as a result of the injustice of 
deliberate murder in the form of capital punishment, his 
reaction to this atrocity by joining an, activist group in 
order to prevent such capital crimes and then to his own 
devastating discovery that he, too, was a transmitter of 
plague even in the name of social reform or in the name of 
what he perceived to be good, are the various stages of 
plague that we knowingly and unknowingly manifest. The 
awakening process through which Tarrou realizes that he was 
the murderer that he was horrified of, that he, too, had 
as a result of blindness and ignorance, murdered is a painful 
metamorphosis—one which all of us in moments of serious 
reflection know to be true—an admission of agony: 
I'm still of the same mind. For many years I've been 
ashamed, mortally ashamed, of having been, even with the 
best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my 
turn. . . . Yes, I've been ashamed ever since; I have 
realized that we all have the plague, and I've lost my 
peace. ... I only know that one must do what one can 
to cease being plague stricken, and that's the only way 
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in which we can hope for some peace or, failing that, a 
decent death. This and only this, can bring relief to 
men and, if not save them, at least do them the least 
harm possible and even, sometimes, a little good. (Camus, 
1972, p. 235) 
"To cease being plague stricken" is the way in which I 
view the praxis offered by the constructs of Dewey, Freire, 
Giroux, and others as they engage in educational reconstruc­
tion with an emancipatory and transformative vision. The 
unifying themes that seem to connect these thinkers in their 
quest "to cease being plague stricken" are many. However, 
their requisite of wakeful, critical, consciousness in the 
struggle for justice and their ability and need to embrace 
the uncertain in this endeavor seem to form the underpinnings 
upon which all of them take action. They reflect the philos­
ophy of life which Dewey discusses as that which "accepts life 
and experience in all of its uncertainty, mystery, doubt and 
half-knowledge and turns that experience upon itself to deepen 
and intensify its own qualities" (Dewey, 1958, p. 34). Conse­
quently, the educational agenda slides radically when addressed 
by those who hold a world view in which uncertainty is 
approached and applauded rather than avoided and dismissed. 
The aims and goals of the educative process shift from 
those of transferring a predetermined body of knowleldge for 
the purposes of turning out a normalized finished product 
to those of developing a "critical consciousness," "a disci­
plined mind," and to being "conscientized" through participa­
tion in praxis for the purposes of emancipation. Emancipation 
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rather than standardization becomes the aim, hope, and vision 
which guides educational theory and practice for those whom 
I shall refer to as holding a "transformative-emancipatory" 
world view. Rather than constructing their practice upon 
theories obtained from industrial and behavioral psychology, 
their practice reflects a theory which is grounded in phenom­
enology and embraces those tenets of pragmatism which speak 
to the hope that as oppressive realities are illuminated 
injustice will be diminished. 
John Dewey and Paulo Freire seem to address most clearly 
the constructs of the transformative-emancipatory vision that 
binds theory to practice. These constructs are generated 
as they become useful in guiding the examination of our 
beliefs. It is the illumination of these unexamined beliefs 
that has provided the structures for Dewey's "Reflective 
Thought" process and Freire's "Conscientization" process. 
The rhythm and movement of "transformative-emancipatory" 
praxis becomes more fully felt in the examination of these 
unveiling processes. 
Section I; 
John Dewey and the Reflective Thought Process 
For Dewey, the "reflective thought" process embodies 
the nature of thinking and, thus, also represents the struc­
ture toward which he feels education ought to be directed. 
The test of education, for Dewey, is "the extent to which 
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it nurtures a type of mind competent to maintain an economi­
cal balance of the unconscious and the conscious" (Dewey, 
1933, p. 214). He maintains that this balance between the 
unconscious and the conscious, the absent and the present, 
the strange and the familiar contains the nature of thinking. 
"Where there is thought, something present suggests and indi­
cates something absent" (Dewey, 1933, p. 223). He writes: 
The familiar and the near do not excite or repay thought 
on their own account, but only as they are adjusted to 
mastering the strange and remote. The old, the near, 
the accustomed, is not that to which but that with which 
we attend; it does not furnish the material of a problem, 
but of its solution . . . the more remote supplies the 
stimulus and the motive; the nearer at hand furnishes 
the point of approach and the available resources. 
(Dewey, 1933.p.222) 
Doubt and uncertainty present the discomfort or problems that 
move one to think. 
The starting point in any process of thinking is some­
thing going on, something just as it stands is incom­
plete or unfulfilled . . . its meaning lies literally 
in what it is going to be, in how it is going to turn 
out ... to consider the bearing of the occurrence upon 
what may be, but is not yet, is to think. (Dewey, 1966, 
p. 146) 
Doubt and uncertainty present the initial discomfort 
that propels one to act; however, it is in the doing and the 
undergoing of the consequences of the action taken in the 
face of uncertainty that offer the possibility for thought 
or "thinking as experience." An awareness of and an inten­
tional attempt to construct or discover the connection between 
action and its consequences results in thinking. Dewey 
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discusses this when he writes, "Thinking ... is the inten­
tional endeavor to discover specific connections between some­
thing which we do and the consequences which result, so that 
the two become continuous" (Dewey, 1966, p. 145). The pres­
ence of the active and passive phases are essential to Dewey's 
understanding of what constitutes thought and learning: 
When we experience something we act upon it, we do some­
thing with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. 
We do something to the thing and then it does something 
to us in return: such is the peculiar combination. 
•The connection of the two phases of experience measures 
the fruitfulness or value of the experience. . . . Expe­
riences as trying involves change, but change is mean­
ingless transition unless it is consciously connected 
with the return wave of consequences which flow from 
it. When an activity is continued into the undergoing 
of consequences, when the change made by action is 
reflected back into a change made in us, the more flux 
is loaded with significance. We learn something. 
(Dewey, 1966, p. 139) 
It is at the point of suffering the consequences of our 
actions that Dewey addresses the issue of responsibility. 
Thoughtful action is synonymous with responsibility in Dewey's 
mind, for in taking thoughtful action, one is working from 
the aims which emerged while contemplating the uncertain. 
In this way, one acknowledges responsibility for future conse­
quences which result from the present action. The construction 
of aims is the acceptance of responsibility for the connec­
tion between doing and undergoing as well as the responsibil­
ity for the links between the conscious and the unconscious. 
The illumination of the connections between doing-undergoing 
and between conscious-unconscious results in unions which 
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address that which Dewey regards as being thought, meaning, 
and responsibility. 
Dewey understands that "the unconscious influence of 
the environment is so subtle and pervasive that it affects 
every fiber of character and mind" (Dewey, 1966, p. 17). 
Thoughtful reflection and responsible construction of aims 
which direct meaningful action which in turn enhance under­
standing are at the root of Dewey's desire to unite the con­
scious with the unconscious and the doing with the undergoing. 
He writes: 
We rarely recognize the extent in which our conscious 
estimates of what is worthwhile . . . are due to stan­
dards of which we are not at all conscious . . . but 
in general the things that we take for granted without 
inquiry or reflection are just the things which determine 
our conscious thinking and decide our conclusions . . . 
and these are the habitudes which lie below the level 
of reflection and have been formed in the constant give 
and take of relationship with others. (Dewey, 1966, 
p. 18) 
The importance of the above statement lies in the immo­
rality of acting from unexamined, unconscious beliefs. For 
Dewey, if one is truly thinking, he/she will also be acting 
and acting in a morally responsible way. If one is awake, 
conscious of and therefore responsible for the connections, 
he/she will be engaging in the moral life, according to Dewey. 
Thinking-wakefulness then becomes the way in which one can 
"cease being plague stricken." He writes, 
All that the wisest man can do is to observe what is 
going on more widely and more minutely and then to select 
more carefully from what is noted just those factors 
which point to something to happen. (Dewey, 1966, 
p. 145) 
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Dewey's "reflective thought" process synthesizes the 
dynamic interaction between the certain and uncertain and 
organizes the stages of how one engages in the unveiling 
process. For Dewey, it offers the guidance for emancipation 
and freedom. 
Genuine freedom, in short, is intellectual; it rests 
in the trained power of thought, in ability to "turn 
things over," to look at matters deliberately, to 
judge the amount and kind of evidence requisite for deci­
sion is at hand, and if not, to tell where and how to 
seek such evidence. (Dewey, 1933, p. 67) 
He goes on to write, "We are free in the degree in which we 
act knowing what we are about" (Dewey, 1929, p. 250). 
The constructs of Dewey's reflective process parallel 
the inductive and deductive stages of scientific research 
methods: (a) a felt difficulty; (b) its location and defini­
tion; (c) suggestion of possible solution; (d) development by 
reasoning of bearings of the suggestion; (e) further observa­
tion and experiment leading to acceptance or rejection (Dewey, 
1933, p. 72). It is a double movement from the given partial 
and confused picture to a suggested comprehensive whole and 
back from the sugggested comprehensive whole to the particular 
facts. The backward and forward movement of this research is 
intended to connect the particular facts with one another and 
then to connect these particular facts with additional facts 
toward which the suggestion has directed our attention. It is 
an awakening and attending process which offers a "freeing" 
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capability. A freedom in which action is informed by a know­
ing examination of and responsibility for the connections. 
This "reflective process" provides a structure for action 
in which "the problem fixes the end of thought and the end 
controls the process of thinking" (Dewey, 1933, p. 12). How­
ever, it is an ongoing and disciplined process and not a 
mechanical one. Dewey writes: 
If the situation presents something novel and hence 
uncertain the entire response is not mechanical, 
because this mechanical operation is put to use in 
solving a problem. There is no end to this spiral 
process: foreign subject-matter transformed through 
thinking into a familiar possession becomes a resource 
for judging and assimilating additional foreign subject-
matter. (Dewey, 1933, p. 223) 
He continues by furthering his understanding that knowledge 
or foreign-subject matter made familiar is not the fixed or 
permanent end of thinking but that it serves to enhance the 
process of inquiry. In fact, for Dewey, the acquiring is 
almost secondary to the inquiring. He writes: 
While all thinking results in knowledge, the true value 
of knowledge is subordinate to its use in thinking. 
For we live not in a settled and finished world but 
in one which is going on, and where our main task is 
prospective and where retrospect—and all knowledge, as 
distinct from thought is retrospect—is of value in the 
solidarity, security and fertility it affords in our 
dealings with the future. (Dewey, 1966, p. 151) 
The "reflective thought process" proposes the type of 
discipline necessary and the direction in which to move in 
demystifying previously oppressive conditions. For Dewey 
dogmatism, tradition, the supernatural constitute the 
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structures of oppression because historically they have been 
beyond question. He writes of this oppression, "Interest in 
the supernatural therefore reinforces other vested interests 
to prolong the social reign of accident" (Dewey, 1934, p. 78). 
The reflective process offers a way of questioning the pre­
viously unquestionable and mystifying while inspiring an eman­
cipatory vision. For Dewey it offers the mechanism with which 
to critique as well as with which to reconstruct through 
morally responsible praxis aimed at emancipation. Dewey's 
discussion of faith in A Common Faith embraces this moving 
and hopeful vision of the "reflective thought process": 
The ideal ends to which we attach our faith are not 
shadowy and wavering. They assume concrete form in our 
understanding of our relations to one another and the 
values contained in these relations. . . . The things 
in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. 
They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the 
continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours 
is the repsonsibility of conserving, transmitting, rec­
tifying and expanding the heritage of values we have 
received that those who come after us may receive it 
more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more 
generously shared than we have received it. Here are 
all the elements for a religious faith that shall not 
be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has 
always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It 
remains to make it explicit and militant. (Dewey, 1934, 
pp. 86-87) 
Dewey's message, although highly complex, concerns itself 
with social reform, transformation, and transmission. He 
is thoroughly committed to the necessity for the examination 
of our ethical, moral, and religious values so that through 
their investigation richer meaning may evolve. He embraces 
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the uncertain as being that which provides the magnetic and 
creative force that pulls and attracts one's awarenesses 
and propels one to reconstruct the meaning of given reali­
ties through the formulation of examined connections spawned 
of imagination and curiosity. His message is one of hope 
for the application of the "reflective thought process" to 
the social and emotional dimenisons of our experience in an 
effort to remove the divisions that oppress us and prevent 
us from realizing the meaning of our existence. His is the 
message of empowerment and hope made possible through the 
application of the "reflective thought process" to the uncer­
tain, unconscious conditions of our existence in order to 
examine that which we take for granted and that which conse­
quently mystifies us. It is the hope that we might be free 
to act as though we knew what we were about in our efforts 
to cease being plague stricken. 
Section II: 
Paulo Freire: The Conscientization Process 
Encompassed within Freire's "conscientization" process 
are many of the fundamental constructs that Dewey offers in 
his "reflective thought process." At the core of both 
Freire's and 'Dewey's work lies their adherence to the value 
of the scientific method, their regard for distanced examina­
tion of reality, and their commitment to phenomenological 
investigation. They both share the quest for certainty by 
98 
facing the uncertain openly and hopefully. Their understand­
ings of being and knowing are rooted in their dedication to 
process and inquiry. They consider the acts of becoming and 
of inquiry to be the vital projects that ought to consume 
our human energies. 
Each regards process itself, rather than acquisition 
or completion, as forming the essence of human being. The 
process rather than the end, the becoming rather than the 
being, serve to focus Freire's and Dewey's concerns. Their 
beliefs that every original end prioritizes and orders the 
means, which then requires responsible action or praxis, and 
that these ends then become the means for yet unrecognized 
and unconstructed ends, reflects the significance of the 
phenomenological movement in their work. 
In his conscientization process Freire clearly embraces 
the phenomenological notion which deals with the tension inher­
ent in relationship, and most specifically in relationships 
that can metaphorically be thought of in a subject and object 
sense. He addresses the tension that exists in the dialectic 
between categories that have been thought of by many as repre­
senting the dualities of our lives, such as teacher-student, 
subject-object, dominator-dominated, and master-slave. 
For both Dewey and Freire, experiencing the tensions 
that are manifest in these dualities provide the objects of 
consciousness. Both Dewey and Freire regard, with utmost 
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seriousness, the issues of consciousness. Consciousness and 
experience are intimately intertwined for them. Experiences 
offer the objects upon which consciousness is shaped and re­
shaped. For both, the phenomenological method provides the 
distance necessary to critically examine experiences in order 
to be more wakeful and responsible in taking action in light 
of freshly gained understandings. 
Paulo Freire's concept of conscientization seems to embody 
the elements of his theoretical and practical understandings 
in the ongoing process of human emancipation. An emancipa­
tion that I feel Paulo Freire and John Dewey would agree as 
being one in which we act knowing what we are about in our 
efforts to cease being plague stricken. Conscientization 
deals with issues of consciousness in much the same manner 
as Dewey's reflective thought process does. In the sense 
that both conscientization and reflective thought address 
the need to problematize and scientifically unveil our real­
ities . 
Conscientization, although not a clearly defined or even 
intended mechanical method, does represent several inter­
related themes that merge as structures of the conscientiza­
tion process. Conscientization is the process by which an 
individual or a group transcend non-existent or naive states 
of consciousness and evolve into a critical consciousness. 
This process is brought about only by praxis, "the authentic 
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union of action and reflection" (Freire, 1985, p. 87). "Con-
scientization is a joint project in that it takes place in 
a man among other men, men united by their action and by their 
reflection upon that action and upon the world" (Freire, 1985, 
p. 85). The themes that emerge during this praxis that are 
encompassed by conscientization include dialogue, problemat-
ization, scientific unveiling and consequent ideological 
critique, and the announcement of a new reality or that to 
which Freire refers as an Utopian enterprise. 
The phenomenological concerns seem to be most specif­
ically represented by the problematization and scientific 
unveiling aspects of conscientization. They seem to also 
be the major connecting links between Dewey and Freire. The 
phenomenological concept of construction and re-construction 
permeates the conscientization process. "Comprehension of 
the process of conscientization and its practice is directly 
linked then to one's understanding of consciousness in its 
relation to the world" (Freire, 1985, p. 168). The construc­
tion and reconstruction of consciousness and experience 
depends upon objectifying the world, to distance the world 
so that we may appropriate or take from the context that which 
we find essential and that which we can utilize in order to 
insert ourselves more fully.into the world. The purpose 
of this phenomenological investigation is to enable us to 
become participants in our world, to allow us to understand 
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that we are capable of more than just accommodating or adapt­
ing ourselves to our world, and thus actually inviting us to 
participate and reconstruct. This is for Freire and Dewey 
the optimism found in the scientific unveiling and the phenom-
enological reconstruction. 
For Freire, consciousness is impossible without objec­
tifying the "not I" and that is not possible without the world. 
Consciousness is constituted in the dialectic of man's objec-
tification of and action upon the world. "[It] is never a 
mere reflection of but a reflection upon material reality" 
(Freire, 1985, p. 69). Consciousness is conditioned by the 
world and experience and the world and experience are molded 
by consciousness. Freire writes: 
One's entire consciousness is always an awareness of 
something toward which one has some intention. Human 
self-consciousness implies a consciousness of things, 
a concrete real world where people see themselves as 
historical beings in a reality they learn through their 
capacity for thought. Knowledge of reality is essential 
for developing self-consciousness and a subsequent 
increase of knowledge. But if it's to be authentic, 
this act of knowledge always requires the unveiling of 
its object. This does not take place in that dichotomy 
between objectivity and subjectivity, action and reflec­
tion, practice and theory. (Freire, 1985, p. 168) 
The action and interaction of subject upon object and 
object upon subject reveals an emerging consciousness and 
a greater understanding of the meaning of our experience in 
the world. It is this active and passive, this doing and 
undergoing dialectic that Dewey refers to as being the dynamic 
action that reveals and enables one to reconstruct those 
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experiences that mold our consciousnesses. Freire writes, 
"We must use our experience or that of other subjects in the 
field as the focus of our reflection, as we attempt to increase 
our understanding" (Freire, 1985, p. 101). Consciousness, 
understood phenomenologically, enables us to more fully par­
ticipate in our experiences as a result of being able to 
recognize the dialectic quality of our experiences and the 
correspondingly constructed nature of these realities. Fur­
ther, phenonenological insight enables one to understand that 
our consciousness is shaped by these very experiences and 
reali ties. 
Consequently, the phenomenological dialectic between 
consciousness and the world in shaping and re-shaping each 
other is essential in understanding the emancipatory educa­
tional vision of Freire and Dewey and others who hold a trans­
formative world view. This doing and undergoing process 
removes the human being from a determinate, fatalistic, pas­
sive position in relation to the world and experience to a 
position that enables the individual to begin to understand 
the contextual and personal quality of history. In under­
standing that history is constructed by human beings and that 
it does not exist beyond our experience, one can sense the 
powerfully illuminating concepts of an emancipatory educa­
tional vision. 
The phenomenological dialectic requires that the indi­
vidual become a participant and an active subject in 
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experiencing and naming the world. It requires the individual 
to re-confront reality and to analyze that reality and his/her 
experience of that reality. It allows the individual to recon­
struct that reality so that he/she can re-enter that situa­
tion in such a way that his/her continued experiences can be 
affirming rather than diminishing or altogether dismissing. 
It requires movement from the concrete which provides the 
facts to the theoretical in which the facts are analyzed and 
back into the concrete in a new form of praxis in which the 
empowered individual participates in a process of his/her 
own liberation. In the words of Dewey, "to observe what is 
going on more widely and more minutely" (Dewey, 1966, p. 145) 
and to understand that "we are free in the degree in which we 
act knowing what we are about" (Dewey, 1929, p. 250). The 
educational praxis of the transformative emancipatory thinkers 
encompasses the dialectic between reality, experience, and 
consciousness in which the empowered individual participates 
responsibly in the reconstruction and reshaping of all three: 
reality, experience, and consciousness. 
Further, Freire and Dewey adhere to the idea that con­
sciousness and knowledge expand as one pulls into conscious­
ness and attends to that which was at one time only intended. 
"Since knowing is a process, knowledge that exists today was 
once only a viability and it then became a new knowledge, 
relative and therefore successive to yesterday's existing 
104 
knowledge" (Freire, 1985, pp. 114-115). Thus the dialectic 
in which human reconstruction occurs not only requires par­
ticipation of those who at one time may have been regarded as 
objects but it also addresses issues of knowledge reconstruc­
tion. This view of knowledge recognizes knowledge, not as 
being for the purpose of transfer and consumption, but as 
being for the purpose of creative responsibility and construc­
tion . 
Knowledge in terms of transformative-emancipatory educa­
tional praxis is knowledge that evolves as consciousness 
evolves and that grows as understanding of experience widens. 
Thus knowledge is not external, it is something which is appre­
hended by the acting subject. For knowledge that is beyond 
the subject's experience and consciousness is of an alienating 
nature. The dialectic creation and expansion of knowledge 
requires that the knowing and participating subject be one 
who is also the source of his or her own authority. Thus, as 
in the dimension of human construction of reality, conscious­
ness, and experience, the human construction of knowledge 
removes knowledge from the realm of being used as a mechanism 
for oppression and exclusion into being used as a tool for 
empowerment and inclusion. 
Section III: 
Reflective Thought and Conscientization Compared 
Dewey's "reflective thought process" and Freire's "con­
scientization process" as reflected in problematization and 
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scientific unveiling parallel each other as each seeks to 
address issues of critical consciousness and responsible 
action. The importance that each recognizes of the reconstruc­
tion of human reality, experience, consciousness, and know­
ledge is addressed by Dewey and Freire within the framework 
of their understanding of the phenomenological dialectic. 
However, although Dewey discusses the dogmatism of traditional 
religious belief and the inequities of economic difference, 
he seems to be less precise than Freire about the issues of 
power, interest, and ideology that maintain the status quo. 
Freire consistently addresses the political interest of 
all action. He understands that conscientization is not just 
a neutral pedagogic tool but that it must be attached to the 
political questions. Not that Dewey thought that the "reflec­
tive thought process" was neutral, or that if implemented, it 
wouldn't contribute to the possibility of radical social 
change. However, Dewey did not articulate or address the 
deeper political interest ramifications of this process or 
the vested interest of the existing social structure. 
Freire is much more clear about his understanding of the 
political significance of pedagogy. 
Whether this is done ingenuously or astutely, separating 
education from politics is not only artificial but dan­
gerous. To think of education independent from the power 
that constitutes it, divorced from the concrete world 
where it is forged, leads us either to reducing it to a 
world of abstract values and ideals (which the pedagogue 
constructs inside his consciousness without even under­
standing the conditioning that makes him think this way), 
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or to converting it to a repertoire of behavioral tech­
niques or to perceiving it as a springboard for changing 
reality. (Freire, 1985, p. 170) 
The fundamental difference in the perspectives held by 
Dewey and Freire stem in part from the contextual differences 
of their personal and historical experiences. Dewey, being 
of the era of optimism and progress that represented the mood 
of hopeful idealism present in the United States at the turn 
of the century, held understandable faith in the pragmatic 
mechanisms of reflective thought processes to liberate and 
emancipate a society experiencing diverse cultural bombard­
ment from Europe to more genuinely embracing the tenets of 
democracy. Freire, on the other hand, comes to the conscien-
tization process from a history and experience that fosters 
a deeper suspicion of the vested interests of the existing 
social structure. Facing the very real struggles for human 
rights and freedom in South America, Freire has faced squarely 
the realities of conflict between the dominant and the 
oppressed. Thus he approaches the ideals of democracy with 
an understanding that there is a tension and struggle in the 
world between those seeking change and those supporting perma­
nence. Freire's suspicion enables him to scientifically 
unveil and problematize a concrete situation, while at the 
same time remaining mindful of the political interests being 
served by the maintenance of such a situation. While Dewey 
and Freire discuss the dialectic between certainty and 
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uncertainty in the thinking, reflective, reconstructing 
process, Freire moves a step further, to include the dialectic 
between permanence and change as it continues to expose ques­
tions of political interest. Consequently, Freire's work 
at its heart, represents the desire and necessity to make 
explicit the political quality of the tensions which exist 
between the dualities which empowerment, "conscientization," 
and "reflective thought" seek to bind. 
Thus, for Freire, the guiding light for conscientization 
and the encompassed praxis must be the beam of political ques­
tions that potentially generates transformation. Freire's 
critique of ideology enables him to address that which Dewey's 
faith or trust in the goodness of the ideals of democracy left 
him incapable of recognizing. Freire understands that the 
knowledge of reality which is revealed in problematization and 
scientific unveiling or in Dewey's reflective thought process 
is in itself not necessarily enough to move one to transform 
that reality. He understands that conscientization is not 
just a pedagogic method but that it must be attached to the 
political questions. Freire makes explicit that which Dewey 
deals with indirectly or implicitly. Freire addresses the 
ideological issues of domination in maintaining the power 
balance which perpetuates the social structure which is trans­
mitted by the educational institution. Central to his under­
standing of the role of schools in functioning as institutions 
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for social control by dichotomizing teaching from learning, 
Freire reminds us of Marx's warning: "The educator should 
also be educated" (Freire, 1985, p. 105). 
Consequently, Freire's conscientization is both political 
and prophetic, in that it must include the oppressed in the 
denunciation of the present reality and it must announce that 
which is coming. Giroux powerfully distinguishes between the 
idealism of Dewey and the more critical stance of Freire when 
he, Giroux, touches upon his own Utopian vision as being that 
which is revealed in a praxis in which we are to live display­
ing "civic courage" or the willingness to act as though we 
were living in a democracy (Giroux, 1983, p. 201). In not 
addressing the political interest of the educational struc­
ture in maintaining the social structure and the reverse, 
Dewey trustingly held to the innate goodness of democratic 
ideals and the clarity of scientific reasoning to transform 
educational and social practice in the direction of emanci­
pation . 
At the center of Freire's work is his desire to'reveal and 
re-unit the connections between the political and the peda­
gogical. Freire seems to most clearly address the nature of 
"interest" when dealing with issues of domination and ideology. 
According to Freire, these political questions regarding domi­
nation and ideology emerge during the problematization and 
scientific unveiling processes of conscientization. As expe­
riences are scrutinized, the individual begins to develop a 
109 
critical consciousness in which he/she recognizes that real­
ity is immersed in a continuous series of political struggles 
that pivot around questions of interest. However, Freire 
realizes what Dewey did not, that problematizing and scien­
tific unveiling alone do not guarantee recognition of oppres­
sive conditions or a corresponding reconstruction. In under­
standing the sociological phenomenon of hegemony Freire 
writes: 
Correcting one's earlier perception isn't always easy. 
The relation between subject and object means that reveal­
ing an objective reality equally affects its subjective 
qualities and sometimes in an intensely dramatic and 
painful manner. (Freire, 1985, p. 16) 
Thus Freire devotes much of his attention to the neces­
sity of becoming politically literate, for as one participates 
in the process of political literacy one also travels the path 
of educational liberation. Freire uses the metaphor of Easter 
in its most profound sense in order to vividly explain polit­
ical literacy: "the educator must be prepared to die as the 
exclusive educator of learners" (Freire, 1985, p. 105). 
Section IV: 
Political Literacy and Educational Emancipation 
The political illiterate "is one who has an ingenuous 
perception of humanity in its relationships with the world" 
(Freire, 1985, p. 103). The political illiterate is one who 
escapes reality by rejecting it and losing oneself in abstrac­
tion, one who is unconcerned about, for whom or for what 
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purposes he/she is working and who further believes in and 
maintains the structures which support subject and object 
dichotomies (Freire, 1985, pp. 102-103). Education is per­
ceived as being for the purpose of transferring facts and 
values. The method of this educational practice is prescrip­
tive. In other words, the political illiterate participates 
in the depository, banking notion of education as expressed 
by Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 
Conversely, the politically literate educators and stu­
dents are those who understand 
the very impossibility of theory without practice, the 
impossibility of thinking without a transforming action 
in the world, as well as the impossibility of knowledge 
for its own sake or the impossibility of a theory that 
only explicates reality and offers a neutral education. 
(Freire, 1985, p. 104) 
The urgency with which Freire expresses his concerns for the 
necessity of developing and nurturing political literacy 
springs from his own recognition that without it critical con­
sciousness cannot emerge. 
If we don't transcend the idea of education as pure 
transference of a knowledge that merely describes 
reality, we will prevent critical consciousness from 
emerging and thus reinforce political illiteracy. 
(Freire, 1985, p. 104) 
Consequently, in the spirit of Easter, the educators as well 
as the students must die to their confining roles as depos­
itors and receivers of knowledge to be reborn and awakened to 
the life of real educators and learners or that of being 
"educators of the self-educator and self-learner" (Freire, 
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1985, p. 105). For "without this mutual death and rebirth, 
education for freedom is impossible" (Freire, 1985, p. 105). 
Thus, for Freire, education for political literacy pro­
vides the serious focus for all educational effort. The 
movement toward political literacy encompasses those aspects 
of the conscientization process that Dewey's reflective 
thought process fails to explicitly articulate, namely, 
critique of ideology, dialogue, and announcement of a new 
reality. 
In analyzing issues of domination through ideological 
critique, Freire turns to the sociological constructs of 
superstructure and infrastructure in order to gain insights 
into the contribution of naive and shrewd attitudes in main­
taining the status quo through social reform and to further 
understand the conditions which foster the entrenchment of 
hegemony. It is through the ideological critique of domina­
tion that Freire steps solidly beyond Dewey's reflective 
thought process and into the arena of explicit political ques­
tioning. Freire clearly reveals that the dominator's oppres­
sive grip is much firmer than Dewey had envisioned with his 
critique of the dogmatic nature of tradition in A Common 
Faith. 
Through Freire's infrastructure-superstructure lens one 
begins to understand that demystification and emancipation 
will not result from merely opening up the institutions of 
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tradition, i.e., religion and education, to examination by 
scientific unveiling or reflective thought process. The 
failure of Dewey's hope that the application of scientific 
reasoning in the form of reflective thought process would con­
tribute to intellectual freedom and liberation is more clearly 
understood when viewing domination through Freire's ideolog­
ical critique. In examining the political interest of the 
dominant traditions and institutions, Freire brings to the 
surface the dialectic interaction between values and action, 
between superstructure and infrastructure that explain the 
social structure itself. Freire understands that the dynamic 
tension between permanence and change characterizes the total 
social structure and that it is this very tension that needs 
to be examined in order to expose the interest being served. 
Thus, authentic praxis must embrace the political, if conscien-
tization is to offer any hope for emergence of a critical 
consciousness that faces us toward emancipation. 
Freire's component of ideological critique within the 
larger conscientization process speaks to the emergence of the 
politically literate individual, one who while developing a 
critical consciousness also penetrates the hierarchies of 
the existing social dualities and is empowered by his/her 
ability to articulate questions of interest. Thus the polit­
ical literate recognizes that the maintenance of the status 
quo is in the interest of the dominant social class and that 
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the action of this class will be in the nature of assuring 
permanence. Understanding this enables the politically lit­
erate individual to criticize reform as being of a reactionary 
nature and as reflecting that which Freire characterizes as 
being either of a naive or shrewd attitude. In understanding 
the reactionary character of reform, one understands that 
changes made only in the infrastructure will not result in 
superstructural transformation. Consequently, without address­
ing the interest or political dynamic of domination and sub­
ordination, the oppressed remain the downtrodden, marginal, 
and objectified victims of social reform in which the social 
structure remains the same. Those possessing the attitude 
of the shrewd realize this and with complete comprehension of 
the political questions of interset support humanitarian action 
that ultimately slows any change in the social structure. 
The action of those possessing a naive attitude is directed 
toward changing the consciousness of the downtrodden through 
humanitarian works and encouragement in "other" worldly values, 
in hopes that a consciousness change will transform the world. 
However, since those possessing a naive attitude are polit­
ically illiterate, they do not address ideological concerns 
or issues of domination and the superstructure remains intact, 
reflecting the attitudes and values of the dominator. 
Political illiteracy resulting in an inability to under­
stand the infrastructure-superstructure dialectic offers the 
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prime condition under which hegemony is fostered. The dom­
inated introject the cultural myths, values, and life styles 
of the dominator. Further: 
prevented from having a "structural perception" of the 
facts involving them, they do not know that they cannot 
"have a voice," that is, they cannot exercise the right 
to participate consciously in the sociohistorical trans­
formation of their society. (Freire, 1985, p. 50) 
Their voice is that of the dominator and when the dominator 
speaks, the dominated listen. 
This results in the duality of the dependent society, 
its ambiguity, its being and not being itself, and the 
ambivalence characteristic of its long experience of 
dependency, both attracted by and rejecting the metro­
politan society. (Freire, 198b, p. 73) 
Without a structural perception the dominated remain mysti­
fied, non-participatory, non-critical, and self-oppressed. 
As the politically literate individual evolves, while 
grasping the significance of ideological critique, the phe­
nomenon of hegemony begins to surface. Those who were once 
outcast, marginal, voiceless begin to name themselves as 
"oppressed," thus removing themselves from the objectified 
categories of marginality and placing themselves into a sub­
jective position in which they have a voice. Once this self-
naming begins, the oppressed have placed themselves into a 
position in which they have the potential for gaining insight 
into the ways in which political interest serves to structure 
the social context. Emancipation, empowerment, political 
literacy is not given, it is not earned, it is gained through 
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continual struggle in which praxis must be guided by reflec­
tion which scrutinizes ideology and consequently exposes the 
nature of the social structure and the existence of hegemony. 
Only when the people of a dependent society break out 
of the culture of silence and win their right to speak— 
only, that is, when radical structural changes transform 
the dependent society—can such a society as a whole 
cease to be silent toward the director society. (Freire, 
1985, p. 73) 
Dialogue is essential to the realization of Freire's 
conscientization process. In becoming politically literate 
one finds his/her voice and becomes capable of participating 
in dialogue. Freire writes that "authentic revolutions are 
undertaken in order to liberate men, precisely because men 
can know themselves to be oppressed, and be conscious of the 
oppressive reality in which they exist" (Freire, 1985, p. 89). 
In gaining a voice while becoming politically literate, one 
articulates and consequently knows himself-herself to be 
oppressed and addresses the oppressive nature of his or her 
own reality. Without a voice authentic revolution could not 
be possible. 
Freire considers that "dialogue is the sign of the act 
of knowing" (Freire, 1985, p. 55). He continues that "for 
dialogue to be a method of true knowledge, the knowing subject 
must approach reality scientifically in order to seek the 
dialectical connections that explain the form of reality" 
(Freire, 1985, p. 55). Therefore, genuine dialogue is truly 
"word-and-action," for expression follows reflection and 
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the actual expression is in itself transforming. Dialogue 
becomes the pivotal point for reflection and action. There­
fore, dialogue is an integral and continuous quality of con-
scientization. "Dialogue with the people, in cultural action 
for freedom, is not a formality but an indispensable condi­
tion in the act of knowing" (Freire, 1985, p. 163). 
Critical consciousness is not an abstraction arising in 
theory but formed from reflection upon and articulation of con­
crete experiences. The meanings of these experiences emerge in 
the dialogue between man and man. In fact, authentic commu­
nication "implies communication between men, mediated by the 
world" (Freire, 1985, p. 84). Freire writes, "Dialogical 
relationship is a sign of the cognitive act, in which the 
knowing object, mediating the knowable subjects, gives itself 
over to a critical revelation" (Freire, 1985, p. 167). The 
presence of genuine dialogue, for Freire, is the indication 
that "conscientization" is occurring and that individuals 
are becoming politically literate. Dialogue is the culminat­
ing act signaling the appearance of individuals acting as 
knowing, responsible, participatory subjects. 
The inclusion of dialogue in Freire's conscientization 
process seems to represent the expression, within the context 
of community, of Dewey's doing and undergoing quality of 
genuine experience. Since, for Freire, the mediating knowing 
object of the dialogical relationship is experience, the 
relationship is propelled by the desire to more fully appre­
hend and clarify experience in order to capture more fully 
the extent to which one has done and undergone an experience. 
Dialogue is the expression in which one confirms, within a 
community, the transforming nature of doing and undergoing 
of experience. Dialogue emerges as knowable objects are 
revealed. That which is known and expressed in dialogue is 
the dynamic active-passive quality of experience and thus 
the transforming nature of dialogue and experience. 
Through dialogue, Freire's final element of conscienti-
zation is disclosed, the announcement of a new reality. In 
keeping with the prophetic dialectic of criticism and hope, 
Freire's announcement of a new reality emerges through dia­
logue in the process of criticism and denouncement. As one 
denounces what is, transformation is occurring. When one 
is empowered to the point of being capable of expressing crit­
icism, one already holds the kernel of possibility of what 
may be coming. "Humanization is their [beings of praxis] 
Utopia, which they announce in denouncing, dehumanizing pro­
cesses" (Freire, 1985, p. 70). 
Freire makes explicit the requirement of this recon­
structive, rebuilding action by addressing the Utopian enter­
prise, or that toward which the conscientization process is 
directed. 
It [Utopian pedagogy] is full of hope, for to be Utopian 
is not to be merely idealistic or impractical but rather 
to engage in denunciation and annunciation. Our pedagogy 
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cannot do without a vision of man and of the world. 
It formulates a scientific humanist conception that finds 
its expression in a dialogical praxis in which teachers 
and learners together, in the act of analyzing a dehu­
manizing reality, denounce it while announcing its trans­
formation in the name of the liberation of man. (Freire, 
1985, p. 57) 
For Freire, the Utopian vision must be announced and con­
structed in order to complete the dialectic movement between 
criticism and hope. However, this denunciation and annuncia­
tion "cannot be exhausted when the reality denounced today 
cedes its place tomorrow to the reality previously announced 
in the denunciation" (Freire, 1985, p. 58). It is a contin­
uous movement in which change and possibility are affirmed 
as steps are taken toward human liberation. . Freire clearly 
understands that 
When education is no longer Utopian, that is, when it 
no longer embodies the dramatic unity of denunciation 
and annunciation, it is either because the future has 
no more meaning for men, or because men are afraid to 
risk living the future as creative overcoming of the 
present, which has become old. (Freire, 1985, p. 58) 
Dialogue is the vehicle through which the politically 
literate individual emerges during the denunciation aspect 
of ideological critique and the annunciation process of an 
Utopian vision. Through dialogue, individuals participate 
in the explicit expression of their criticisms of their 
present realities and take part in the concrete construction 
of their visions and hopes for a new reality. Dialogue, as 
an expression of doing and undergoing of experience, binds 
denunciation with annunciation and criticism with hope. 
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Dewey's "reflective thought process" in lacking the 
connective link of dialogue remains vulnerable to being incap­
able of addressing the issues of ideological critique and 
the envisioned new realities of Freire's conscientization 
process. Dewey's work implicitly embodies both criticism 
of tradition and hope for the realization of democratic 
ideals. However, in not recognizing the requirement of dia­
logue in the emergence of political literacy, he remains mysti­
fied by his own method and by his idealistic faith in the 
reality of democracy. By failing to understand the deeper 
roots of the questions of interest, Dewey innocently pleads 
for the realization of justice which is inherent in our demo­
cratic principles. Further, he relies upon the logic offererd 
by the reflective thought process to make these ideals of 
freedom and equality manifest. 
In spite of their historical and contextual differences 
that result in the above stated theoretical variations, Dewey 
and Freire represent, for me, the essence and attraction of 
transformative-emancipatory educational thinking and practice. 
Their message of empowerment is addressed as issues regarding 
the nature and quality of consciousness and experience are 
dealt with. The distancing and appropriating of phenomeno-
logical investigation of experience, consciousness, and know­
ledge form the framework within which emancipatory construction 
and reconstruction of reality take place. Their central 
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positioning of praxis and dialogue further attends to the 
importance of responsibility that takes place within the 
empowerment process. The dialogic rather than dualistic 
manner of approaching experiences in the face of uncertainty 
affirms their effort to reduce the alienating structures of 
hierarchy. Theirs is a message of empowerment that accom­
panies the demystification of oppressive realities as con­
sciousness, knowledge, and experience are reconstructed 
within a greater vision of justice. The heart of their mes­
sage holds the hope that we may come to know what we are about 
in our efforts to cease being plague stricken. 
The transformative-emancipatory educational vision is 
one in which the struggle to realize a more just community 
is central. Paramount to this realization of justice are 
the constructs of demystification which Dewey and Freire 
refer to in the "reflective thought" and "conscientization" 
process, respectively. Critical consciousness and the social 
reconstruction of knowledge, experience, and consciousness 
provide the essential qualities of praxis that empower. Thus 
transformative-emancipatory educational practice embraces 
the freeing action of empowerment as critical consciousness 
and reconstruction are aimed at responsible and caring acts 
of justice. 
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Section V: 
My Transformative-Emancipatory Hermeneutic Journey 
My affirmation of the validity of the transformative-
emancipatory message is addressed as I turn to reflect upon 
my own hermeneutic journies. As touched upon earlier, my 
first trip around the hermeneutic circle was on the level 
of examination of those to whom Freire would refer to as having 
a "naive attitude." I was unable to voice the deeper polit­
ical questions of interest, for the interpretation of my inter­
pretations remained primarily in the realm of a technical 
consciousness. Consequently, my taken-for-granted world was 
rarely questioned. Further, the generally accepted nature 
of my helping action, in the form of teaching, aided in pre­
serving the very structures of the educational institution 
that I found to be alienating and offensive. 
As my second hermeneutic journey became reflexive rather 
than reflective, the interpretation of my understandings and 
my taken-for-granted realities changed. Reflecting a more 
politically literate consciousness, I was able to reinterpret 
my teaching practice in terms that enabled me to see that 
much of my helping was actually contributing to the main­
tenance of the unjust, dignity-denying relationships that 
I was hoping to diminish. In the words of Camus, I was an 
oblivious transmitter of the plague: "The evil that is in 
the world always comes of ignorance, and good intentions may 
do as much harm as malevolence, if they lack understanding" 
(Camus, 1972, p. 124). 
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A gradual demystification process began to slowly take 
effect as the questions of interest began to resonate with 
my discomfort. I began to be able to voice my uneasiness 
and to unite theory with practice. My second trip around 
the hermeneutic circle was energized by the empowerment gained 
through the illumination of issues of interest. 
I feel that quite possibly my sensitivity to the ques­
tions of interest and my increasing discomfort with the super­
ficial, empty nature of the positivistic, traditional techni­
cal rationale were heightened by the births of my own chil­
dren. Their presence in this world has had an awesome and 
humbling effect upon me, an effect which has opened me to 
wisdom of the message of praxis. A message which addresses 
the urgency of the need for critical reflection upon and 
responsible action taken in the face of injustice and oppres­
sion. I have experienced an overwhelming sense of a loss 
of innocence as I have attempted to contemplate the meanings 
of their births. Their presence has illuminated more clearly, 
for me, my connections with myself and with our world. Con­
cern for my children's beings and futures has increased my 
understanding of and empathy with all mothers of the world 
who anguish for their children's health and well-being. This 
has connected me at a deeper level with the quest for justice 
and human dignity. Therefore, I feel that perhaps I have 
heard-more clearly than before the empty and death-dealing 
promises of the technical rationale. 
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The questions of interest, as formulated by critical 
theory and expressed by transformative-emancipatory thinkers, 
began to offer me ways of making new connections and recon­
structing others. My second trip around the hermeneutic circle 
has enabled me to soundly question and criticize the techno­
cratic rationale of positivistically informed educational 
practice. This criticism has enabled me to construct an 
interpretation of my world that has embraced a political 
understanding. I have been invigorated and energized by the 
realization and ownership of the understanding of social con­
struction of reality. I have been captivated by the endless 
possibilities that this realization has offered in addressing 
and rectifying the conditions of oppression and injustice 
that have manifested themselves at all levels of our society. 
At this point, I have connected most solidly with the 
messages of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Henry Giroux, who, 
while adhering to the ideals of democracy, deal with educa­
tional emancipation from a social transformation standpoint. 
Their messages of reflective thought, conscientization, and 
transformative intellectualism speak to action and reflec­
tion upon conditions of oppression that I had felt inadequate 
to address as a special education teacher indoctrinated with 
the technical rationale. Their work has offered me a world 
that can be transformed through social reconstruction; it 
has given me the political understanding of interest as it 
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is connected to questions of experience, consciousness, and 
knowledge. It has enabled me to firmly address the aliena­
tion created by the oppressive structures of the dominant 
mentality in maintaining the status quo through liberal social 
reform. This transformative, emancipatory vision has ener­
gized me with hope and has enabled me to criticize the struc­
tural injustice of positivistic, technical thinking. At 
this point I felt that through "reflective thought," "con-
scientization," and "transformative intellectualism," lib­
eration would occur. 
My second trip around the hermeneutic circle has filled 
me with a transformative consciousness.that has given me a 
sociological orientation which has provided me with a commu­
nity rather than individualistic orientation and a structural 
rather than personal understanding of oppression. It has 
enabled me to examine my taken-for-granted world through the 
political lens of interest. I have been empowered by Paulo 
Freire's "conscientization" and John Dewey's "reflective 
thought" processes as questions of interest and possibilities 
of reconstruction reveal and illuminate painful paradoxes 
existing in our schools and culture. Thus I have begun to 
develop a language which has enabled me to address injustice 
and oppression from a position of critical theory. The trans­
formative consciousness of critical theory has provided me 
with the tools of reconstruction with which to address human 
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dignity through acts of justice. From the perspective 
offered by Reinholt Niebuhr, critical theory and trans-
formative-emancipatory consciousness has allowed me to 
t 
speak to the plight of those who have so little power 
that their being is almost impossible. 
Yet, in spite of my own hermeneutic verification of the 
wisdom of the transformative-emancipatory message, I also 
realize that it is an incomplete vision of liberation. As 
I begin to examine the transformative-emancipatory vision 
supported by critical theory as it connects to the liberation 
of the labeled exceptional population, I begin to feel uneasy. 
That which has empowered me, that which has filled me with 
visions of social justice and affirmed.my dignity is not going 
to be the same enabler for the disabled, the handicapped, 
and the young. Social justice and emancipation as put forth 
by critical theory do not adequately reach the depth needed 
to illuminate the human dignity of these people. 
The transformative-emancipatory consciousness potentially 
seems to address ways of responding to conditions of injus­
tice through the formulation of "conscientization" and/or 
"reflective thought" processes which can function as tools 
for emancipation and empowerment. However, the issues of 
human dignity, for the young and handicapped, as revealed 
through justice and love, are not fully addressed by crit­
ical theory. Consequently, the dialectic between the 
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transformative-emancipatory and the transcendent-liberatory 
seem to be vital to our hopes and visions of revealing who 
and what we are as human beings. 
With the emphasis of emancipation placed upon "conscien-
tization," "reflective thought," and "political literacy," 
the transformative view regards intellectual and literacy 
abilities as being necessary prerequisites for empowerment. 
One cannot appropriate if one's reasoning skills are not rela­
tively intact. Thus, the capacity for critical exploration 
is an essential ingredient for emancipatory thinking. Conse­
quently, the young and the severely handicapped are unable 
to participate in this emancipatory process and remain vul­
nerable to the benevolent and potentially patronizing and 
oppressive intentions of the emancipated. Love, that which 
for me cannot be left to chance, that which cannot be manip­
ulated and appropriated, is not necessarily brought forth 
by the transformative consciousness of critical theory. 
As my questions change from those of interest, which 
I perceive as addressing justice, to those of that which 
cannot be left to chance, which I consider as dealing with 
issues of love and relationship, I begin a third trip around 
the hermeneutic circle. This journey is propelled by the 
concern for how we are to respond to one another or how we 
are to understand love. At this point I turn to the phil­
osophical and spiritual insights offered by Martin Buber and 
Abraham' Heschel as they respond to the questions of love and 
relationship. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TRANSCENDENT-LIBERATORY VISION 
The educational vision of the transcendent-1iberatory 
orientation is one in which human dignity is confirmed and 
illuminated through serious acts of love. Mutuality, reci­
procity, and subjectivity form the core of the transcendent-
liberatory vision. The educational mission is a calling to 
participate in relation in such a way that we do not diminish 
our capacity to confirm and be confirmed. The educational 
mission and calling require action that passionately propels 
us to engage in the mystery. Such engagement leaves us with 
awe and wonder. Awe enables us to become aware of the mystery 
but awe never results in our comprehension or revelation of 
the mystery. Heschel writes: 
Awe is an intuition for the dignity of all things, a 
realization that things not only are what they are but 
also stand, however remotely, for something supreme. 
Awe is a sense for the transcendence, for the reference 
everywhere to mystery beyond all things. . . . What we 
cannot comprehend by analysis, we become aware of in awe. 
(Heschel, 1965, pp. 88-89) 
The transcendent-liberatory vision of educational prac­
tice and purpose embraces the mystery rather than the uncer­
tain. Their quest becomes one of awe-inspired wisdom rather 
than curiosity-sparked knowledge. The aim of the transcendent-
liberatory mission is guided toward a heightened conscience 
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in which one becomes aware of his existential guilt and exis­
tential indebtedness rather than a critical consciousness 
which enables us to reconstruct reality. The spiritual dia­
lectic rather than the dialectic of praxis encompasses the 
tensions of the transcendent-liberatory vision. The spiritual 
dialectic is molded by the struggles of good in the face of 
evil which shape that which is "between man and man," namely 
relation, dialogue, love, and spirit. 
This vision concerns itself primarily with how one 
responds to that which is required. Consequently, how one 
faces himself, the world, and God constitute the focus of 
the transcendent-liberatory practice. Insights from Buber and 
Heschel provide the sources for constructing such an educa­
tional vision of the spiritual dialectic. It is a dialectic 
in which existential guilt and existential indebtedness provide 
us with the intimation of how one engages in life and the 
mystery. 
In responding to the "how," the transcendent-liberatory 
vision of educational practice encompasses the relation between 
good and evil and attempts to consistently name the destruc­
tive powers of evil, namely exclusion and alienation. In so 
doing, the transcendent-liberatory mission calls one to take 
direction, make decision, and act in love. This calling is 
one of surrender and inclusion, it is one done in wholeness, 
it is the potentiality of our mutually bringing one another to 
presence during encounter by confirming and being confirmed. 
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Martin Buber offers insights into good and evil, rela­
tion, and consciousness that provide the basic tenets upon 
which the transcendent-liberatory vision rests. Abraham 
Heschel offers reflections upon dignity and reciprocity which 
further contribute to the foundations of the transcendent-
liberatory mission. Together Buber and Heschel provide the 
theological and philosophical orientation upon which the 
transcendent-liberatory vision is founded. 
Section I: 
Martin Buber; Distance and Return 
In contemplating the dynamics of human being and becom­
ing, Martin Buber offers the metaphorical distinctions between 
an I-It self-consciousness of ego and an I-Thou self-
consciousness of person. In so doing,'he attempts to address 
the crucial elements of distance and return as they form the 
conditions for the possibility of all genuine relationship as 
well as the potential for impairment to the formulation of 
relationship. He discusses this distancing and relating as 
being the two-fold movement and principle of human life. For 
only when something has been set at a distance, can the pos­
sibility of relation exist. However, the distancing is only 
the presupposition for relation and not the guarantee of it. 
In the distancing, man is provided with his situation, 
and in the relating he is given the possibility of becoming, 
in that situation. Buber writes: 
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The facts of the movement of distance yield the essen­
tial answer to the question, How is man possible; the 
facts of the movement of relation yield the essential 
answer to the question, How is human life realized. 
. . . Distance provides the human situation; relation 
provides man's becoming in that situation. . . . This 
difference can be seen in two spheres, within the con­
nection with things and within the connection with one's 
fellow men. (Buber, 1965, p. 64) 
The complexity of this dynamic is further illuminated 
in understanding that man is the one creature who is capable 
of distancing the whole as a world rather than only cutting 
out that which he needs. Consequently, man is capable of 
entering into a relationship which reveals his whole being 
and becoming and which transcends the relationships of utility 
and experience. 
Rather is this the peculiarity of human life, that here 
and here alone a being has arisen from the whole, endowed 
and entitled to detach the whole as a world from himself 
and to make it an opposite to himself, instead of cutting 
out with his senses the part he needs from it, as all 
other beings do, and bring content with that. This 
endowment and this entitlement of man produce, out of 
the whole, the being of the world, and this being can 
only mean that it is there for man as something that is 
for itself, with which he is able to enter into rela­
tion. (Buber, 1965, p. 63) 
Further, it is in the distancing that language emerges 
as the link for possible relation. The distancing movement 
evokes the word which attempts to connect that which has been 
distanced. Buber writes, 
To speak to others is something essentially human, 
and is based on the establishment and acknowledgment 
of the independent otherness of the other with whom one 
fosters relation, addressing and being addressed on 
this very basis. (Buber, 1965, p. 68) 
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The word that is spoken, from this distanced position, has 
the capacity for placing us into authentic relationship or 
for preventing genuine encounter. If one speaks "it," then 
one enters into a relationship mediated by and concerned with 
experience. Experience remains between man and man prevent­
ing actual relation. However, if one says, "Thou," one is 
offered the possibility of coming into being through the 
event of relation. 
Thus the distancing movement is vital to our very being. 
In the distancing, I become an "I" in the world, I exist, 
I have a world. As an "I," I am capable of return. The ques­
tions I formulate, as I exist and am distanced, offer the 
opportunity to return with either an ego self-consciousness 
of it or a person self-consciousness of thou. Distance 
offers the possibility for becoming, it is a presupposition 
for being but not the source of the realization of being. 
The appearance of distance gives space for the relation. 
In addition, the way in which I distance further contributes 
to my capacity for saying "it" or "thou." If I appropriate 
and cut out that from which I distance, if I do not distance 
from the whole, I am unable to relate or return as a whole. 
That from which I distance offers the potentiality for who 
I can become and how I am capable of returning. I am who 
and how I am, based upon how I distance and what I speak while 
distanced. 
Distance is the presupposition for relation as well as 
for evil. Therefore, the way in which we distance, whether 
what is over and above us is the whole or an appropriated 
and selected portion of the whole, determines what we are 
able to enter into relation with. How we conduct ourselves 
while distanced, the types of questions we formulate, the 
words that are spoken, direct the kinds of relationships we 
may enter into. Do we speak "it" and enter into a relation 
of experience and utility, or do we say "thou" and poten­
tially enter into pure presence and being? 
The return is not a guarantee of the realization of 
being, for in returning one is either saying "it" or "thou." 
Thus one returns either as the "subject" of further subject-
object relationships or as subjectivity with the potentiality 
for mutually bringing oneself and the other to presence. 
The longing for relation is primary, the cupped hand 
into which the being that confronts us nestles, and the 
relation to that, which is a wordless anticipation of 
saying You comes second. (Buber, 1970, p. 78) 
Thus the yearning for relation precedes the word that is 
spoken and in our desire for return we may either say "it" 
or "thou." 
Even, in longing for relation and in returning while 
saying "Thou," one is still not guaranteed of being or becom­
ing, for actuality is given in grace. Buber writes, "When 
we walk our way and encounter a man who comes toward us, walk­
ing his way, we know our way only and not his; for his comes 
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to life for us only in the encounter" (Buber, 1970, p. 124). 
He continues: 
Our concern, our care must be not for the other side 
but for our own, not for grace but for will. Grace con­
cerns us insofar as we proceed toward it and await its 
presence; it is not our object. (Buber, 1970, p. 124) 
The will that constitutes our side of relation is the 
will to attach our power, energy, and actions toward becom­
ing. Thus "will" is the will to respond to God's command, 
that of performing the essential deed. Man's essential deed 
and supreme duty require him to return, in spirit, to the 
distraction of the world. Risking to say "thou" with his 
whole being, surrendering his power to determine and control 
the possible outcomes of an encounter, and being able to 
exclusively and completely confront the one who is before 
him are the sacrifices and risks that the essential deed 
involves. 
What is required is a deed that a man does with his 
whole being: if he commits it and speaks with his being 
the basic word to the form that appears, then the crea­
tive power is released and the work comes into being. 
(Buber, 1970, p. 60) 
We cannot "will" our selves into being by following a 
prescription for relationship. As Heschel writes, "My own 
existence is not the result of my will to exist" (Heschel, 
1965, p. 98). However, our responsibility is to know our 
side of this relationship. We must know our will and it must 
be directed toward the two-fold electing and elected nature 
of relationship. We must always be going forth, reaching 
134 
toward encounter, while at the same time being prepared to 
say "Thou" at any moment. Our "power" needs to be concen­
trated upon going forth and remaining open while our "will" 
should be directed at speaking "Thou." "Man's will to be 
cannot be separated from his ought to be. . . . Being is obedi­
ence, a response. 'Thou art' precedes 'I am.' I am because 
I am called upon to be" (Heschel, 1965, p. 98). 
For Heschel, the "characteristic of human existence is 
the mutual involvement of being and meaning" (Heschel, 1965, 
p. 98). Further, the concern for meaning is the core which 
constitutes the truth of being human. Thus, "Man may be char­
acterized as a being in quest of a meaning of life" (Heschel, 
1965, p. 54). This meaning is ultimately found in mutuality, 
reciprocity, and unity. Heschel writes, "The cry for meaning 
is a cry for ultimate relationship, for ultimate belonging" 
(Heschel, 1965, p. 73). To "be" means to be human which means 
to be concerned for the meaning of human being. This meaning 
can be touched upon only in relationship. Thus, the insights 
we gain, the momentary flickers of meaning, are illuminated 
only in the reciprocity of relationship. Meaning is received 
in encounter and being is a response to the command that we 
engage in these relationships that reveal the meaning of our 
being human. Meaning and being are received as we engage 
in relationships. We are indebted to the other for the oppor­
tunity to engage in relationship, for being able to glimpse 
135 
meaning and for illuminating our being. "Man cannot think 
of himself as human without being conscious of his indebted­
ness" (Heschel, 1965, p. 108). 
In the genuine relationship, which is given in grace 
and for which we are eternally grateful, we recognize our 
indebtedness. Upon such a recognition, meaning and being 
are illuminated. Only in the reciprocity of relation can 
we glimpse the nature of our being and the meaning of our 
being human—a meaning which intimately recognizes its 
indebtedness. 
Therefore, the act of will is not one in which meaning 
and being are objects and outcomes of the will's determina­
tion and power. But meaning and being emerge and are illumi­
nated as the intentionality and control of "will" are surren­
dered to the sacrificing and risking "will" to engage in the 
essential deed. The essential deed, to speak "Thou" with 
one's whole being, is not performed for the purpose of self-
realization and self-actualization but because it, the essen­
tial deed, is required of man. The essential deed is one's 
supreme duty, and it is the way in which one is commanded 
to live. Buber writes of this command and essential deed: 
Here the You appeared to man out of a deeper mystery, 
addressed him out of the dark, and he responded with 
his life. Here the word has become life, and this life, 
. . . is teaching. Thus it stands before posterity in 
order to teach it, not what is and not what ought be, 
but how one lives in the spirit, in the countenance of 
the You. And that means: it stands ready to become 
a You for them at any time opening up the You-world; 
no, it does not stand ready; it always comes toward them 
and touches them. (Buber, 1970, p. 92) 
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We cannot know the other side which is given in grace, 
but we must proceed toward its presence with a full under­
standing of our side and our responsibility. "Man's will 
to profit and will to power are natural and legitimate as 
long as they are tied to the will to human relations and car­
ried by it" (Buber, 1970, p. 97). Our concern is with the 
way in which we encounter, in truth, and with authenticity, 
every real event in this world and this means to "will" to 
risk and "will" to sacrifice in order to engage in the "essen­
tial deed." 
In the returning moment, the will to say "thou" or the 
will to say "it" do not emerge from the same self-consciousness. 
Buber writes, "The I of the basic word I-You is different 
from that of the basic word I-It" (Buber, 1970, p. 111). 
He continues, "The I of the basic word I-lt appears as an 
ego and becomes conscious of itself as a subject (of experi­
ence and use)" (Buber, 1970, pp. 111-112). Conversely, "The 
I of the basic word I-You appears as a person and becomes con­
scious of itself as subjectivity (without any dependent 
genetive)" (Buber, 1970, p. 112). In becoming either ego 
or person, the "I" establishes its mode of existence in the 
world. He writes, "The basic word I-You can only be spoken 
with one's whole being" but "the basic word I-It can never 
be spoken with one's whole being" (Buber, 1970, p. 54). 
If we have distanced ourselves from an appropriated and 
cut-up portion of the whole, we are unable to become a whole 
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being and are incapable of speaking anything other than "it." 
When that which is over and above us is the whole, and when 
the other is exclusively and completely the other, only then 
can we speak "Thou" and participate in the possibility of 
becoming. Buber writes: 
Whoever stands in relation, participates in an actual­
ity; that is, in a being that is neither merely a part 
of him nor merely outside him. All actuality is an 
activity in which I participate without being able to 
appropriate it. Where there is no participation, there 
is no actuality. Where there is self-appropriation, 
there is no actuality. The more directly the You is 
touched, the more perfect is the participation. (Buber, 
1970, p. 113) 
It is the penetration and concentration of the "I" during 
these distanced moments in which the comprehension of experi­
ence is grasped or in which the event of relation is inte­
grated and turns the I toward the world with either an appro­
priating or participating attitude. However, these attitudes 
do not reflect two distinct types of individuals but rather 
a dynamic oscillation between two radically different ways 
of being in and greeting the world. Buber writes, "There 
are not two kinds of human beings, but there are two poles 
of humanity" (Buber, 1970, p. 114). He continues, "No human 
being is pure person, and none is pure ego; none is entirely 
actual, none is entirely lacking in actuality" (Buber, 1970, 
p. 114). 
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Section II: 
Buber; The I Self-consciousness of Ego 
The I-lt self-consciousness of ego becomes conscious of 
itself as a subject which sets itself apart from other egos 
for the purpose of utilizing, experiencing, and possessing 
those distanced objects of observation (Buber, 1970, pp. 111-
114). The self-consciousness of ego is refined in the 
subject-object dynamic in which the subject acts upon the 
object and is, in return, acted upon by the object. This 
doing and undergoing of experience allows the ego to compre­
hend, or understand, more and more or less and less of the 
object in question. In other words, understanding takes 
place in the meeting of texts as the subject is able to 
apprehend the object. 
The purpose of the dynamic interchange between subject 
and object in the I-It mode of existence is to know, to make 
stable, and to possess more of the object. It is the phenom­
enon of which Dewey and POlanyi speak when they refer to making 
that of which we are aware that to which we attend, so that 
what we attend to will eventually embrace or make more certain 
that of which we were at one time only aware. The dialectic 
of the subject and object in the I-It mode of existence is 
for the purpose of refining and reforming the subject so 
thait the subject is capable of having finer and more compre­
hensible experiences. Unfortunately, as Buber points out, 
as our skills for living in the I-It world improve, our 
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ability to live in the I-Thou decreases. He writes, "The 
improvement of the capacity for experience and use generally 
involves a decrease in man's power to relate—that power which 
alone can enable man to live in the spirit" (Buber, 1970, 
p. 89). 
The refinement of experience and improvement of living 
in the world of utility are further understood as impediments 
to the power of relation as one recognizes the self-deception 
that the ego devises as it lives in the world of experience. 
Buber writes: 
The ego becomes conscious of himself as a being this 
way and not that . . . ; the ego says, "That is how I 
am" ... To the ego it ("Know Thyself") means: know 
your being-that-way. By setting himself apart from 
others, the ego moves away from being. 
The ego . . . wallows in his being-that-way a fiction 
that he has devised for himself. For at bottom self-
knowledge usually means to him the fabrication of an 
effective apparition of the self that has the power to 
deceive him even more thoroughly. (Buber, 1970, 
pp. 113-114) 
The I-It self-consciousness of ego is one of appearance 
and seeming which ultimately distorts and prevents the oppor­
tunity for authentic dialogue in which one is capable of 
saying Thou, of confirming the other, or of being confirmed 
by another. The mask of appearance that the ego fabricates 
stands in the way of giving or receiving the event of rela­
tion. Consequently, the ego "knows himself as a subject, 
but this subject can appropraite as much as it wants to, it 
will never gain any substance: it remains like a point, 
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functional, that which experiences, that which uses, nothing 
more (Buber, 1970, p. 114). 
In brief summary, by living in the world of experience 
one becomes accomplished at the skills of appropriating and 
utilizing. These skills enable one to construct a vision 
of himself as being-a-certain-way in the world. These images 
of the self as a utilizer or experiencer formulate a mask 
of appearances which enable one to more successfully and effi­
ciently engage in the refinement and- transformation of experi­
ences. However, these same self-images are the very masks 
which ultimately diminish, distort, and prevent one from par­
ticipating in relation because they conceal and dull the whole 
being of the person. Thus the masked ego actively appropri­
ates and experiences the world but does not gain spiritual 
maturation or substance. The ego does not participate in 
or receive any actuality. "The more a human being, the more 
humanity is dominated by ego, the more does the I fall prey 
to inactuality" (Buber, 1970, p. 115). 
The penetration and concentration of the I of the ego 
self-consciousness is one in which the I integrates finer 
and more efficient ways of possessing and experiencing 
greater portions of the objects of the world. During the 
moments of distance, the I of the ego self-consciousness cuts 
out and appropriates to itself those objects of experience 
which when related to, upon encounter, enable or empower the 
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ego to be more fully and critically conscious of the dynamics 
of that particular experience. The distancing and returning 
movements of the ego self-consciousness of the I-lt are 
designed to enable the ego "I" to become more skillful in 
appropriating, utilizing, and experiencing the objects of 
contemplation. The I-It self-consciousness of ego does not 
distance from a unified whole but rather from a selected por­
tion of the whole, thus the ego is incapable of coming into 
relation with his whole being. Since the I-It ego distanced 
itself from an appropriated piece of the whole, it is unable 
to relate with its whole being and is consequently incapable 
of saying anything other than "it." "The basic word I-It 
can never be spoken with one's whole being" (Buber, 1970, 
p. 54). The penetration of the I of the ego self-
consciousness provides the mask of appearances which enables 
and prepares the ego to effectively appropriate and to effi­
ciently experience. 
In saying "I" the ego self-consciousness sounds tragic, 
pitiful, terrifying, embarrassing, or disgusting. These are 
the sounds which signal the inauthenticity of the "I" or the 
speaker. These are the tones which alert one to the distor­
tion or possible betrayal of relation. These are the sounds 
of appearance. Buber writes: 
How dissonant the I of the ego sounds! When it issues 
from tragic lips tense with some self-contradiction that 
they try to hold back, it can move us to great pity. 
When it issues from chaotic lips that savagely, 
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Heedlessly, unconsciously represent contradiction, it 
can make us shudder. When the lips are vain and smooth, 
it sounds embarrassing or disgusting. (Buber, 1970, 
p. 115) 
Section III: 
Buber: The I Consciousness of person 
The I-Thou self-consciousness of person, on the other 
hand, does not deny the world of experience and utility but 
recognizes it as being a fundamental mode of meaningful exis­
tence. Buber writes, "This does not mean that the person 
'gives up' his being-that-way, his being different; only, 
this is not the decisive perspective but merely the necessary 
and meaningful form of being" (Buber, -1970, p. 114). Buber 
powerfully makes the distinction between living in the I-It 
self-consciousness of ego and the I-Thou self-consciousness 
of person when he writes, "And in all the seriousness of 
truth, listen: without It a human being cannot live. But 
whoever lives only with that is not human" (Buber, 1970, 
p. 85) . 
"How much of a person a man is depends on how strong 
the I of the basic I-You is in the human duality of his I" 
(Buber, 1970, p. 115). The I-Thou self-consciousness of per­
son is one in which the I becomes conscious of itself as subjec­
tivity. "Persons appear by entering into relation to other 
persons" (Buber, 1970, p. 112) . Further, "The purpose of 
r e l a t i o n  i s  t h e  r e l a t i o n  i t s e l f — t o u c h i n g  t h e  Y o u  . . .  a s  
soon as we touch a You, we are touched by a breath of eternal 
life" (Buber, 1970, pp. 112-113). Buber writes: 
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The person becomes conscious of himself as participat­
ing in being, as being with, and thus as a being. . . . 
The person says, "I am"; . . . "Know thyself" means to 
the person: know yourself as being. (Buber, 1970, 
p. 113) 
The I-Thou self-consciousness of person is apparent in 
the being of the free man who responds by entering into rela­
tionship with his whole being and "risks" to live in the spirit. 
Of the free man Buber writes: 
The man to whom freedom is guaranteed does not feel 
oppressed by causality. He knows that his mortal life 
is by its very nature an oscillation between You and 
It, and he senses the meaning of this. It suffices him 
that again and again he may set foot on the threshold 
of the sanctuary in which he could never tarry. Indeed, 
having to leave it again and again is for him an intimate 
part of the meaning and destiny of this life. There, 
on the threshold, the response, the spirit is kindled 
in him again and again; here in the unholy and indigent 
land the spark has to prove itself. What is here called 
necessity can not frighten it; for there he recognized 
true necessity: fate. (Buber, 1970, pp. 101-102) 
The free man encounters, with his whole being, that which 
he goes forth and reaches toward. 
He listens to that which grows, to the way of Being in 
the world, not in order to be carried along by it but 
rather in order to actualize it in the manner in which 
it, needing him, wants to be actualized by him—with 
human spirit and human deed, with human life and human 
death. (Buber, 1970, p. 109) 
The free man, who has the self-consciousness of person, 
distances from a unified and whole world, making that from 
which he distances exclusively and completely whole, thus 
he is capable of going forth with his whole being—the task 
of the free man. Further, he is capable of saying "Thou" 
with his whole being—the essential deed of the free man. 
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The person does not utilize, appropriate, or experience. 
He "sacrifice[s] his little will, which is unfree and ruled 
by things and drives, to his great will that moves away from 
being determined to find destiny" (Buber, 1970, p. 109). 
The person attaches will and power to being which sustains 
and engages in the event of relation. The little will is 
sacrificed in order that the great will is freed tc say "Thou" 
and in order that power be concentrated on going forth and 
remaining open. The going forth, while remaining open and 
saying "Thou," in hope of encountering another person and touch­
ing the eternal-Thou, are the duties of the free man who in 
saying "I" means the I-Thou self-consciousness of person. 
The concentration and penetration of the I of the person 
self-consciousness is one of spiritual maturation in which 
the I apprehends the duality of association and distance. 
The I, of the person self-consciousness, matures spiritually 
as it participates in the two-fold movement of human life. 
"What confronts us comes and vanishes, relational events take 
shape and scatter and through these changes crystallizes, 
more and more each time the consciousness of the constant 
partner, the I-consciousness" (Buber, 1970, p. 80). 
The I-consciousness of person understands that, during 
the moments of departure and distance, in which the event 
of relation vanishes, actuality is not lost but remains as 
a living potentiality. Buber writes, "But the I that steps 
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out of the event of the relation accompanying that, does not 
lose its actuality, p'articipation remains in it as a living 
potentiality" (Buber, 1970, p. 113). Buber continues by 
writing: 
This is the realm of subjectivity in which the I appre­
hends simultaneously its association and its detachment. 
Genuine subjectivity can be understood only dynamically, 
as the vibration of the I in its lonely truth. This 
is also the place where the desire for even higher and 
more unconditional relation and for perfect participa­
tion in being arises and keeps rising. In subjectivity 
the spiritual substance of person matures. (Buber, 1970, 
p. 113) 
The I-consciousness of person is shaped and reformed by 
each event and departure of relation. Although the lessons 
of the actuality and latency of these encounters cannot be 
articulated and set in place for further utilization, they 
are an indication or sign of the world order. An order which 
has at its heart the a priori of relation. "The encounters 
do not order themselves to become a world, but each is for 
you a sign of the world order" (Buber, 1970, p. 83). 
The formation of the I-consciousness of person does not 
enable one to experience, utilize, or determine the event 
of relation. The intimations of the event of relation are 
felt, leaving the person ready for and open to the potential­
ity of future encounters which offer the person the oppor­
tunity to speak "Thou" with his entire being. Buber writes 
of the intimations of the event of relation: 
The man who steps out of the essential act of pure rela­
tion has something More in his being, something new 
has grown there of which he did not know before and for 
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whose origin he lacks any suitable words. . . . Actually, 
we receive what we did not have before, in such a manner 
that we know: it has been given to us. (Buber, 1970, 
p. 158) 
The distanced, loneliness of the concentration of the 
I-consciousness of person is not an empty, isolated, auton­
omous self-reflection. The inmost growth, "the more," that 
has been given and received, is the presence of energy that 
is known only as a result of the actual and genuine encounter. 
The growth that takes place during the lonely moments of dis­
tance is possible only insofar as the human person has par­
ticipated in relation and further prepares himself to continue 
to participate again in the event of relation when the moment 
of encounter is offered in grace. As Buber writes, it is 
not autonomous, self-reflection, and self-affirmation which 
concentrates the I-consciousness of person: 
For the inmost growth of the self is not accomplished, 
as people like to suppose today, in man's relation to 
himself, but in the relation between the one and the 
other, between men, that is pre-eminently in the mutual­
ity of the making present—in the making present in his 
own self by the other—together with the mutuality of 
acceptance, of affirmation and confirmation. (Buber, 
1965, p. 71) 
Although the concentration of the I-consciousness is 
a lonely process, the self-consciousness of person takes shape 
during the encounter and in the participation of relation. 
Actuality, during the event of relation, penetrates the I 
leaving it with "more" than it had before the encounter, but 
also giving the "I" something which is beyond the grasp of 
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verbal expression. This loneliness is discussed by Buber 
when he writes: 
You can not come to an understanding about it with 
others; you are lonely with it; but it teaches you to 
encounter others and to stand your ground in such encoun­
ters; and through the grace of its advents and the melan­
choly of its departures it leads you to that You in which 
the lines of relation, though parallel, intersect. It 
does not help you to survive; it only helps you to have 
intimations of eternity. (Buber, 1970, p. 84) 
It is not a loneliness that fosters independence and auton­
omy, but a solitude which heightens our sense of dependence 
upon the reciprocity of relation. 
With spiritual maturation, the I-consciousness of person, 
of the free man, is penetrated and concentrated with a pres­
ence and an energy which transcends the concrete. Unlike 
the I-consciousness of ego which is concentrated and focused 
upon formulating a mask of appearances which enables the "I" 
to savor and contemplate the richness of experience, the 
I-consciousness of person is integrated in order that the 
meaning of relation, that has been received, can be put into 
practice. The spiritually mature I-consciousness of person 
is propelled to engage in the two-fold nature of man's life 
with man, "the wish of every man to be confirmed as what he 
is, even as what he can become by men; and the innate capacity 
in man to confirm his fellow men in this way" (Buber, 1965, 
p. 68). It is the action of going forth and saying "Thou"— 
the practice and command of the free man! 
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Spiritual maturity of the free man, whose I-consciousness 
is integrated by a self-consciousness of person, is not one 
of passive satisfaction upon finding God and resting within 
the presence of His eternal "Thou-saying," but rather it is 
a call to action in which participation and response are com­
manded. "For this finding is not an end of the way but only 
its eternal center" (Buber, 1970, p. 128).. Upon touching 
the eternal threshold, we are energized and strengthened by 
the wisdom of relation; however, our mission, our responsi­
bility, is to respond and return. "The meaning we receive 
can be put to proof in action only by each person in the 
uniqueness of his being and the uniqueness of his life" 
(Buber, 1970, p. 159). Further, "As we have nothing but a 
You on our lips when we enter the enco.unter, it is with this 
on our lips that we are released from it into the world" 
(Buber, 1970, p. 159). 
The encounter is a two-fold movement in which we reach 
out and go forth saying "Thou," and if by grace we find—in 
an encounter—that we have been made mutually present, we 
return from that event of relation reaching out, going forth 
and saying "Thou." The relational event in which the meaning 
of reciprocity and mutuality is actualized and made present 
is the core, the center but not the end. The strength and 
energy received demands that the meaning of this reciprocity 
be enacted in the world. Buber writes of this responsibil­
ity: 
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It is not the meaning of "another life" but that of this 
our life, not that of a "beyond" but of this our world, 
and it wants to be demonstrated by us in this life and 
this world. The meaning can be received but not experi­
enced; it cannot be experienced, but it can be done; 
and this is what it intends with us. The guarantee does 
not wish to remain shut up with me, it wants'to be born 
into the world by me. (Buber, 1970, p. 159) 
Consequently, for Buber, 
All modern attempts to reinterpret this primal actual­
ity of dialogue and to make it a relationship of the 
I to the self . . . as if it were a process confined 
to man's self-sufficient inwardness, are vain and belong 
to the abysmal history of deactualization. (Buber, 
1970, p. 133) 
In finding God and in being satisfied to rest at that point, 
one distorts the command and betrays the meaning of reciproc­
ity. Buber writes, "The encounter with God does not come 
to man in order that he may henceforth attend to God but in 
order that he may prove its meaning in action in the world" 
(Buber, 1970, p. 164). 
Every encounter and subsequent revelation is a calling 
and a mission. He continues, 
Revelation does not pour into the world through its 
recipient as if he were a funnel: it confers itself 
upon him, it seizes his whole element . . . and 
fuses with it . . . and to sound means to modify 
sound. (Buber, 1970, p. 166) 
The urgency of the mission and the intensity of the command 
are further illuminated as Buber discusses the essence of 
reciprocity by simply stating, "You need God in order to be 
and God needs you—for that is the meaning of your life" 
(Buber, 1970, p. 130). 
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Consequently, in the lonely distanced moments, the 
I-consciousness draws away from an encounter with the memory 
of either objects of experience or events of relation. Dur­
ing these moments, the I-consciousness of the constant part­
ner is re-penetrated and re-concentrated in such a way that 
it re-turns to the world with either an ego-appropriating 
attitude or a person-participating attitude, and with either 
an "it" or a "thou" on its lips. The I-consciousness is 
penetrated in such a way as to further enhance the fabrica­
tion of masks which enable the ego to smoothly function in 
the world of experience and use, or it is concentrated in 
such a manner as to illuminate the subjectivity of the person 
as it ventures forth carrying within it the true meaning of 
reciprocity. The "I" freezes and thaws as it vibrates 
between the world of experience, utility, and appropriation, 
and the world of relation and the spiritual dialectic. The 
spiritual dialectic being the recognition of the tensions 
present in the process of spiritual maturation in which the 
practice of openly going forth while speaking "Thou" is 
informed by the intimation of the meaning of reciprocity. 
Buber reminds us that the way in which one prepares to 
say I places him/her either into the world of experience or 
relation. He writes: 
The way he says I—what he means when he says I— 
decides where a man belongs and where he goes. The word 
"I" is the true shibboleth of humanity. Listen to it! 
(Buber, 1970, p. 115) 
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"I" is the watchword which signals whether we are encounter­
ing one another as ego or as person. The I in its autono-. 
mous distance, when penetrated by the it-world, focuses upon 
cultivating its ego and increasing its skills for experi­
encing and utilizing that world. The I, in its lonely soli­
tude, when concentrated by the thou-relation, integrates its 
person and opens itself to the potentiality for being and 
becoming in the world. As Heschel writes, "My view of the 
world and my understanding of the self determine each other" 
(Heschel, 1965, p. 88). My self-consciousness as ego perpet­
uates my saying I and meaning and receiving "it." My self-
consciousness as person enhances my opportunity to say I, 
meaning and receiving "thou." The "I" is the clue, the 
watchword the crux for understanding the emergence of either 
monologue or dialogue. The "I" reveals the hopes and despairs, 
the vulnerabilities and frailities of humanity. 
The I-Thou and I-It exist in a dynamic oscillation 
between the events of relation during the thaws of the I-
self-consciousness of person and the appropriation and utili­
zation of experience during the frozen moments of the I-
self-consciousness of ego. The "I" vibrates between thaws 
and freezes with the memory of concentrated wholeness during 
the event of relation or the recollection of an appropriated 
exclusion during the occurrence of experience. Thus the self-
consciousness of person is one in which the I feels the 
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intimations of wholeness while the self-consciousness of 
ego is one in which the I remembers appropriation. The I 
that retains an inkling of unity speaks differently from the 
I that recollects partiality. The manifestation of these 
different voices provides a way of understanding the relation 
of good and evil. 
Section IV; 
Buber: Good and Evil 
Buber offers insights into good and evil that go beyond 
considering them as being "two poles, two opposite direc­
tions" (Buber, 1952, p. 121). Good and evil may be more 
clearly understood in their relation to one another as the human 
soul moves through the two existent stages of human reality. 
The first stage "begins with the experience of chaos as a con­
dition perceived in the soul" (Buber, 1952, p. 125). In the 
human being's quest to understand the meaning of his life, 
he may enter into relation with this chaos which either dis­
torts or illuminates this meaning. The second stage of living 
reality corresponds to "man's endeavor to render the contra­
dictory state, which has arisen in consequence of his lack of 
direction and his pseudo-decisions, bearable and even satisfy­
ing, by affirming this state" (Buber, 1952, pp. 139-140). In 
man's attempt to understand his incompleteness and distraction 
he removes himself from the necessity to confirm and receive 
confirmation and turns to the perversion of self-affirmation, 
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an affirmation made in the distraction of incompleteness which 
further freezes him into the "It-world." 
The first stage of living reality in which evil is pos­
sible correpsonds to man's attempt to overcome the chaotic 
state of his soul, "the state of undirected surging passion" 
(Buber, 1952, p. 139). In the midst of chaos, the soul of 
man seeks to understand the meaning of his being. In so doing 
he recognizes the "chaos of possibilities of being," which 
becomes transformed into the "chaos of possibilities of 
action" (Buber, 1952, p. 126). This means that "It is not 
things which revolve in the vortex, but the possible ways 
of joining and overcoming them" (Buber, 1952, p. 126), that 
offer the possibility for either unification or distraction. 
Consequently, the first stage presents us with a chaos which 
prompts us to take action. This action can be either an authen­
tically directing action or it can be one which lacks direc­
tion. It is the distraction and the lack of direction that 
presents itself as evil during this first stage of living 
reality. 
In seeking the unity of his soul, man "slips" into evil 
when he passionately but randomly seeks unification with var­
ious objects and in such a way that these relations are ulti­
mately incapable of rendering wholeness to the soul. Buber 
writes: 
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The soul driven round in the dizzy whirl cannot remain 
fixed within it; it strives to escape. If the ebb that 
leads back to familiar normality does not make its appear­
ance, there exist for it two issues. One is repeatedly 
offered it: it can clutch at any object, past which 
the vortex happens to carry it, and cast its passion 
upon it; or else, in repsonse to a prompting that is 
still incomprehensible to itself, it can set about the 
audacious work of self-unification. In the former case, 
it exchanges an undirected possibility for an undirected 
reality, in which it does what it wills not to do, what 
is preposterous to it, the alien, the 'evil'; in the 
latter, if the work meets with success, the soul has 
given up undirected plenitude in favour of the one taut 
string, the one stretched beam of direction. If the 
work is not successful, which is no wonder with such 
an unfathomable undertaking, the soul has nevertheless 
gained an inkling of what direction, or rather the direc­
tion is—for in the strict sense there is only one. 
To the extent to which the soul achieves unification, 
it becomes aware of direction, becomes aware of itself 
as sent in quest of it. It comes into the service of 
good or into service for good. (Buber, 1952, p. 127) 
In exchanging undirected possibility for undirected real­
ity, the soul is attempting to acquire wholeness and unity. 
However, in its effort to acquire such unity, it falls into 
evil and slips further away from the direction with points 
to and means that unity. Buber refers to this first image 
of evil as being that of the "motif of becoming-like-God . . . 
but is brought to an ironic conclusion" (Buber, 1952, p. 120). 
This image of becoming-like-God is one in which man attempts 
to become a unified soul. However, the tragedy and irony 
of such intention and effort is that it results in the oppo­
site—that of a distracted and a disintegrated soul. Conse­
quently, good may not be done, for good can only be done with 
one's whole soul. The soul that wills its unification can 
never be whole. 
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Thus, in the first stage of living reality as one attempts 
to overcome the chaos, evil emerges as the soul wills its 
unification but lacking direction attaches itself to objects 
in such a way that unity and wholeness are impossible. "Evil 
is lack of direction and that which is done in it and out 
of it as the grasping, seizing, devouring, compelling, seducing, 
exploiting, humiliating, torturing and destroying of what 
offers itself" (Buber, 1952, p. 130). In the first stage, 
one slips into evil as one attaches to objects which, lacking 
direction, throw one further into the chaos. 
The second stage of living reality in which evil can 
become a possibility is one in which man attempts to make 
the contradictions of his It-world bearable by affirming his 
lack of direction and his pseudo-decisions. Man "chooses him­
self, in the sense of his being-constituted-thus or having-
become-thus" (Buber, 1952, p. 140). Once slipping away from 
direction by randomly and frantically choosing objects in 
an effort to grasp meaning and quell the chaos, man, in the 
second stage of the living reality, affirms the willed dis­
harmony of the soul. Buber writes: 
In the second stage evil grows radical, because what 
man finds in himself is willed; whoever lends to that 
which in the depths of self-awareness was time and again 
recognized by him as what should be negated, the mark 
of being affirmed, because it is his, gives it the sub­
stantial character which it did not previously possess. 
(Buber, 1952, p. 140) 
Man congratulates himself and further seeks to fabricate 
the masks of his ego in this second stage of living reality. 
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He affirms himself as being a certain way. In affirming 
himself, man places himself above the need for confirmation 
from others as well as beyond the necessity to confirm others. 
In this state, evil grows and man sets himself in the posi­
tion of being his own creator. "Being-like-God, dominates 
the scene in the last image of the second series" (Buber, 
1952, p. 120). Becoming his own creator, man need only 
decide for himself what he shall become, he becomes auton­
omous and is blinded to being confirmed or confirming. He 
decides to say only "it." Buber writes: 
By glorifying and blessing himself as his own creator, 
he commits the lie against being, yea, he wants to raise 
it, the lie, to rule over being, for truth shall no longer 
be what he experiences as such but what he ordains as 
such. (Buber, 1952, p. 138) 
The two stages of living reality, chaos and contradic­
tion, provide the conditions which determine the manifesta­
tion of evil as the human being attempts to come to terms 
with the meaning of his being in these states. In the first, 
man finds himself slipping into the occurrence of evil, and 
in the second he descends into evil as he decides for and 
affirms "the contradictions of the ego and the It-world. 
Although the character of evil changes as the two stages of 
living reality emerge, the character of good retains "the 
same momentum which may occur at either the first or second 
stage" (Buber, 1952, p. 139). There is only one beam of 
direction and one true decision. "Good is direction and what 
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is done in it . . .is done with the whole soul" (Buber, 1952, 
pp. 130-131). This one directive and decisive beam pene­
trates both stages of the living reality. 
The good is the direction, the decision, and can be 
thought as being in service of the goal of creation. The 
good is direction and decision which are attached to human 
being in such a way that: 
In decision, taking the direction thus means: taking 
the direction toward the point of being at which, execut­
ing for my part the design which I am, I encounter the 
divine mystery of my created uniqueness, the mystery 
waiting for me. (Buber, 1952, p. 142) 
One goes forth openly, confirming. Good is that which is 
and can only be done with one's whole soul, "so that in fact 
all the vigour and passion with which evil might have been 
done is included in it" (Buber, 1952, p. 131). Evil, the 
lack of direction and indecision in the face of chaos and 
contradiction, is done with the distracted, appropriated and 
unwhole soul. Consequently, the whole soul includes that 
which was at one time incomplete and in its wholeness, pas­
sionately embraces and overcomes the evil urge in love. Conse­
quently, good and evil are not the antithesis of one- another 
but rather good presupposes evil and the energy of direction 
and decision encompass that which may have been incomplete 
and undirected. 
In the face of chaos of the first stage of the living 
reality, good, direction, decision remain the same, one goes 
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forth openly, saying "thou." In the face of chaos one does 
not grasp objects seeking to utliize them for the purpose 
of comprehending experience and to devour them hoping for 
unity, but one faces the chaos and seeks relation with it 
for the purpose of relation itself. In so doing, it may or 
may not find unification; however, it will have glanced an 
intimation of the direction and be concentrated in such a 
way that it will be readied for future encounters. 
In the face of contradiction in the second stage of 
living reality, the good, the direction, the decision remain 
the same; one goes forth openly saying "thou." One confirms, 
and in grace is confirmed; the order of being and relation 
are not ruptured. In the face of contradiction, one attempts 
to evoke the memory of person rather than affirming the masks 
of ego which destroy the possibility of relation. One decides 
to participate, not to appropriate. In the face of contradic­
tion, good names the contradiction as being that which dis­
torts relation. In the face of contradiction good does not 
affirm the disharmony and disintegration caused by the actual 
contradiction. 
In the face of chaos, contradiction, indecision, and 
lack of direction, that which is humanly right and good remains 
the same. I encounter in my unique way, openly and com­
pletely, that which is before me and in grace, may be given 
a moment of understanding of my own and the other's becoming. 
Buber writes: 
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My uniqueness, this unrepeatable form of being here, 
not analysable into any elements and not compoundable 
out of any, I experience as a designed or performed one, 
entrusted to me for execution, although everything that 
affects me participates in this execution. That a 
unique human being is created does not mean that it is 
put into being for a mere existence, but for the ful­
fillment of a being-intention, an intention of being 
which is personal, not however in the sense of a free 
unfolding of infinite singularities, but of a realisa­
tion of the right in infinite personal shapes. For cre­
ation has a goal and the humanly right is service 
directed in the One direction, service of the goal of 
creation which we are given to surmise only to the extent 
necessary within this scope; the humanly right is ever 
the service of the single person who realises the right 
uniqueness purposed for him in his creation. (Buber, 
1952, pp. 141-142) 
Although the I-It world and the I-consciousness of ego 
are not intrinsically evil, they do provide the context within 
which evil may flourish. Buber warns us to listen to the 
I of the ego reminding us of its dissonance. The tragic lips 
that move us to great pity as we listen to the plight of modern 
man in all his alienation; the chaotic lips that make us shud­
der with fear as we listen to the hatred and evil released 
by the Hitlers and the Napoleons of our time; the vain and 
smooth lips that evoke disgust as we listen to the patronizing 
confidence of the Grand Inquisitors of our political and spir­
itual well-being; these are the clashing sounds of ego that 
impair, distort, and betray genuine relation and actuality. 
These are the dissonant sounds of the ego and the "it"-world 
which establish the ground within which evil may take root. 
Any injury to the possibility for the occurrence of 
genuine relationship constitutes the presupposition for evil. 
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The genuine I-Thou relationship is of a two-fold nature; it 
is a being elected as well as electing. Therefore, injury 
may occur in either the active or passive state of relation­
ship. Evil becomes a very real possibility when the human 
being is unable to openly go forth or is unable to speak 
"Thou." When our power is detached from our longing for rela­
tion and our will is directed away from speaking Thou, injury 
to our being becomes a very real possibility. Buber writes, 
"There is no evil drive until the drive detaches itself from 
our being" (Buber, 1970, p. 97). When our will to power is 
directed away from going forth and speaking Thou, the poten­
tiality for evil lurks. 
The seeds for evil are sown in doom, for doom is the 
belief that one cannot return from the It-world of the ego 
self-consciousness. "Nothing can doom man but the belief 
in doom, for this prevents the movement of return" (Buber, 
1970, p. 107). The inability to return from or move out of 
the I-It world presents us with the feelings of doom and the 
conditions of alienation in which evil may grow. The I-It 
self-consciousness of ego, in which objectification and appro­
priation result in impersonalization and deactualization, 
provides fertile ground for the growth of "seeming" and 
"imposition." "Seeming" and "imposition" are acts of the 
ego which diminish our capacity to confirm and be confirmed 
and which consequently threaten our very being. Seeming and 
imposition interfere with and ultimately prevent relation. 
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Seeming is the pretense or appearance of being; it is 
the inauthenticity of the human element of relation. Seem­
ing enables one to ignore the responsibility of being brought 
into being by another as he says "thou." To "seem" rather 
than to "be" enables one to avoid the intensity and responsi­
bility of the living relationship. Never participating, 
never becoming fully human, the "I" of the ego self-
consciousness can live in the security and safety of the "It" 
world. Buber writes of this cowardice: 
It is no light thing to be confirmed in one's being by 
others, and seeming deceptively offers itself as a help 
in this. To yield to seeming is man's essential cow­
ardice, to resist it is his essential courage. (Buber, 
1965, p. 78) 
The I-consciousness of ego is intimately tied to seeming 
and the "It" world. The source of injury to relation occurs 
as the I-consciousness of ego sets itself apart from others 
in order to more efficiently use and experience those others 
as objects. As the "I" of the ego self-consciousness emerges 
it fabricates the masks which enable it to see itself as 
"being" or "seeming" a particular way. These masks further 
enhance the capacity of the ego to appropriate from experi­
ence that which is desirable. It knows itself as an appropri­
ating and experiencing subject. The I-consciousness of ego 
is a manifestation of "seeming," it pretends to "be" as it 
actively savors and experiences life, but it is shallow and 
superficial, it never really penetrates into relationship 
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that requires it to be fully present in saying "thou" and 
thus it never recognizes itself in the process of mutually 
becoming present. 
Imposition represents a condition of violence and pro­
vides further ground within which evil may grow. To impose 
requires manipulation, use, and control. Imposition is inter­
ested in knowing or encountering the other only in order to 
control and exploit him. Buber refers to this as propaganda 
and writes: 
This kind of propaganda enters upon different relations 
with force; it supplements it or replaces it, according 
to the need or the prospects, but it is in the last analy­
sis nothing but sublimated violence, which has become 
imperceptible as such. It places men's souls under a 
pressure which allows the illusion of autonomy. Polit­
ical methods at their height mean the abolition of the 
human factor. (Buber, 1965, p. 83) 
The propagandist imposes himself using special methods, 
because he doesn't trust his cause to attain itself. Since 
it is not a mutual or reciprocal relationship, political or 
special methods are necessary in order to assure that the 
subject's interst will prevail. In winning power over the 
other, the other is depersonalized. This, objectification 
of the other, violates the possibility of relation because 
the depersonalization and deactualization remove the poten­
tiality of being confirmed or for confirming. 
The seeming of I-consciousness of ego represents the 
possibility for evil that occurs when will is detached from 
being. It results in a way of existing in the world when 
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the will to say "thou" is replaced by a will to say only "it." 
Imposition and propaganda, on the other hand, represent the 
sources for potential evil that result when power has been 
diverted from our power to remain open, and has been directed 
toward our power to control, manipulate, and utilize. Seem­
ing and imposition result in the penetration of an I-
consciousness of ego that views the world through appropriat­
ing, manipulating eyes. These eyes become dulled to the real 
possibility of being as the It-world deceptively appears to 
offer life—a life of experience. The security of the life 
of experience fosters the feeling of doom in which the I-
consciousness of ego looses its memory of person and forgets 
the fate of return. Evil lurks in such doom and doom becomes 
manifest during times of seeming and imposition in which the 
truth of relation is forgotten. 
Love and decision are the counter forces of seeming, 
imposition, and doom. Thus, love and decision offer the hope 
that subdues the roots of evil. Love and decision are the 
actions of good that connect will and power to being. They 
are the actions of the spiritual dialectic that demand respon­
sible action in the world as will is connected to saying "thou" 
and power is directed at openly going forth toward the other. 
Love and decision are the actions that awaken the I-
consciousness of person, concentrating it to the core, so 
that it speaks "thou" with full recognition of the truth of 
reciprocity. 
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Love and decision are the antidotes to the possibility 
of evil, love being the responsibility of an I for a Thou. 
It is the agape love that goes beyond the acknowledgment of 
the other person as a person and which seeks reunion with 
the other. For Tillich agape love is the absolute moral 
principle and is the basic principle of justice. He writes: 
Its greatness is that it accepts and tolerates the other 
person even if he is unacceptable to us and we can barely 
tolerate him. Its aim is a union that is more than a 
union on the basis of sympathy or friendship, a union 
even in spite of enmity. Loving one's enemies is not 
sentimentality; the enemy remains an enemy. (Tillich, 
1967, p. 108) 
It is the responsibility of my being wholely present and saying 
"Thou," for the other in such a way that "Thou" may be spoken 
by him. In assuming the responsibility for a Thou, the I-
self-consciousness of person establishes the ever-present 
possibility of relationship. 
The capacity for decision can only be made by those who 
have known the love of an I for a Thou. "Only those who know 
relation and who know the presence of the You have the capac­
ity for decision" (Buber, 1970, p. 100). The decision is 
the decision of the free man who, upon stepping up to the 
threshold of eternity, is rekindled with the energizing spark, 
the power, to go forth receptively and openly to relation. 
It is the decision to return. This is the decision which 
can potentially set one into relation and therefore remove 
one from the doom of the It-world. 
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Buber writes, "If there were a devil he would not be 
the one who decided against God but he that in all eternity 
did not decide" (Buber, 1970, p. 101). The devil would be 
the one who, knowing the actuality of relation, never par­
ticipates, never returns, never moves from the It-world. 
He would be the one who having been confirmed never risks 
confirming. One who having known the actualization of rela­
tion remains frozen in form and therefore never says "thou." 
"Yet whoever hates directly is closer to a relation than those 
who are without love and hate" (Buber, 1970, p. 68). Having 
chosen not to decide, it is decided for him, his neutrality 
is a decision to remain distanced and in the realm of It. 
The crushing causality of doom freezes him into the ego self-
consciousnesses of seeming and imposition. He remains neutral 
and objective, no love or hate sets him toward relation. 
He exists, but is not human. In his neutrality, he has 
decided not to be. 
Love and decision present the possibility for will and 
power to become re-attached to being. Love, being the respon­
sibility of an I for a Thou, which enables us to will to say 
"Thou" in the process of potentially bringing each other into 
"being." Decision, being the responsibility to return to 
the world carrying the spark and holding the energy that gives 
us the strength and power to remain open to the possibility 
of encounter. Love has the capacity to awaken the person 
self-consciousness and to diminish the ego self-consciousness 
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of "seeming" by empowering us with the will to say "thou." 
Decision reduces the grip of the ego-consciousness of impo­
sition by replacing the strength of the power to control with 
the energizing power to remain open to the possibility of 
relation and thus jogs the memory of person self-consciousness. 
Empowerment, liberation, the reattachment of power and 
will to being through love and decision, requires a spiritual 
dialectic which enables us to and demands that we address 
the It-world by its real name, "its true nature: the partic-
ularization and alienation" (Buber, 1970, p. 107). We must 
name the It-world as being one of alienation and impersonali-
zation; one in which an ego can exist but a person can never 
become fully human. The educational task is one of a spir­
itual dialectic in which the I-consciousness of person is 
awakened and energized in such a way so that it can penetrate 
the power of doom, imposition, and seeming in order to thaw 
the I-consciousness of person to the power of relation and 
to freeze the inevitable I-consciousness of ego in such a 
way that it retains and remembers its true destiny—that of 
returning to person. 
Section V; 
The Transcendent-Liberatory Educational Vision 
My third hermeneutic journey has been propelled and 
energized by the Buberian insights regarding I-Thou self-
consciousness of person, the two-fold principle of human life: 
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distance and return, and the relation of good to evil. As 
my questions changed from those of political interest to those 
of that which cannot be left to chance, namely love, my sym­
bolic language of the dawn changed from that of critical 
theory to that of the prophetic religious tradition. Rather 
than dealing with experience, the uncertain, and knowledge, 
the platform shifted to grappling with relation, the mystery 
and wisdom. 
The day of my interpretation changed from an interpreta­
tion of help and care situated in justice to a concern that 
encompassed justice within the broader spectrum of love. 
Further, the dusk of my interpretation of my interpretations 
shifted from the scrutinizing lens of "in whose interest?" 
to a deeper interpretation penetrated by "what is required 
of me?" Thus the night of my understandings deepened to 
include love in addition to justice. 
The educational task and challenge expanded from concerns 
for empowered reconstruction, emancipation from oppression 
and social justice td include the more pervasive regard for 
decision and direction aimed at good in the illumination of 
human dignity revealed in acts of love. Thus my third her-
meneutic journey has filled me with the necessity to attempt 
to pull together a third educational vision, one which 
addresses the concerns of how we are to understand one another 
and to relate with one another in light of such understand­
ing. Consequently, I have borrowed from Buber and Heschel 
168 
constructs which touch upon such questions and which I 
feel further expand the educational vision. 
The educational task, as envisioned by the transcendent-
liberatory view, is one in which Buber's and Heschel's 
insights into relation, good, evil, and love are central. 
It is a vision in which evil is addressed in its dynamic rela­
tion to good; and one in which the confrontation of evil in 
relation to good offers the possibility of illuminating the 
liberating action of the "free man." The free man being one 
who is engaged in the process of the "spiritual dialectic" 
in which the essential deed is performed. 
The educational task becomes one of struggling with the 
existence of evil while engaging in the good, which is recog­
nized as being that of decision and direction. The educa­
tional mission becomes one of recognizing and participating 
in the struggle and realizing that it is the only engagement 
worthy of our energy and our passion. For it is in this 
struggle that we must participate, in order that we might 
glimpse the meaning of being human. In understanding this 
meaning, one recognizes that "Man exists . . . not in his 
isolation, but in the completeness of the relation between 
man and man? what humanity is can be properly grasped only 
in vital reciprocity" (Buber, 1965, p. 84). 
This engagement, this struggle, this action is energized 
by love which permeates the educational task of the 
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transcendent-liberatory vision. This is the decisive and 
directed action of good in the face of evil. The educational 
mission of the transcendent-liberatory vision maintains its 
focus by continually holding to the conditions of seeming 
and imposition which perpetuate the "ego" penetration of the 
I self-consciousness. Such conditions further heighten the 
anxiety of doom in the frozen moments of the It-world. The 
transcendent-liberatory vision retains a memory of the condi­
tions of evil in all of its love propelled decision and 
directi on. 
Held within this vision is the recognition that the most 
fundamental question to live by is not "What is being?" but 
rather "What is required of me?" (Heschel, 1965, p. 107). 
Further, in contemplating the significance of this question, 
the transcendent-liberatory vision responds with: it is not 
what is required of me, or ought to be required of me but 
how I respond to the requirement. Buber writes: 
Thus it stands before posterity in order to teach it, 
not what is and not what ought to be, but how one lives 
in the spirit, in the countenance of the You. And that 
means: it stands ready to become a You for them at any 
time, opening up the You-world; no, it does not stand 
ready, it always comes toward them and touches them. 
(Buber, 1970, p. 92) 
Thus the educational mission of the transcendent-
liberatory vision becomes one of dealinq with how one.prepares 
himself to go forth to the world. The how, the process, the 
action, is the direction and decision that can be made and 
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taken only with one's whole, unappropriated being. It is 
the call to live in the spirit, as a free man performing in 
his unique way the essential deed. However, it is more than 
just the technique or process of going forth and speaking 
"thou" that composes this question of how. The how includes 
a deeper trust in existence itself that can only be touched 
by the act of relation. Consequently, "It is not insight 
into process but trust in existence that enables us to enter 
into genuine meeting with the unique reality that accosts 
us in the new moment" (Friedman, 1986, p. 84). The educa­
tional calling of the transcendent-liberatory vision is founded 
on a trust in which the response of love is required. 
The how of the transcendent-liberatory vision is 
answered with, but not satiated or finalized by, the response 
of love. It is not a sentimental response, limited to sympathy 
or friendship, but one that accepts and tolerates the unac­
cepted, the enemy, with the aim of unity in spite of aversion. 
As Buber writes: 
I become aware of him, aware that he is different, 
essentially different from myself, in the definite, 
unique way which is peculiar to him, and I accept whom 
I thus see, so that in full earnestness I can direct 
what I say to him as the person he is. . . . I affirm 
the person I struggle with . . . if I thus give to the 
other who confronts me his legitimate standing as a man 
with whom I am ready to enter into dialogue, then I may 
trust him and suppose him to be also ready to deal with 
me as his partner. (Buber, 1965, pp. 79-80) 
One prepares oneself by opening up to and facing completely 
the one who confronts him. 
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Further, this opening and facing serves no utilitarian 
purpose other than that of relation itself. The encounter, 
the relation, may, in grace, reveal our mutually bringing 
each other to presence, but it is not for that purpose that 
we come into relation. The other is not to be regarded as 
the object which may be consumed in our impatience to come 
into being and meaning. Buber discusses this delicate bal­
ance when he writes, 
The only thing that matters is that for each of the two 
men the other happens as the particular other, that each 
becomes aware of the other and is thus related to him 
in such a way that he does not regard and use him as 
his object, but as his partner in a living event. (Buber, 
1965, p. 74) 
This opening up to the other, in granting him his posi­
tion as partner, while at the same time not observing him 
or utilizing him as the object or means with which to acquire 
being, addresses two major conditions within which human dig­
nity may emerge. "The dignity of human existence is in the 
power of reciprocity" (Heschel, 1965, p. 46). Thus, in grant­
ing the other, his position as partner, through openly facing 
him, in spite of his unacceptableness, the potential for 
reciprocity and thus the illumination of dignity exists. 
Further, "If I use a person as a thing I myself lose my dig­
nity as a person" (Tillich, 1967, p. 94). Therefore, in recog­
nizing that one cannot use the other as a means for achieving 
being, without further distorting the potentiality of such 
becoming, one opens up the possibility of enhancing human 
dignity. 
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In the contemplation of how one prepares to meet the 
world, the transcendent-liberatory vision of the educational 
mission responds with love. This response of agape love 
informs the spiritual dialectic which works to go forth openly 
and to speak "thou." In so doing the spiritual dialectic 
illuminates dignity by addressing issues of reciprocity and 
objectivity. 
The spiritual dialectic is not the dialectic of praxis 
in which subjects and objects are formed and reformed by the 
tension of "doing" and "undergoing." The tension of the dia­
lectic of praxis is one in which subjects become objects and 
objects become subjects in a dramatic and dynamic, interchange 
and inversion. Rather, the spiritual dialectic is shaped by 
the tensions within the "between." The spiritual dialectic 
grapples with that which is "between man and man," not in an 
effort to transform that which is between us, but in a hope 
to participate in it in such a way as to illuminate the mean­
ing of our being which is found only in the "between." The 
spiritual dialectic is propelled by that which exists in the 
"between," that of love, dialogue, and spirit. The tensions 
of the spiritual dialectic are felt in subjectivity as one 
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attempts to and participates in relation. It is the "living 
event" rather than the "living experience" that constitutes 
the dynamic of the spiritual dialectic. Rather than dealing 
with the phenomenological clarification of the tensions 
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between subjects and objects in an attempt to reconstruct 
experience, the spiritual dialectic is propelled by the ten­
sions of subjectivity which are further understood in contem­
plating Buber1s insights regarding "existential guilt" and 
Heschel's understandings concerning "existential indebtedness." 
"Existential guilt" being that which goes beyond feelings 
of guilt that one experiences upon transgressing the taboos 
of our society, rather, "existential guilt occurs when some­
one injures an order of the human world whose foundations he 
knows and recognizes as those of his own existence and of all 
common foundations" (Buber, 1965, p. 127). This guilt arises 
from the knowledge that one has contributed to the rupture 
or injury of relationship. Guilt is the evil of indecision, 
inaction, and lack of direction which turns one away from 
relation and, through seeming and imposition, blocks one's 
going forth to confirm and to be confirmed. The task of pro­
phetic criticism rests in the recognition of "existential 
guilt." It is in a recognition of existential guilt that one 
understands that it (real guilt) "arises out of his being and 
for which he cannot take responsibility without being respon­
sible to his relationship to his own being" (Buber, 1965, 
p. 135). This responsibility to his own being is indeed a 
recognition of reciprocity and that his being and meaning are 
intimately and vitally linked to relation. 
In naming and criticizing the core of "existential 
guilt," namely the distortion of relation, one is energized 
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by the recognition of his existential indebtedness and moved 
to act in love. "Man is never guilty toward himself alone" 
(Friedman, 1986, p. 74). Thus, in healing the injury to 
relation he assumes a two-fold responsibility. Man must face 
his guilt and at the same time recognize his guilt toward 
other beings. He must realize his responsibility and that 
this responsibility is indeed action, and further, he must 
understand that when such action, decision, direction is not 
taken, he denies life not only to himself but to others. He 
must address his existential indebtedness upon the realiza­
tion of his existential guilt, for his own being is nothing 
without relation. 
"Existential indebtedness" being that which recognizes 
the necessity of reciprocity and understands that meaning lies 
only in such reciprocity. Thus, one is indebted to the other, 
the one that faces him and with whom he struggles for the 
very meaning of his life. The cry for meaning is the call for 
relationship and that called for meaning lies in the reciproc­
ity. Imbedded within the existential indebtedness is the 
prophetic energy of hope that, in responding to this indebted­
ness, one will actualize the authenticity which addresses and 
transcends the evils of exclusion, alienation, seeming, and 
imposition. In embracing and acting out of our indebtedness, 
we are energized by the possibility of relation and in such 
relation one is graced with hope. 
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As John Merick (the Elephant Man) screams "I am a human 
being!", one is painfully awakened to the anguish of the 
rupture of relation. When one is excluded from the possibil­
ity of coming into and participating in being and meaning, 
everyone is diminished. We are all "existentially guilty." 
In denying reciprocity human dignity is abolished. In perceiv­
ing the other as an object of amusement, pity, sympathy, or 
horror, human dignity is blighted. The elephant man reminds 
us of our existential guilt and courageously challenges us to 
embrace our existential indebtedness. The task of the tran-
scendent-liberatory educational vision faces such a challenge. 
The educational task of the transcendent-1iberatory vision 
is of a two-fold nature, that of meeting the other and that 
of meeting oneself within this process of teaching. However, 
at both stages the dialectic between "existential guilt" and 
"existential indebtedness" exists. The two-fold nature of 
the educational mission is permeated by the naming of evil 
in the face of good. At both stages the prophetic dialectic 
of criticism and energy are present. Both stages contain the 
memory of Walter Brueggeman's grief work: 
There is work to be done in the present. There is grief 
work to be done in the present that the future may come. 
There is mourning to be done for those who do not know 
of the deathliness of their situation. There is mourn­
ing to be done with those who know pain and suffering and 
lack the power of freedom to bring it to speech. The 
saying is a harsh one, for it sets this grief work as 
the precondition of joy. It announces that those who 
have not cared enough to grieve will not know joy. 
(Brueggeman, 1978, p. 112) 
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Those who do not recognize their "existential guilt" are 
unable to respond authentically to their "existential indebt­
edness" and are consequently not fully human. 
In retaining the memory of Brueggeman's grief work mess­
ages, while holding to the reciprocal and subjective nature 
of human dignity, the challenge of transcendent-liberatory 
educational practice becomes one of meeting and unfolding 
that which confronts us and that which we must encounter. 
Tarrou's response: "That's my job in life—giving people 
chances" (Camus, 1972, p. 142) could appropriately stand as 
the claim and requirement of transcendent-liberatory educa­
tion. In seeing himself as a helper of the actualizing forces, 
the educator becomes a chance giver: 
The educator who unfolds what is there believes in the 
primal power which has scattered itself, and still scat­
ters itself, in all human beings in order that it may 
grow up in each man in the special form of that man. He 
is confident that this growth needs at each moment only 
that help which is given in meeting, and that he is called 
to supply that help. (Buber, 1965, p. 83) 
In believing that "A man cannot really be grasped except 
on the basis of the spirit which belongs to man alone . . . 
the spirit which determines the person" (Buber, 1965, p. 80), 
it becomes the mission of the educator to encounter that other 
person in such a way that he is able to foster reciprocity 
and provide the chance for the other to come into being. 
Thus the transcendent-liberatory vision becomes one of "meet­
ing" rather than "teaching" and of "unfolding" rather than 
"prescribing." 
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This unfolidng process is one of healing aimed at repair­
ing and strengthening relation. Further, the educator who 
participates in such healing, meeting, and unfolding is one 
who "lives in a world of individuals, a certain number of 
whom are always at any one time committed to his care" (Buber, 
1965, p. 83). The educator perceives of each of these indi­
vidual students as being "in a position to become a unique, 
single person, and thus the bearer of a special task of exis­
tence which can be fulfilled through him (the student) and 
through him alone" (Buber, 1965, p. 83). Thus, in the face 
of evil, in the forms of imposition and seeming, the educator 
perceives himself as a helper of the actualizing forces. "He 
knows these forces; they have shaped and they still shape 
him" (Buber, 1965, p. 83). 
The major task of the transcendent-liberatory educator 
is to place himself, as one who has been shaped by the actual­
izing forces, at the disposal of those students within his 
care "for a new struggle and a new work" (Buber, 1965, p. 83). 
Further, the educator may not impose upon his students the 
wisdom and goodness of reciprocity and subjectivity. Buber 
writes of imposition: 
He cannot wish to impose himself, for he believes in the 
effect of the actualizing forces, that is, he believes 
that in every man what is right is established in a 
single and uniquely personal way. No other way may be 
imposed on a man, but another way, that of the educator, 
may and must unfold what is right. (Buber, 1965, 
p. 83) 
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Further, this meeting and unfolding is not a passive and 
humble process that just happens when teachers and students 
meet, but one that requires that the educator think consis­
tently and work exactly. The educator, in recognizing "exis­
tential guilt" and understanding "existential indebtedness," 
must guide his students to the place where they, too, may be 
afforded the opportunity to participate in the spiritual dia­
lectic which embraces both guilt and indebtedness. This 
guiding is not done by one who has an end in sight but by one 
who knows the actualizing forces and with this wisdom is pro­
pelled to act in love. This love manifests itself as influ­
ence but not imposition. 
The desire to influence the other then does not mean the 
effort to change the other, to inject one's own "right-
ness" into him; but it means the effort to let that which 
is recognized as right, as just, as true . . . through 
one's influence take seed and grow in the form suited 
to individuation. (Buber, 1965, p. 69) 
Therefore, the teacher cannot determine how the good or 
the right will unfold or develop. The teacher's mission 
remains one in which he is required to "guide it (the student) 
to where essential help of the self, a help till now neither 
willed nor anticipated, can begin" (Buber, 1965, p. 131). 
Further: 
It is neither given the therapist (teacher) nor allowed 
to him to indicate a way that leads onward from here. 
But from the watch tower to which the patient (student) 
has been conducted he can manage to see a way that is 
right for him and that he can walk, a way that it is not 
granted the doctor (educator) to see. (Buber, 1965, 
p. 131) 
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The educator's serious mission is and can only be that of 
always furthering the healing but it can never be one of 
offering the solution or salvation. Further, this healing 
and unfolding can only take place within the meeting. 
The way in which we prepare to meet or encounter the 
student becomes the message and mission of the transcendent-
liberatory vision. The unfolding process reveals that which 
is right, or the way in which one meets that which confronts 
him and that which he must encounter. The healing process 
is that which places one on the path or into relation in 
a decisive, directed, and active way—a way in which good 
is addressed in its relation to evil. The healing and the 
unfolding processes of the transcendent-liberatory vision 
retain the memory of "existential guilt" and are energized 
by the hope which emerges as one anticipates the possible 
repair of relation upon the recognition of "existential 
indebtedness." The meeting is shaped by the spiritual dia­
lectic which struggles with the tensions of guilt and 
indebtedness. 
In order to meet the other in a healing and unfolding 
way, one must first have been able to meet and encounter 
himself. The teacher is uanble and incapable of placing 
himself at the disposal of his students without first hav­
ing prepared himself. This preparation constitutes the 
second dimension of the transcendent-liberatory educational 
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vision. Buber writes of the doctor but it could well be 
said of the teacher: 
The doctor can only conduct him (the patient) to the 
point from which he (the patient) can glimpse his per­
sonal way or at least its beginning. But in order 
that the doctor shall be able to do this, he must also 
know about the general nature of the way, common to 
all great acts of conscience, and about the connec­
tion that exists between the nature of existential 
guilt and the nature of this way. (Buber, 1965, 
p. 133) 
The teacher must know the actualizing forces and must recog­
nize the dynamic relation of existential guilt to existen­
tial indebtedness. In order to persevere in the good, one 
must attend to himself. "One cannot do evil with his whole 
soul, one can do only good with the whole soul . . . only 
when he has first attained his own self does the good thrive 
through him" (Buber, 1965, p. 136). The preparation of 
the teacher within the transcendent-liberatory vision is 
of a three-fold nature—that of self-illumination, perse­
verance, and reconciliation. 
Self-illumination and perseverance being the self-
educative acts which focus upon the penetration of the 
I-consciousness of person rather than of ego and which 
further deal with the recognition of existential guilt as 
its criticism moves one to respond. The response is that 
of reconciliation. Reconciliation addresses the return 
movement of the teacher, who upon educating and preparing, 
himself, reaches toward and meets the world. Reconciliation 
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is the action taken upon recognition of one's existential 
indebtedness. Thus the three-fold nature of the process of 
teacher preparation rests upon a two-dimensional movement in 
which the distancing movement requires coming to terms with 
"existential guilt" through self-illumination and persever­
ance; and the returning movement deals with an understanding 
of "existential indebtedness" with the response of recon­
ciliation . 
Self-illumination is the illumination of the I-self-
consciousness of ego in which one begins to recognize the 
guilt that he bears as a result of his responsibility for 
the injury to relation. He has perpetuated this injury while 
existing in an It-world with an I-self-consciousness of ego. 
Self-illumination is the heightened awareness of the inten­
tional and unintentional acts of ego which have maintained 
an It-world and have blocked the possibility of relation. 
Self-illumination jogs us into recognizing the dooming powers 
of evil as manifest in the conditions of imposition and seem­
ing. Self-illumination further connects us to our part in 
maintaining these life-denying conditions. Buber writes, 
The "opening door" of self-illumination leads us . . . 
into the interior of the law . . . the law of man . . . 
the law of the identity of the human person as such 
with himself, the one who recognizes guilt with the 
one who bears guilt. (Buber, 1965, p. 147) 
Buber continues by writing, "The hard trial of self-
illumination is followed by the still harder, because never 
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ceasing, trial of persevering in this self-identification" 
(Buber, 1965, p. 147). It is the perseverance of the whole 
person in light of that which is right. Perseverance is the 
process of holding on to this newly received humble recogni­
tion of self, as person, while retaining the memory of the 
imposing and seeming ego which was revealed by self-
illumination. 
Further, "If man were only guilty toward himself . . . 
he would need to take . . . one road from the gate of self-
illumination, that of persevering" (Buber, 1965, p. 147). 
However: 
A man is always guilty toward other beings as well, 
toward the world, toward the being that exists over 
against him. From self-illumination he must, in order 
to do justice to the summons, (that meets him at the 
height of conscience) take not one road but two roads, 
of which the second is that of reconciliation. (Buber, 
1965, p. 147) 
It is not enough to recognize one's guilt and the 
destructive nature of ego self-consciousness. It is not 
enough to persist in a newly gained understanding of person. 
Reconciliation means action, action taken in love to restore, 
repair, and reuinite the relation-that was injured and rup­
tured during ego existence. Reconciliation is the essential 
deed, Buber writes: 
Reconciliation means here, first of all, that I approach 
the man toward whom I am guilty in the light of my self-
illumination acknowledge to his face my existential 
guilt and help him, in so far as possible, to overcome 
the consequences of my guilty action. But such a deed 
can be valid here only as reconciliation if it is done 
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not out of a premeditated resolution, but in the unarbi-
trary working of the existence I have achieved. And 
this can happen, naturally, only out of the core of a 
transformed relationship to the world, a new service 
to the world with the renewed forces of the renewed 
man. (Buber, 1965, pp. 147-148) 
Reconciliation is the going forth openly, saying Thou, and 
encountering that which confronts him. One goes forth with 
his whole being in such a way that with the grace of the 
eternal Thou, meaning and being might be revealed. Thus the 
new service to the world is that of restoring relation by the 
renewed man who has been energized and hope-filled by the 
very relation. Reconciliation is the deed and the source of 
energy which propels the transcendent-1iberatory educator. 
The transcendent-1iberatory educational vision of teacher 
preparation is a three-faceted event which embraces the 
spiritual dialectic tension between the relation of existen­
tial guilt to existential indebtedness. During self-
illumination, existential guilt is felt as one recognizes 
his contribution to the impairment of relation. During this 
self-illumination, ego-self-consciousness is exposed as a 
consciousness that furthers lack of direction and indecision 
which then impede relation. Perseverance follows self-
illumination as one persists in holding to his new self-
identification, that of being a person. However, the teacher 
preparation does not rest with self-illumination and confirma­
tion of self as person but requires the return, in .the form of 
reconciliation, in which the newly transformed person turns 
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to face all of those who have been injured by his former 
lack of direction and indecision. 
The reconciliation stage of teacher preparation prepares 
one to confront the other and more precisely requires and 
demands that one encounter the other. Self-illumination and 
perseverance are the dimensions of teacher preparation in 
which the I-consciousness of person is illuminated and 
embraced so that during the inevitable moments of the It-
world, the I self-consciousness of person re-emerges and the 
ego self-consciousness remembers its true destiny—that of 
returning to person. In the returning to person, reconcil­
iation is the response of the person-teacher who has attended 
to self-illumination and perseverance.. Reconciliation is 
the new service toward the world, a service which is minis­
tered to by the renewed man who has-been revived by the 
renewed, rekindled forces of relation itself. 
The person-teacher is one who has prepared himself in 
such a manner that he recognizes the forces of actualization. 
With such a recognition, he understands his teaching as a 
mission and a calling. The person-teacher decides, takes 
direction, and acts. He heroically goes forth, calmly and 
persistently holding on to his self-identification as person. 
The person-teacher has discovered his essence, and his 
essential deed is his response. Buber writes: 
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Those are great moments of existence when a man dis­
covers his essence or rediscovers it on a higher plane; 
when he decides and decides anew to become what he is 
and, as one who is becoming this, to establish a genuine 
relation to the world; when he heroically maintains his 
discovery and decision against his everyday conscious­
ness and against his unconscious. (Buber, 1965, p. 130) 
Only when the teacher has prepared himself through self-
illumination, perseverance, and reconciliation is he ready 
and capable of deciding and acting. Only upon careful and 
excting preparation can the person-teacher place himself at 
the disposal of the students in an effort "to find and 
further in the soul of the other the disposition toward 
what he has recognized in himself as the right" (Buber, 
1965, p. 82). In order to know what one knows as right, 
one must have prepared himself in this exacting and demanding 
manner so that the teaching and the deed are one. 
What counts is not the extent of spiritual possessions, 
not the thoroughness of knowledge, nor the keenness 
of thought, but to know what one knows, and to believe 
what one believes, so directly that it can be trans­
lated into the life one lives. (Herberg, 1956, p. 321) 
His discovery of the essential deed and the decision to take 
direction are known so completely that the teaching and the 
deed are eternally linked. The deed and teaching are trans­
ferred into the life one lives in such a way that they 
require no special methods of imposition or manipulation in 
order for them to.be actualized. 
The task of the transcendent-liberatory educator is to 
return to the world renewed by and in the service of these 
actualizing forces. The person-teacher, through penetrating 
preparation, is energized by this preparation to courageously 
and heroically go forth to the world. It is his calling and 
passion; it is that which he cannot otherwise do and remain 
human. Buber writes: 
"He who studies with an intent other than to act," say 
the Talmud, "it would have been more fitting for him 
nevei: to have been created" (Pal. Talmud, Shabbat 3b). 
It is bad to have teaching without the deed, . . . the 
simple man who acts is given preference over the scholar 
whose knowledge is not expressed in his deeds. . . . 
"He whose deeds exceed his wisdom, his wisdom shall 
endure; but he whose wisdom exceeds his deeds, his 
wisdom shall not endure." (Herberg, 1956, p. 321) 
The requirement is action, direction, and decision. The 
essential deed commands that action to restore, repair, and 
heal relation be taken. This action requires courage to 
criticize the existence of evil and vision to energize the 
directed and decisive acts of love which reconcile and 
restore. 
The preparation of self-illuminaton, perseverance, and 
reconciliation provides one with "conscience-vision" and 
"conscience-courage" which Buber regards as being the truly 
great but yet unrecognized task of education: 
The vulgar conscience that knows admiringly well how 
to torment and harass, but cannot arrive at the ground 
and abyss of guilt, is incapable, to be sure, of summon­
ing to such responsibility. For this summoning a 
greater conscience is needed, one that has become 
wholly personal, one that does not shy away from the 
glance into the depths and that already in admonishing 
envisages the way that leads across it. But this in 
no way means that this personal conscience is reserved 
for some type of "higher" man. This conscience is 
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possessed by every simple man who gathers himself into 
himself in order to venture the breakthrough out of 
the entanglement in guilt. And it is a great, not 
yet sufficiently recognized, task of education to ele­
vate the conscience from its lower common form to 
conscience-vision and conscience-courage. For it is 
innate to the conscience of man that it can elevate 
itself. (Buber, 1965, p. 135) 
Just as love must be elevated beyond sympathy and sentimen­
tality, guilt and conscience must transcend feelings of 
guilt connected to taboos and move beyond this to a con­
science, that recognizes the ground and abyss of guilt, 
namely rupture to relation and the personal responsibility 
for such injury. Thus, through self-illumination, perse­
verance, and reconciliation, existential guilt and existen­
tial indebtedness are linked to relation. In full maturity, 
freedom, and heightened conscience the human being is pre­
pared to embrace a conscience-vision of love, hope, indebt­
edness and reconciliation, as well as to maintain a conscience-
courage which enables one to look into the abyss, face the 
ego, make decision, and take direction in the face of such 
realization. 
The educational vision of transcendent-liberation faces 
itself toward the exacting tasks of conscience-courage and 
conscience-vision in an effort to arrive at a "heightened" 
conscience. This vision embraces the spiritual dialectic 
which is propelled by the tensions of the "between," spe­
cifically the dynamic relation of good to evil. In the 
recognition of such relation of good and evil, the seeds 
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of understanding existential guilt and existential indebted­
ness are sown. Further, the prophetic task of criticism 
and energizing lies within the recognition of such guilt 
and indebtedness. Thus the educational mission becomes 
one of embracing the spiritual dialectic, while engaging 
with and encountering oneself and the other in an effort 
to unfold the actualizing forces that enable and direct 
one toward the event of relation. The educational calling 
is a prophetic mission requiring conscience-courage and 
conscience-vision which is aimed at a liberating heightened 
conscience. 
This is a vision that confirms and affirms that our 
meaning and being are to be found in the "between" and thus 
in relation. By placing meaning into this realm, it becomes 
possible for all to actualize this meaning. It is a vision 
of inclusion, no one is excluded from the potentiality of 
coming into being and into meaning. Further, this vision 
understands that every single human being has been given 
a special and precious gift which he, and he alone, is cap­
able of illuminating during the event of relation. Thus, 
as Buber powerfully and movingly reminds us: 
That you need God more than anything, you know at all 
times in your heart. But don't you know also that 
God needs you—in the fullness of his eternity, you? 
. . . You need God in order to be, and God needs you— 
for that which is the meaning of your life. . . . The 
world is not divine play, it is divine fate. That 
there are world, man, the human person, you and I, 
has divine meaning. (Buber, 1970, p. 130) 
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The transcendent-liberatory vision responds to the divine 
fate. Its mission is that of reconciliation, one of unfold­
ing the actualizing forces that reveal our precious gift, 
our divine spark. The trancendent-liberatory vision aims 
at care, love, decision, direction, and inclusion in a hope 
that we may nurture and reveal ourselves, each other, and 
our God. The courage and vision of this educational view 
is a courage that is turned toward diminishing, as much 
as possible, the injuries to human dignity, so that our 
vision may enbrace a present and a future in such a way 
that our divine sparks are not extinguished. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In attempting to more completely and deeply understand 
the significance of my experience as a special educator, 
I have placed my experience within the context of three 
visions. These perspectives have evolved from the reflec­
tive critique and examination of my own theoretical frame­
work and have been based upon my interpretation of three 
distinct yet connected hermeneutic journies. The first 
hermeneutic trip is symbolized by the technical rationale 
embodied within the Tylerian constructs of educational cur­
riculum development and planning. The second hermeneutic 
journey, the transformative-emancipatory vision, is repre­
sentative of the orientation set forth by the demystifica-
tion, empowerment and reconstructive momentum of the 
critical theorists. The third journey, the transcendent-
liberatory vision, is reflective of the criticizing and 
energizing thrust of the prophetic and religious traditions. 
These three ways of thinking live within me and are 
dialectically interconnected. The dynamics of these visions 
narrow and expand my world and my consciousness. 
Consciousness, far from being transparent to itself, 
is at the same time what reveals and conceals; it is 
this relation of conceal/reveal which calls for a spe­
cific reading, a hermeneutics. (Reagan & Stewart, 
1978, p. 215) 
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My hermeneutically Interpreted journies have served as lenses 
through which I have examined and reflected upon educational 
and teaching experiences. Each has functioned to bring 
to the surface and to submerge understandings as special 
educational practice and concerns for human dignity have 
been filtered through these visions. 
Further, these three journies have been utilized to 
organize a typological structure which represents three 
distinct educational visions. This connection of my per­
sonal framework to the larger educational structure has 
enabled me to move my insights and understandings regarding 
my personal and professional experience into the broader 
arena of educational concerns and perspectives. Thus my 
private and personal hopes and fears can be expressed in 
a more public and communal way. My professional criticisms 
and personal alienation can be situated within a larger 
structural and social context. My personal and professional 
experience confirms the criticism of critical theory and 
responds to the energy and hope of spiritual and religious 
inroads into education. 
The typological structure serves to categorize existing 
visions and educational perspectives as well as to envision 
possible educational platforms. In order to create new 
platforms, as Decker F. Walker points out, one must include 
"an idea of what is and a vision of what ought to be, and 
J 
192 
these guide the curriculum developer in determining what 
he should do to realize his vision" (Macdonald & Purpel, 
1987, p. 185). Further in constructing new platforms, 
one needs to be sensitive to the revealing and concealing 
nature of the platform and the new vision. As Macdonald 
and Purpel reflect, "We must be concerned with both the 
..limiting and liberating power of the metaphors that shape 
our ideas on what education is to be" (1987, p. 184). 
With this in mind, I interpret the three-fold typolog­
ical structure as representing what education is, in the 
form of the Technical Rationale, and what education ought 
to be, as shaped by the transformative-emancipatory and 
transcendent-liberatory visions. In attempting to analyze 
the constructs of each vision, it is hoped that further scruti-
nization of these major themes can serve to enhance a deeper 
understanding of what each vision reveals and conceals. In 
filtering my special education experience and my concerns 
for human dignity through the visions of the technical-
rationale, transformative-emancipatory, and transcendent-
liberatory orientations, I can, with deeper insight, clarify 
what I consider educational practice as being and what it 
ought to be. With a further regard for what is, and cannot 
be, left to chance, and with a greater understanding of what 
is dismissed and included in each of these visions, I can 
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illuminate the urgency I feel for the necessity to shift 
paradigms from what is to what ought to be. 
Section I': The Technical Rationale 
The work of Ralph Tyler captures the essence of the 
technical rationale, his basic constructs of needs assess­
ment, educational objective development and evaluation 
feed the larger production ethic of the Technical Rationale 
and stand as the dominate platform for educational pratice. 
"The Tyler rationale is essential to understanding today's 
curriculum planning process since it remains the foundational 
and functional paradigm for the profession" (Macdonald 
& Purpel, 1987,p.179). 
As my special educational experiences are filtered 
through the technical rationale, my responses and inter­
pretations are paradoxical and complicated. On the one 
hand, the orientation of Ralph Tyler and the technical 
rationale makes the most sense for the vast majority of 
moderately and profoundly handicapped children. This is 
not only because it is the accepted and currently practiced 
orientation, but is due to its remarkable success in intro­
ducing and acclimating large numbers of previously excluded 
and forgotten individuals to school and society. The 
diagnostic-prescriptive orientation of the technical 
rationale has been enthusiastically embraced by special 
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educators not only because it is the taken-for-granted posi­
tion, but because it has provided a bridge that extends 
itself to a population that has been unreached by public 
education. 
As has been discussed earlier, the Tylerian constructs 
form the core of the Education of All Handicapped Children 
Act: PL 94-142. This particular legislation has done more 
than any other legal act, social reform, or humanitarian 
intent, to include the physically, mentally, socially, and 
emotionally handicapped person within the scope of public 
education. The behavioral objective is at the heart of 
this legislation, and the diagnostic-prescriptive structure 
of PL 94-142 has given many educators and parents the 
courage to reach for and to embrace their handicapped child 
in ways that they may have never done before. The direc­
tion and guidance of the prescription has given many educa­
tors and parents a hope and an energy that they otherwise 
may not have been able to muster. In many cases, the behav­
ioral objective and the prescription have served as the 
actual invitations for the handicapped to participate in 
the educational endeavor. As a result of the behavioral 
objective and the prescription, educators and parents have 
the courage to engage, with their handicapped child, in 
the hope of a more inclusive vision offered by PL 94-142. 
The behavioral objective and the diagnostic prescription 
have become the "chance givers" of the technical rationale. 
195 
The prescription has provided a vision of liberation 
or emancipation that at one level appears to be very sound. 
Through the diagnostic-prescriptive structure of task analy­
sis, severely handicapped children are aided and guided 
through various stages of independence, such as self-feeding 
and dressing, to more advanced skills of managing a simple 
shopping list, being able to ride a bus, and ordering food 
at McDonald's. All of these are certainly not significant 
and casually dismised accomplishments; they are impressive 
achievements that have been aided by behavioral objectives 
and motivated and propelled by the larger legislative act. 
In one sense of the word, they are emancipatory; they have 
enabled a lage number of previously excluded handicapped 
individuals to participate in the life of the greater social 
community. The behavioral objective has served as an invi­
tation to and the bridge by which many isolated and ostra­
cized individuals have come to engage in the larger society. 
On the other hand, the painful paradox presented by 
the success of the Tylerian constructs in special education 
becomes apparent as regard for human dignity is filtered 
through the vision held by the technical rationale. In 
considering reciprocity and subjectivity as being the crucial 
qualities of human dignity, one can turn to a re-examination 
of the constructs of the technical rationale—specifically 
the behavioral objective and the prescription. As one 
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analyzes the behavioral objective and the diagnostic pre­
scription for their capacity to encourage relationship and 
to enhance subjectivity, the empty superficiality of the 
technical rationale's vision of emancipation begins to 
emerge. 
As students, teachers, and the curriculum meet, within 
the confines of this technical rationale, it is for the 
purposes of defining, guiding, and determining behavior. 
The behavioral objective and the prescription that evolve, 
during the needs assessment and development of the educa­
tional objective, constitute the meeting points within which 
interpretation and meaning may evolve.. This meeting is 
of a one-dimensional and one-directional nature. The under­
standings that may emerge during the meeting of students, 
teachers, and the curriculum are organized and determined 
by the prescription and the behavioral objective. Conse­
quently, as texts meet to interpret meaning in the form 
of understanding, the revealed understanding concerns itself 
with the meaning of the behavioral objective and with the 
adherence to the prescription. There is no dialogue con­
cerning the interpretation or the intention of the prescrip­
tion; there is no awe or curiosity regarding the meaning 
of the behavioral objective. There is only a "top down" 
monologue and certainty that are directed and controlled 
by the prescription. The technical curriculum concerns 
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itself with "a series of 'shoulds,' mastery of which will 
purportedly lead students to be 'good' persons, to live 
a 'good' life, and to make a 'good' society" (Macdonald & 
Purpel, 1987, p. 183). 
As students and teachers come into contact within the 
context of the technical rationale, it is for the purpose 
of fulfilling the requirements of the educational objec­
tive, within which each participant carries out his pre­
determined and prescribed role: teachers as transmitters 
of the valued body of knowledge and students as the receiv­
ers of such facts and skills. The prescription controls 
the flow, direction, and content of the conversation between 
students, teachers, and curriculum. The non-dynamic nature 
of the prescription results in a monologue rather than a 
dialogue and thus stunts the possibility for any authentic 
relation, encounter, or genuine understanding. As Macdonald 
and Purpel point out, 
Technical curriculum planning does not respond to this 
human potential . . . there is no moral grounding for 
the Tyler rationale—no affirmation of basic beliefs, 
no reverence for life, no concern for compassion, or 
worrying about justice. (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, 
p. 183) 
The control exerted by the prescription and the behav­
ioral objective in distorting dialogue further abolishes 
the possibility of any genuine meeting. Consequently, the 
technical rationale is void of authentic relationship and 
therefore lacks the capacity for confirming, affirming, 
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or sustaining human dignity. Further, in compliance with 
the behavioral objective, all who participate in fulfilling 
the mandate of the prescription are reduced to objects. 
Teachers, students, parents all carry out their particular 
role—a role and a reaction which has been predetermined 
by t'he prescription. The technical rationale supports a 
system of objects and objectivity rather than subjects and 
subjectivity. 
Consequently, when the technical rationale is viewed 
through the focus of human dignity, the limitations inherent 
in the prescription and the behavioral objective surface 
as being restraints that contribute to the perpetuation 
of a structure that denies relationship and which stifles 
subjectivity. The initially liberating capacities of the 
behavioral objective and the diagnostic prescription are 
seen as the actual mechanisms which support an alienating 
and dignity-denying vision. The real concerns for human 
dignity can not be addressed by the vision of educational 
practice held by the technical rationale. Since there is 
no possibility for authentic relationship within this vision, 
issues of reciprocity and subjectivity are muted and cannot 
be mentioned. Consequently, regard for human dignity is 
disregarded. 
Upon a deeper and more critical examinaton of the 
technical rationale, it appears that relationship and the 
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consequent concern for human dignity that is covered within 
this reciprocity and subjectivity have been concealed. 
This dismissal and disregard for human dignity cheapens 
and invalidates the seemingly emancipatory strides made 
by the success of behavioral objectives. 
That which this vision does not leave to chance is 
the predictable control of human behavior but it is at the 
cost of relationship, subjectivity, and human dignity, which 
this vision does leave to chance. Macdonald and Purpel 
further reflect upon the serious inadequacies of this view 
when they comment, "We believe that the metaphors of control, 
certainty and elitism implicit in the Tyler rationale are 
not appropriate for questioning for our highest human aspi­
rations" (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 187). 
Thus, the omissions of the technical rationale present 
us with the serious and pressing need to know what our edu­
cational practice is in order to move to what it can and 
ought to be. As Macdonald and Purpel remark: 
An enormous amount of critical and imaginative work 
must be done in order to forge powerful and compelling 
alternatives to the existing technical orientation. 
It is not just that this work would be a useful and 
interesting task but that we see such efforts as a 
metaphor for the urgent and critical task of freeing 
ourselves from the narrowness of the existing mechanis­
tic and control-oriented paradigm that shapes so much 
of our culture. (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 192) 
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In regarding human dignity, relationship, and subjec­
tivity as being those things which the educational endeavor 
can not leave to change, I turn to consider the perspectives 
of the transformative-emancipatory and transcendent-
liberatory visions. Centrally positioned within each of 
these visions is the concern for liberation which, as Mac-
donald and Purpel point out, ought to constitute the goal 
of education. 
The most fundamental and highest goal of education 
then becomes human liberation, in both a negative and 
positive sense. Negatively, liberation means being 
free from unnecessary constraints and barriers to human 
dignity and potential such as those that come from 
being poor, frightened, misguided, ignorant and 
unaffirmed—in a word controlled. Human liberation 
in a positive sense refers to the capacity for full 
consciousness, fulfillment, joy, integration—in a 
word freedom. (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, 
p. 187) 
As the goals of education shift from productive trans­
mission, conformity and standardization, to goals of per­
sonal and social liberation, the questions regarding reci­
procity, subjectivity, and human dignity assume a central 
position. Such human dignity contemplations and questions 
constitute that which cannot be left to chance within the 
visions offered by transformative-emancipation and 
transcendent-liberation. 
As the transformative-emancipatory and transcendent-
liberatory visions are filtered through my experience as 
a special educator and further sifted through concerns 
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for human dignity, the limiting and liberating capacity 
of these visions becomes more refined. Such refinement 
enables us to more clearly articulate what is, what can 
be, and what ought to be our greater educational metaphor. 
Section II; The Transformative-Emancipatory Vision 
The transformative-emancipatory vision is one in which 
the message of empowerment is central. The core of this 
empowerment rests in one's capacities to develop critical 
consciousnesses in which oppressive and unjust conditions 
are demystified. This demystification process, when eman­
cipatory, empowers one to engage in socially responsible 
action in the quest to diminish injustice. 
The demystification process of this model is one in 
which the taken-for-granted nature of experience is inves­
tigated through phenomenological distancing and bracket­
ing. This examination lends itself to the formulation of 
questions of interest which evolve during authentic dialogue 
and which may contribute to the revelation of oppressive 
and alienating conditions and relationships which press 
upon our lives in destructive and manipulative ways. 
The themes of the transformative-emancipatory vision 
are reflected in the works of Dewey, Freire, and Giroux 
whose reflective thought process, conscientization, and 
transformative intellectualism concern themselves with 
critical consciousness, empowerment, praxis, and justice. 
„ 202 
The educational practice offered by this vision is one in 
-*1. 
which both teachers and students engage in the process of 
empowerment as critical reflection upon the world and expe­
rience, results in emancipating and transforming social 
and personal action. 
Through its regard for social liberation and justice, 
concerns for human dignity are addressed by the transformative-
emancipatory vision. Concerns for reciprocity and relation­
ship are central to the constructs of critical consciousness 
and empowerment. Such consciousness and empowerment evolve 
as subjects meet to reflect upon experience within a dia-
logical framework. As teachers, students, and the curriculum 
meet, for the purpose of understanding.meaning within a 
transformative-emancipatory vision, the dialogue is mediated 
by a reflection and analysis of experience. There is a 
dynamic quality to this meeting in which, as one reflects 
upon experience, he is in turn shaped by his reflection 
of that experience. There exists a dialectic process within 
the reflection that is captured by Dewey's sense of the 
"doing" and "undergoing" quality of experience. Conse­
quently, there is a dynamic rather than a static interchange 
that takes place as teachers and students meet; dialogue 
rather than monologue pervades the atmosphere of the meeting. 
As teachers, students, and the curriculum meet and 
through inquiry investigate the uncertain, experience is 
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made more certain, and the previously mystifying situations 
are demystified and brought into the realm of the knowable. 
Once demystified, a particular situation may serve as the 
basis for taking empowering action in which one emancipates 
oneself from the oppression of the particular condition. 
This social liberation forms the core of the transformative-
emancipatory vision and serves as the source of the illumi­
nation of human dignity through acts of justice. Dialogue 
directed at demystification and empowerment can only take 
place within relationship as texts meet to reflect upon 
experience. In the quest for justice, the transformative-
emancipatory vision locates human dignity within the rela­
tionship that is required in order to demystify, through 
dialogue, the conditions of oppression. 
Although the regard for reciprocity, which is central 
to the confirmation of human dignity, is solidly positioned 
within the transformative-emancipatory vision, the "subjec­
tivity" requirement of human dignity is not as fully addressed. 
As Paul Tillich reflects, "if one uses a person as a thing 
. . . loss of human dignity results" (Tillich, 1967, p. 94). 
The subject-object tension that exists in the doing and 
undergoing of experience requires that there be a continuous 
shifting of the positions of subjects and objects. Although 
the reflective object of the transformative-emancipatory 
vision remains, for the most part, experience, there is a 
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very real risk that human beings may be included within 
the objectification of any particular experience. A person 
may come to be objectified and used as a thing which results 
in a two-fold loss of dignity, that of the objectifier and 
the objectified. The requirement that one never be used as 
an object is more precariously positioned within the 
transformative-emancipatory vision. 
A more perplexing dilemma, however, than that of the 
delicacy of the balance of subjectivity for the transformative-
emancipatory vision is brought to the surface as the issues 
of special education are filtered through the lens of this 
vision. The requisites of a critical consciousness and an 
active reconstruction of experience which depend upon one's 
ability to appropriate, take from, a demystified context 
those things which can be utilized to reposition one's self 
into a more liberating circumstance, requires a certain 
and a high degree of intellectual ability, without which one 
is incapable of gaining the necessary critical consciousness 
required by the reflective thought process and the conscien-
tization process to become liberated. 
There exists within the transformative-emancipatory 
vision a subtle yet existing hierarchy which can ultimately 
function as a sorting and excluding mechanism. Intellectual 
reasoning skills constitute the source of one's ability to 
engage in the reflective thought and the conscientization 
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processes. Intellectual reasoning, rather than the behav­
ioral objective, becomes the invitation to participate in 
relationship in which meaning is understood. One cannot 
demystify, appropriate, or engage in empowering relationships 
if one is inarticulate as a result of age or emotional, 
social, or intellectual impairment. The transformative-
emancipatory vision when encountered by special education 
leaves exposed, vulnerable, and excluded the young, the old, 
and the handicapped. 
As the transformative-emancipatory vision faces special 
education it becomes apparent that social liberation and 
emancipatory praxis alone will not reach deep enough to 
illuminate the dignity of the many individuals who will be 
left still oppressed when the good works of conscientization 
are completed. The young and the handicapped remain in the 
precarious care of the emancipated. They may be excluded 
or objectified by transformative-emancipation which may or 
may not view them affectionately. That which cannot be but 
is left to chance in this vision is the very real possibil­
ity that the dignity of these persons may be left unaffirmed. 
A praxis informed by the regard for social liberation and 
social justice does not reach far enough to touch the vul­
nerable population of the handicapped, the young, and the 
old who, lacking the intellectual and emotional capacities 
necessary to participate in the empowering relationship and 
the emancipating dialogue, remain excluded and voiceless. 
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Consequently, as the transformative-emancipatory vision 
is focused by issues regarding human dignity and special 
education, it emerges as certainly a vision whose concerns 
are located in the right place, i.e., human dignity, but 
whose stipulations for participation result in an incom­
plete picture of liberation. Relationship is at the core of 
this vision, but the intellectual requirements forming the 
guidelines for critical reflection upon experience consti­
tute the barriers by which many are prevented from fulfill­
ing its goal of liberation. The limitations of the 
transformative-emancipatory paradigm are brought into focus 
by its exclusion of the handicapped. By bringing to the 
surface issues and concerns of special education, the 
transformative-emancipatory vision appears as only a partial, 
although vital, reflection of liberation. 
Section III; The Transcendent-Liberatory Vision 
The third metaphor, the transcendent-liberatory vision, 
is probably the most elusive of the three visions and is 
further plagued by the concerns which Purpel and Macdonald 
express regarding their turn to a paradigm situated within 
religious language. "Our fear has been that our language 
might seem sentimental, fuzzy and pious, thereby repelling 
many of our readers" (Macdonald & Purpel, 1987, p. 186). 
The transcendent-liberatory vision is one in which the 
essence of relationship and subjectivity, which have 
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been more familiarly discussed by spiritual and reli­
gious writers, attempt to gain their voice and position 
within the educational realm. In referring to the work of 
Heschel and Buber, a vision of education has been set forth 
in which issues of subjectivity and reciprocity form the 
core of its practice. 
With an understanding of the dialectical movement between 
Buber's I-It and I-Thou and with insight into sources and 
roots of good and evil, this vision embraces as its metaphor 
the "spiritual dialectic," in which the tensions of subjec­
tivity oscillate. The goal of this vision also rests in 
freedom and liberation in which the "free" man is liberated 
to perform the "essential deed," that of going forth to 
the world speaking Thou. This is the act of reconciliation 
which can be undertaken as one illuminates his "existential 
guilt," recognizing his responsibility for impairment to 
relationship, and as one embraces his "existential indebted­
ness," understanding his dependence upon the other for his 
very existence. 
The teaching deed of this vision occurs in the meeting 
as the teacher makes possible the unfolding of the precious 
essence of each student. This unfolding takes place within 
the event of relation as the teacher also reveals the forces 
which have constituted and actualized him/her (the teacher). 
The preparation of the teacher rests upon the self-educative 
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tasks of self-illumination, the bringing to surface acts 
which have prevented relaton, and perseverance, the maintain­
ing the true and wise course upon the realizations made 
possible through self-i1lumination. Finally the act of 
reconciliation, or return, completes the three-fold nature 
of teacher preparation. The teacher, upon the recognition 
of guilt and indebtedness, turns to encounter that which 
he must encounter, his fellow man, in such a way as to do 
no further damage to relationship and that means to perform 
the essential deed of Thou-saying. The act of Thou-saying 
is the manifestation of love. 
Love, liberation, and freedom become the goals of the 
transcendent-liberatory vision and constitute those essen­
tials that can not be left to chance. As issues of human 
dignity and special education are filtered through the lens 
of this vision, goals of liberation are more completely 
addressed. 
As students, teachers, and curriculum meet in this 
vision, it is for the purpose of understanding understanding, 
itself. Consequently, the meaning that is illuminated is 
meaning about understanding, an understanding that embraces 
the a priori of relation. In placing understanding about 
understanding as the reason, goal, and purpose for the meet­
ing, rather than in placing reflection upon experience as 
the focus of the meeting, the transcendent-liberatory vision 
209 
eliminates the subtle and blatant hierarchical ordering 
that occurs among meetings for the purpose of critical 
reflection upon experience. 
The old, the young, and the handicapped are all equally 
capable of engaging in relationship; each possesses full 
capacity for meeting. Once the requirement of critical 
reflection upon experience is removed, the barrier to rela­
tion is also removed. Within the transcendent-1iberatory 
vision, the meeting is for the purpose of enhancing reci­
procity, illuminating subjectivity, and engaging in the 
dialogue (the Thou-saying) which enables us to be made fully 
and mutually present. The purpose of relation serves to 
address the reciprocal and subjective dimensions of human 
dignity. Thus, when filtered through the concerns for human 
dignity, it appears that these concerns constitute the heart 
of the transcendent-liberatory perspective. 
With the heart of the transcendent-liberatory vision 
being located within relation which openly embraces reci­
procity and subjectivity, the requirement of an invitation 
and a need for a bridge by which to participate are elim­
inated. The issues of inclusion which dominate the concerns 
of special education vanish. There is no need for technical 
rationale's behavioral objective or transformative-
emancipation's requirement of critical reflection. The 
transcendent-liberatory vision exposes the dignity-denying 
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nature of the behavioral objective and the exclusionary 
function of critical consciousness„ It leaves us with a 
paradigm that has centrally positioned the regard for human 
dignity within a context of love, and it is from this posi­
tion that we can begin to construct a vision of what educa­
tion ought to be as its practice is directed toward the 
goal of liberation. 
The dialectic between justice and love can be symbol­
ically represented by the movement between the transformative-
emancipatory and the transcendent-liberatory visions. 
Although examination of the transformative-emancipatory 
vision through the focus of special education has revealed 
critical consciousness as being elitist, the good works 
of conscientization cannot and should not be dismissed. 
Niebuhr's reflection in Moral Man and Immoral Society, 
regarding those who have so little power that they have 
forgotten the essence of being, constantly reminds me that 
social liberation, emancipation, and justice must be held 
in balance with personal liberation, transcendence, and 
love. It is the dynamic movement to which Buber refers 
between the I-It and the I-Thou. His further insight 
regarding the realization that "without it a human being 
cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not human" 
(Buber, 1970, p. 85) resonates with my understanding 
of the vibration between the transformative-emancipatory 
and transcendent-liberatory visions. 
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Section IV: Beyond the Typology 
Although the three-fold typological structure of this 
paper has enabled me to organize and clarify my experience 
as well as to illuminate my despairs and hopes, I realize 
that in order to avoid the temptation of reducing the 
typology to a technique, it too must be transcended. As 
Milner paraphrases Immanuel Kant in stating "experience 
without typologies is blind, typologies without experience 
is empty" (Milner, 1976, p. 38), it becomes apparent that 
the value of the typology is in its heuristic contribution 
and not in its ability to stand as a method or a solution 
to a problem. 
The technical-rationale, the transformative-emancipatory 
and transcendent-liberatory visions have functioned to form 
a typological structure which has enabled me to make sense 
out of my personal and professional experience and which 
has further stimulated critical examination of that expe­
rience. However, insights gained and understandings illum­
inated only intensify the dilemma of dealing with such issues 
as human dignity within the context of special education. 
These reflections are not enough to address the complexity 
of the human condition; in fact, the surfacing of these 
understandings only points to the gap or the void that appears 
as one attempts to grapple with these concerns, especially 
within an educational setting. 
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More specifically, each vision offers a hope and an 
action which attempts to address freedom and alleviate the 
suffering of humankind. However, the solutions differ radi­
cally ranging from prediction and control to critical 
consciousness and performance of the essential deed. The 
hopes for humanity and the visions of freedom that consti­
tute these paradigms are equally divergent. 
The typological structure has contributed to the clari­
fication and criticism of the visions, but vision itself 
does not seem to reflect the deepest issue. It becomes 
apparent, as I analyze the insights gained from the typolog­
ical framework, that there is not a lack of vision or even 
an absence of understanding regarding the value of living 
in a good and just world, but there is disagreement as to 
what constitutes that goodness and justice. More pervas­
ively, there exists a difference in the direction in which 
one's vision is turned or aimed in order to illuminate that 
goodness and justice. It seems to be a matter of direction 
as well as vision. 
In attempting to transcend the confines of this vision-
oriented typological structure, I turn to the Allegory of 
the Cave, in which Plato points out that it is not a lack 
of vision but rather the issue of misdirection that must 
be addressed. As Plato aptly states: 
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"But our reasoning indicates," I said, "that this 
power (understanding) is already in the soul of each, 
and is the instrument by which each learns; thus if 
the eye could not see without being turned with the 
whole body from the dark towards the light, so this 
instrument must be turned round with the whole soul 
away from the world of becoming until it is able to 
endure the sight of being and the most brilliant light 
of being: and this we say is the good, dont' we?" 
"Then this instrument," said I, "must have its own 
art for.circumturning or conversion, to show how the 
turn can be most easily and successfully made; not 
an art of putting sight into an eye, which we say has 
it already, but since the instrument has not been turned 
aright and does not look where it ought to look—that's 
what must be managed." (Rouse, 1956, p. 317) 
It is the turning of the soul toward the good rather 
than the construction of a vision which surfaces as pre­
senting the deeper tension. Plato understands that the 
power of vision or understanding resides within us all; 
however, the challenge emerges as one further realizes that 
direction of the vision points one's understanding toward 
goodness or evil. Plato comments that 
The virtue of understanding everything really belongs 
to something certainly more divine, (than the virtues 
which are put in place by habits and practice) as it 
seems, for it never loses its power, but becomes useful 
and helpful or again useless and harmful, by the direc­
tion in which it is turned. (Rouse, 1956, p. 317) 
Consequently, the educational task becomes one of 
addressing the good, wise, and just and of taking action 
in which one turns the soul toward this authentic being. 
One can not be allowed to direct his or her vision toward 
the shadows or even the hand-made images. The responsibility 
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of the educator is to turn one toward that which is real, 
the brilliance of the sunlight. This of course is not done 
without risk, pain, and confusion, but it remains as being 
the action which can' and must be taken if we intend to or 
hope to deal sensitively and authentically with issues of 
human dignity. 
Plato offers us an image of turning the eyes toward 
the real light of being or or directing our efforts at 
understanding toward genuine being rather than toward shadows 
and images. The educational task becomes one of directing 
understanding toward authenticity rather than one of filling 
the eyes with vision. I suggest that this aspect of the 
Allegory of the Cave be interpreted as representing the 
dialectic between love and justice. Specifically, I con­
sider that the action of turning the soul be regarded as 
the responsibility of an I for a Thou or the enactment of 
love. The turning of the soul is performed in light of 
the responsibility one has for another and this turning 
is an action of'love. Further, the turning of the soul 
is not to be done aimlessly but must be directed at the 
good which I regard as being the justice set forth in the 
beatitudes. The educational task becomes one of lovingly 
turning the soul toward justice. The mission becomes one 
of wisely addressing that justice and of initiating that 
love. It is not a matter of convincing another of what 
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that goodness and justice are, but of directing another's 
vision and/or understanding toward this goodness and justice. 
It is not a matter of imposing justice upon another but 
of guiding, influencing, and directing another's under­
standing toward that goodness and justice so that it may 
be revealed in the unique way made possible by that very 
individual. 
The gaps that are illuminated by the structure of the 
typology are those that emerge in contemplating Plato's 
understanding that it is not vision but rather direction 
which rests at the heart of the educational endeavor. Thus 
the responsibility becomes one of not only lovingly turning 
the soul, but of openly and critically articulating the 
good, the just, and the beautiful. It becomes a matter 
of wisely knowing the direction in which one is turning 
and of further being grounded in a wisdom of the goodness 
and authenticity of the direction. It is a responsibility 
that requires us to be as wide awake as possible, to be 
suspicious that our vision and understanding may have been 
aimed at the shadows, and to be clear about the goodness 
and the justice. 
The educational mission requires that we address the 
good and the direction. However, as Purpel and Macdonald 
have indicated, if that vision of the good and the direc­
tion by love are couched within religious language, one 
runs the risk of being dismissed or accused of being senti­
mental. In spite of this, I feel that this risk needs to 
be faced, for otherwise the educational response to issues 
of human dignity seems empty, superficial, and aimless. 
In addition, this turning toward the religious metaphors 
is not done for the purpose of seeking fundamental resolve 
of the questions of goodness and justice, but with the desire 
of recognizing the awe and mystery that humbles us as we 
attempt to contemplate the complexity of these questions. 
The process of writing this paper has been a humbling 
and at times overwhelming project. The intensity of the 
issues, the gravity of the concerns, and the paradoxical 
tensions present in the emergent understanding of responsi­
bility have all contributed to the difficulty of addressing 
the dilemma of human dignity within a special educational 
context. I am further humbled by the prospect of finding 
my own voice and articulating a statement of the good. 
In addition to the humbling recognition of the neces­
sity of addressing the good comes the understanding that 
I must also relinquish my quest for solution and certainty 
which have contributed to the construction of the original 
typology. In going beyond the framework, I turn to the 
realization that it is the struggle, not the solution, that 
constitutes the educational endeavor as one is faced toward 
love, justice, dignity, and goodness. In transcending the 
solution orientation of visions, I arrive at a level of 
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the recognition of and affirmation of direction. The 
reflections and insights gained during the effort of con­
structing solution-oriented visions points to the necessity 
and urgency of addressing the tensions that prompted the 
quest for a solution in the first place. Although the solu­
tion evades grasp, the direction of the quest emerges as 
the struggle over the issues evolves. As one attempts to 
keep oneself directed toward the illumination of the good 
and the just, the genuine and authentic debate regarding 
human dignity can take place. 
As I find myself turning toward the religious tradi­
tions for my understandings of the good, I am cautioned 
by the criticisms of Dewey, Giroux, and others who have 
exposed the mystifying and oppressive nature of traditions 
grounded in religious dogma, authority, and institutions. 
But as I attempt to deal with human dignity, inclusion, 
and the disenfranchised, I find myself compelled to turn 
to concepts of love, justice, and goodness as they are 
illuminated in the religious context, not for the authority 
they present but for the richness of possibility they offer. 
I am especially touched by the understanding of agape 
love in which it seems that love and justice merge requir­
ing the difficult and paradoxical task of naming the enemy 
and embracing him. The handicapped population in a sense 
crystallizes this paradox for education. We cannot just 
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name and identify but we must embrace. In the embracing, 
the handicapped must not be allowed only to gaze upon the 
shadows, because that is what they are most capable of doing, 
but in love they must be turned toward the good, the just, 
and the beautiful. Their human dignity and ours will not 
be affirmed until this is included within the spectrum of 
educational concerns. 
As Plato reminds us, we all contain the capacity to 
understand, and through the act of love our souls may be 
turned in such a way that our understanding illuminates, 
in our own unique way, the goodness toward which we have 
been turned. From the religious traditions I have gained 
a sense of the good and an inkling of the direction. However, 
I remain cautioned by the tradition of suspicion that reminds 
me that I may have been turned toward the shadows. I seem 
to embrace the paradox that Sharon Welch addresses as she 
speaks of infinite hope, undying suspicion, and faith: 
The value of Christian faith may be that it gives us 
the ability to live with that tension. If the life 
of faith is one of absolute commitment and inifinite 
suspicion, the ground of commitment is neither 
rationalistic nor authoritarian. It is possible 
to avoid both the intellectual certainty of rational 
explanation and the mysterious certainty of an author­
itative revelation and faith. (Welch, 1985, p. 91) 
This paper has enabled me to establish an order which 
has contributed to my clarification and criticism of 
experience and has allowed me to more thoroughly analyze 
conditions of human dignity. As I have worked through 
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the typology I have been further humbled by the immensity 
of such an undertaking and have been pushed to loosen my 
hold upon the structures that first empowered me to turn 
my vision toward such an endeavor. I am left paradox­
ically in a more vulnerable and precarious position but am 
filled with a hope that enables me to endure the uncertainty 
and the confusion. In this confusion, I embrace the chal­
lenge and aspire to touch the source of courage that would 
enable me to act with the sense of responsibility that 
Ross L. Mooney refers to as he writes: 
Here we seek 
to meet the night 
in ways 
that bring the dawn. (Mooney, 1976, p. 104) 
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